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ABSTRACT
It is argued that if theories of rationality are to avoid logical difficulties (i.e., self 
referential inconsistencies or logical paradoxes), then these theories require a 
minimal dogmatism, that is, some basic presuppositions that are unjustifiable without 
intuitions, vicious circularity, or infinite regress. Thus, it is argued that if rationality 
is characterized as the search for justifications then a comprehensive rationality is in 
the end an impossible and self -contradictory task; while if rationality is 
characterized by the criticizability of any position, then a rationality that intends to 
be comprehensive leads to self-referential logical paradox.
It is also argued that there are logical limits to the justifiability of the most basic 
scientific methodological rules and aims, that is, it is argued that to justify our 
various scientific methods and aims we are required to assume without a bona fide 
justification (i.e., dogmatically) some basic cognitive methods and goals.
These conclusions are illustrated by exploring the theories of rationality of the 
Popperian tradition and the theories of scientific method of various naturalised 
scientific meta-methodologies, in particular, by critically examining the alleged 
justification of our scientific methods provided by ‘evolutionary epistemology’ and 
Laudan’s normative naturalism.
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PREFACE
In this thesis, I explore the logical limits of argument and its consequences for 
rationality in general and for scientific rationality in particular. The rational attitude 
is at its most basic a high valuation of argument as a justificatory or critical tool, and 
this high valuation of argument is something that cannot be rationally defended or 
criticized without assuming it. Hence, a belief in the rational value of argument has a 
dogmatic character, if  by dogma we understand a presupposition without a non- 
viciously circular justification.
On the other hand, all argument has some premisses, so that an argumentative 
justification can lead us into an infinite regress, a regress that can only be stopped 
circularly or dogmatically. And if probative circular arguments are to be avoided, 
because of their being viciously circular, then we are left with dogmatism as the only 
option left to stop the regress. This last claim is the main conclusion of this thesis, 
that is, the contention that we have to accept dogmatically some basic 
presuppositions of rationality, in general, and of scientific methodology in particular. 
The theory of rationality proposed by Popper in his ‘Open Society’ and the 
alternative proposal of W. W. Bartley are used to illustrate this unavoidable 
dogmatism in Chapter I. On the other hand, Chapter II is a general introduction to the 
naturalised tradition in epistemology and to some of the difficulties inherent in this 
approach. While the specific naturalised meta-methodologies proposed by 
‘Evolutionary Epistemology’ and by Laudan’s ‘Normative Naturalism’ are discussed 
in Chapters III to V.
Most (if not all) of any value in this thesis I owe to Professor John Worrall, my 
sincerest thanks to him for his patient and careful advice. I must also thank the 
Mexican tax-paying citizen who made possible my studies at LSE via several grants 
during the years 1992-97.
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CHAPTER ONE
IS SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY LOGICALLY LIMITED?
Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is 
burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason 
itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is 
also not able to answer.
(Kant)
The Humean predicament is the human predicament.
(Quine)
Two related problems will be introduced and clarified in this chapter through a 
historical examination of some influential formulations and answers. This chapter’s 
special attention is given to the formulation and the answers of the Popperian 
tradition to the two problems at hand. The questions to be examined are fundamental 
sceptical ones: the radical doubts about the logical possibility of rationally defending 
rationality itself; of reason being its own guarantor, in particular, I will delve into 
doubts about the logical possibility of rationally defending our most basic procedures 
of knowledge acquisition. These queries ask for a rational defence (or criticism) of 
our ultimate methodological presuppositions. What is being challenged is the 
possibility of rationality as a self-comprehensive activity, an activity without regress, 
dogmatism, vicious circularities, paradoxes or inconsistencies.
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I THE PROBLEMS
P I: Is rationality rational?
Can rationality be self-justifying or 'comprehensive'?
If not, is rationality defensible rationally, i.e. without regress, vicious circularities, 
logical paradoxes, or fideistic commitments?
In particular, P2: Is scientific rationality rational?
Can scientists be rational about, or defend rationally, their ultimate cognitive aims 
and rules of method? In other words, can the basic concerns of scientific rationality 
themselves be given a rational defence?
If not, from what standpoint, other than that of mere prejudice or a viciously circular 
one, can we assess the ultimate cognitive aims and rules1 of science? Suppose, for 
example, that some scientific community espouses some methodological rules; the 
question then arises of what underwrites these rules. A sceptical answer to this 
question was given by Sextus Empiricus , who argued that if  we would have a basis 
for saying how things actually are, we would require rules or criteria to select 
amongst conflicting appearances, criteria that would provide us with knowledge of 
reality. The sceptic would then probe these rules in their turn, and show (as Sextus 
does in the five tropes of ‘Agrippa’) how an infinite regress is started once we ask for 
warrants of these rules (my P2) so that there is no fixed point,
...from which to begin to establish anything, and suspension of judgment 
follows.
(Sextus Empiricus.)
The ‘dogmatist’ then either blocks the infinite regress with something,
1 The ultimate cognitive presuppositions of science are those cognitive principles and aims 
underpinning whatever framework of rationality one may propose for scientific rationality, 
principles such as modus ponens and some inductive mle, or scientific aims such as 
empirical predictability.
2 Quoted and discussed in Hookway, pp. 9-11.
7
...assume[d] simply and without proof in virtue of a concession.
(Sextus Empiricus)
That is, the dogmatist stops the regress by assuming something on faith rather than 
on evidence. A third alternative is to stop the regress by arguing circularly, a move 
by which the justification of the methodological rule rests upon the same rule, or 
when the justification of the methodological rule depends on propositions whose 
warrant in turn depends upon the rule at issue.
The problem of justifying our methodological criteria is especially important in 
periods of intellectual crisis, in periods of epistemic change, when there is no 
unchallenged criterion of knowledge. The fundamental question then arises of how to 
justify the basis of one’s knowledge; this problem of deciding on a criterion became 
important, for example, during the Reformation and its sequel (the period 1500- 
1675), because the need arose of how to recognize religious truth (if any). Protestants 
proposed an alternative criterion of religious truth (“what individual conscience is 
compelled to believe on reading Scripture is true” ) to the orthodox Catholic one (the 
Church’s traditional authority as the judge of correctness of Bible interpretation and 
any other religious propositions) and then one had to choose between these two 
competing criteria. One had to identify the correct criterion, that is, one had to decide 
how to justify the basis of one’s knowledge.
The search for a solution to conflicts between criteria leads to the trilemma already 
discussed by Sextus:
... in order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion, we 
must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the 
dispute; and in order to possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about the 
criterion must first be decided. And when the argument thus reduces itself to 
a form of circular reasoning the discovery of the criterion becomes 
impracticable, since we do not allow them [the Dogmatic philosophers] to 
adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterion by 
a criterion we force them to a regress ad infinitum.
(Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, II, Chap. IV.)
OF RATIONAL METHODS AND SCIENTIFIC AIMS
Most philosophers before the 1960’s (such as Hempel, Carnap, E. Nagel, Popper) 
considered science as the archetype of a rational enterprise. Hence, for these thinkers 
a theory of science would also have been a theory of rationality, and since scientists 
do not seem to act capriciously when evaluating scientific theories, science has been 
thought of as having a method (or methods), and the rationality of science has been 
thought to reside in its method.
In what follows, I will address the question of how to justify as correct our scientific 
methods and aims (problem P2) and I will end concluding that our ultimate scientific 
methods have to be accepted as correct dogmatically. That is, it will be concluded 
that our most basic scientific methods have to be accepted as correct without 
justification or only with a viciously circular justification.
Now, whatever the method of science is, one would expect that it will include some 
collection of inferential processes, such as induction and deduction, plus some 
‘source’ or non-inferential processes, such as memory, perception and intuition. Let’s 
focus on the justification of our inferential processes.
Induction and deduction have been the prototypes of rational inferential strategies, 
and the argumentative dead ends reviewed by Sextus: infinite regress, dogmatism, 
and circularity, have been examined repeatedly when searching for warrants for 
induction and deduction. Thus, Hume argued against induction in a form reminiscent 
of Sextus' Agrippan modes, he claimed that no rational justification can be provided 
for induction:
3 Cfi, H. Popkin, p. 3
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... all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the 
future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of 
this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding 
existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, 
which is the very point in question.
(Hume, 1748, pp. 35-6.)
Thus, Hume answered P2 (for induction) in the negative, since to try to prove 
induction empirically is to end up with a circle, and to escape the circle one would 
have to support one portion of Reason, induction, by another portion of Reason, say 
deduction. But this cannot be done, at least prima facie, since deduction and 
induction are different forms of inference, thus in the case of valid deductive 
arguments, if the premisses are true then the conclusion will of necessity be true, 
while in the case of inductive inferences from true premisses a conclusion with any 
true value can follow. Thus, Russell’s inductive turkey (which after being fed every 
day for many months and inductively inferring that this phenomenon was a natural 
regularity finally found, to his chagrin, that he was going to be cooked) dramatically 
exemplifies this last situation. Therefore, the deductive support desired for induction 
is unavailable, since deduction cannot warrant a form of inference that is not 
deductive4. Hume offered instead a non-rational explanation for our inductive or 
causal reasoning:
Our judgements concerning cause and effect are derived from habit and 
experience; and when we have been accustomed to see one object united 
with another, our imagination passes from the first to the second, by a
4 Inductive inferences are not deductions except if we put as a premiss of the inductive 
argument a principle of induction. This deductive-inductive argument could go as follows:
Many A’s are found to have property B, in a wide variety of situations and without 
exception.
Principle of induction: If many A’s are found to have property B, without exception 
and in a wide variety of situations, then probably all A’s have property B.
Then probably all A’s have property B.
The problem of finding a justification now re-arises, however, because the sceptic will 
demand the warrant of the principle of induction, and this principle again cannot be 
warranted by deduction, because the conditional characterizing the principle of induction 
may well have a true antecedent and a false consequent.
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natural transition, which precedes reflection, and which cannot be prevented 
by it.
(Hume, 1739, p.147.)
Hume claims that inductive or causal reasoning is the result of our mental 
functioning, and he claims that its source is our disposition to reason inductively or 
causally, and that this disposition of ours is guided by habit and imagination, that it is 
a ‘natural transition’ that is involuntary. Now, this putative urge of ours does not 
legitimise induction, it does not justify it. In other words, a propensity for inductive 
inferences may be a fixed brute fact of the human condition, but this human fact does 
not legitimise our inductive inferences. It does not provide us with reasons for 
thinking that inductive inferences lead to truths (at least, in the sense of the 
correspondence theory of truth.) In short, even if it could be proved that we have an 
inductive disposition, this fact by itself would fail to show that our hypothetical 
inferential disposition is correct. A Humean would say, that while reasoning 
inductively,
... we accept what we find ourselves accepting, and rational evaluation does 
not influence acceptance.
(Hookway, p. 94)
If so, we would find ourselves being lead by our imagination and habit into 
sustaining beliefs that cannot be warranted. We would find ourselves constrained by 
processes that seem to undermine our intellectual freedom; we would be 
psychologically inclined not to doubt our inductive beliefs even though we cannot 
logically warrant them. If so, we cannot disqualify as irrational the man who does not 
make inductions (who for example makes counter-inductions) since this strange man 
could always retort that he just has a different habit, and then there wouldn’t be any 
difference between insanity and sanity as Russell would say5.
D. Papineau has argued in favour of the reliability of induction6 as follows:
5 B. Russell, 1945, p. 673.
6 Cf., Papineau 1992, pp. 13-14.
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i. People objectively make inductions: they do not just think they make them.
ii. When people have made inductions, “their conclusions have indeed turned 
out true”.
Papineau then concludes from these two premisses:
iii. “In general, inductive inferences yield truths."
These three statements are, however, problematic:
a) Popper, for instance, has denied the very common first assumption, but for 
the sake of argument, I will grant this supposition.
b) The second assumption, on the other hand, is clearly false, there are 
numerous examples of inductions that lead to wrong conclusions (as is the 
case of the inference made by Russell's turkey). Moreover, it is not a simple 
matter to distinguish 'good' inductions from 'wrong' ones except ex post facto. 
Papineau tries to deal with this objection by narrowing the characterization of 
induction; he recognizes that "simple enumerative induction cannot possibly 
be a reliable7 method of inference." But then, exactly which inductive 
strategy is reliable? Papineau vaguely speculates that reliable inductions 
would be those constrained by considerations about projectable predicates, 
such that,
... the conclusions of such inferences will need to be beliefs of less than 
full degree, and perhaps also restricted to claims that certain judgments 
are approximately, rather than precisely, true.
(Papineau, 1992, p. 19)
c) Whereas, the third assumption, it is plainly circular. Papineau infers (from his 
belief that many past inductions have yielded truths and by using an inductive 
rule of inference) that in general inductive inferences yield truths. Hence, 
Papineau uses (and assumes as reliable8) at the meta level the very inductive
7 An inferential strategy is reliable if its deliverances are in general true when its premisses 
are tme.
8 Notice that Papineau is using induction as an inferential rule in an argument that he takes to 
be correct, therefore he is at least implicitly assuming that induction is a reliable inferential 
strategy, precisely what he wants to establish via his argument.
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inferential rule that he is trying to justify, he uses induction to conclude that 
induction is a reliable inferential strategy.
Papineau deals with this criticism of circularity by distinguishing 'rule circularity' 
from 'premiss-circularity,' and by claiming that:
1. Rule circularity is acceptable, and that only premiss-circularity is 
vicious.
2. That the circularity found in his previous inductive argument for 
induction is ‘only’ rule circular and therefore not viciously circular. 
Thus,
An argument is premiss-circular if its conclusion is contained among its 
premisses; an argument is rule-circular if it reaches the conclusion that a 
certain rule of inference is reliable by using that same rule of inference...
(Papineau, 1992, p. 15.)
Notice that Papineau’s characterization of vicious circularity cannot be right, at least 
prima facie, since it could imply that all deductively valid arguments are viciously 
circular. Papineau is aware of this difficulty but he thinks it can be disposed of by 
properly constructing the concept of ‘containment’, something Papineau leaves 
undone. Leaving this aside, Papineau points that the warranting of any methods of
Q
investigation has to start somewhere, and that
... it can scarcely be a general requirement, on all legitimate forms of 
inference, that it be possible to show that they are reliable in some non- 
rule-circular way. For this would disqualify even deduction as a 
legitimate form of inference.
(Ibidem, p. 16) (Emphasis added.)
A sceptic would retort: 'and so what?’ Our sceptic’s leitmotif is precisely that our 
most basic scientific methods cannot have a non-circular warrant. He would argue 
that our most basic methods -including deduction- have the logical character of
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dogmas, that these methods are not justifiable as reliable without circularity, and that 
therefore they may not be rational10. For the sceptic, these methodological dogmas 
provide our methodological starting point they are our methodological foundations. 
Papineau would answer that there is no reason to distrust the reliability of induction 
and consequently there is no reason to ask for its non-circular justification, while the 
sceptic will retort that the lack of non-circular justification for our methodological 
foundations provides by itself one reason for doubting the reliability of these 
foundations. Papineau, for example, says of his circular inductive argument for 
induction":
We should not expect it to perform the impossible task of knocking 
imaginary non-inductivists out of their non-inductivism - its task is only to 
allow normal people, like ourselves, to resolve the issue of whether 
induction is reliable.
(Ibidem, 1992, p. 18.)(Emphasis added.)
Hence, for Papineau, the sceptic is not one of the ‘normal people’; the sceptic is not 
normal because he doesn’t share Papineau’s standards. For the sceptic, induction’s 
lack of a non-circular justification means that induction’s reliability is being taken 
for granted, since we are already assuming that induction is in general a correct rule 
of inference, when circularly using induction to conclude that induction is in general 
a correct rule of inference. This circularity is not, however, for Papineau reason 
enough to distrust induction’s reliability, so there is a clash of standards about what 
is sufficient to warrant a doubt about induction’s reliability.
Still, what is acceptable about rule circularity, that isn’t okay about premiss 
circularity? Papineau says that his previous inductive argument for the reliability of 
induction is satisfactory because “it is a genuinely expansive argument, whose
9 Cf., Papineau (1992), p. 15.
10 Whether these methodological foundations are rational or not will depend on our theory of 
rationality, a belief in these foundations would be irrational, for example, if a belief or 
statement is rational iff it is justified without circularity. Various theories of rationality will 
be analysed in the second part of this chapter.
11 Max Black already argued for a circular inductive defence of induction in the Journal of 
Philosophy, vol. 55 (1958), pp. 718-25.
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12conclusion... manifestly outruns its premisses...” and therefore it is clearly not 
premiss-circular, this evaluation of rule circularity looks however suspiciously self- 
serving. Yet, it could be argued that premiss-circularity is vicious because if  an 
argument intends to be probative then the premisses should be less problematic, more 
secure, than the conclusion. While rule circularity is not vicious, because it does not 
intend to be probative, it only wants to show that there is some sort of coherence 
amongst our system of beliefs and cognitive processes. But the sceptic does not want 
just this; he wants some sort of demonstration -even if not a conclusive one- that our 
most basic methodological processes are reliable. This demonstration is precisely 
what is lacking; Papineau can show induction to be reliable only if he assumes 
induction as reliable, that is, only by self-vindication.
Rule circularity seems to be a mask for the uncomfortable fact that some basic and 
crucial inferential processes have to be taken for granted as reliable. Rule circularity 
is a euphemism for the unsavoury fact that while some basic inferential processes 
seem to be reliable in the light of our intellectual system - an intellectual system that 
includes and requires these very processes - these processes may in fact be 
unreliable. It is an uncomfortable fact because it implies that the world could be quite 
different from our theoretical picture of it. It means that we may end rejecting some 
truths and accepting some falsehoods, even if we were to achieve maximal epistemic 
coherence, that is, a state where all our processes would seem reliable in the light of 
our reliably generated beliefs. It means that even in the case of maximal epistemic 
coherence our reliable processes may only seem to us to be reliable, but in fact may 
not be reliable. And this means that our success at survival may in part be the result, 
so far, of a fortunate accident.
Papineau asks us to accept rule circularity, because otherwise, if rational, we might 
have to give up induction and even deduction, and end in "philosophical catatonia" 
(ibidem, p. 15). Not really, we would just have to resign ourselves to the fact that 
there is no escape from the circle or web of belief, even if this web is quite 
comprehensive. Or, to what is logically equivalent, we would have to resign 
ourselves to the logical fact, that some methodological dogmas - a minimal 
methodological dogmatism - has to be admitted because it is inescapable.
12 Cf., Papineau, 1992, p. 15.
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Now, Papineau (ibidem, p. 17-8) recognizes that one could use rule circularity even 
to justify counter-induction as reliable, as a result, many possible methods of 
inference could be self-supporting, although not all. For example,
While soothsayers may use dreams as a method of prediction, they do not 
normally dream that dreaming is a reliable method of prediction.
(Goldman, p. 45)(Emphasis added.)
Hence, dreaming as a method of prediction is not the kind of method that can 
‘normally’ vindicate itself. But what does Goldman mean by ‘normally dream’? If he 
means a recurring dream, this is too strong a requirement, since, for a soothsayer to 
circularly justify dreams as methods of prediction, it could be enough that at least 
once a soothsayer dreams that dreaming is a reliable method of prediction. And if 
Goldman means by ‘normally dream’, to dream correctly, then Goldman would be 
invoking evaluative standards to judge some dreams, and to judge some rule- 
circularities, and these evaluative standards would have to be spelled out and 
justified.
Rule circularity works only for the faithful: with those who make inductions, and 
who don't doubt inductive inferences but who still enjoy the credo being ratified. 
Circular rule justification is merely reaffirmation, inside the web of belief. In other 
words,
... the status of the circular argument is only that of persuasion. It cannot be 
made logically or even probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to 
step into the circle.
(Th. Kuhn, p. 94.)
Papineau as a true believer says of induction:
... neither the fact that this practice may be invalid, nor the fact that its 
reliability might only be discoverable in a rule-circular way, will be a barrier 
to our concluding that it yields knowledge.
(Papineau, 1992, p. 20.)
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Papineau ends with circularity or dogmatism, thus Papineau cannot cope with our 
sceptic’s request for non-circular justifications. And this negative result, this lack of 
non-circular ultimate justification, may open the gates to a possible relativism of 
various incompatible -and unjustified- ultimate methods. This negative result creates 
the logical possibility of a relativism of more than one self-vindicating coherent 
intellectual system, i.e., of more than one fully self-vindicating web of beliefs cum 
inferential processes. One such intellectual system could be the set of beliefs 
generated by an oracle who would declare himself as an infallible source of beliefs. 
Papineau excludes such oracle systems by saying that they are not properly self- 
vindicating. Papineau recommends that satisfactory intellectual systems should 
properly individuate belief-forming processes, to have as powerful a set of belief- 
forming processes as possible (cfi, 1987, p. 204). The problem now arises of how to 
justify these evaluative judgments, and of whether these recommendations are not ad 
hoc or self-serving. Extra examples of possible alternative coherent webs of belief 
could be that of the ‘scientific’ creationist, or that of the counter-inductivist, hence 
belief coherence is not enough.
13Papineau, however, believes that in a world like ours only one intellectual system 
will be fully self-vindicating or coherent, and that such an intellectual system will be 
the correct one.14 Papineau introduces a general meta-principle (a meta-principle that 
recalls Occam’s razor) and says: “a complex theory won’t be true if a simple theory 
fits the same evidence.”15 Papineau then argues - with the help of this meta-principle 
- that in worlds like ours, different intellectual systems couldn’t all be fully self- 
vindicating, because only the system incorporating the simplest theories, that fit the 
evidence, would be correct. Therefore, Papineau may conclude that a relativism of 
alternative coherent systems is not a danger.
13 A world like ours is a world that differs from the actual world only in some historical 
specifics, for example, a world where the Aztecs would not have been conquered in the 
XVIth century. Papineau’s intuition is that a world like ours is a world with causal 
mechanisms analogous to those of the actual world, a world in which we can “discount 
outlandish causal possibilities.” Papineau, 1987, p. 222.
14Cf., Papineau, 1987, p. 219.
15 Cf., ibidem, p. 225.
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The sceptic won’t agree, he will point out that there are many accounts of what to 
understand by simplicity, that simplicity is a notoriously difficult notion, that it is a 
problematic criterion of choice among scientific theories. In addition, since it is a 
matter of debate what to understand by simplicity, the meta-principle could be used 
to select whatever theory is prejudged as convenient, the meta-principle can easily be 
used to warrant our prejudices16. Besides, Papineau’s meta-principle seems to be 
saying that nature is simple, but what reason is there to suppose that this 
metaphysical assumption is true? What reason is there to suppose that simplicity is a 
sign of truth? In other words, why should we accept a simpler theory instead of its 
more complex rivals? Or is Papineau’s vague meta-principle also going to be taken 
for granted?
Papineau also argues (for his belief that there is only one correct and fully 
vindicating system of beliefs) by saying, that to claim that a coherent or fully self- 
vindicating intellectual system could be erroneous in a world like ours, is tantamount
16 Papineau concedes that simplicity is a rather obscure concept, but Papineau believes that a 
proper notion of simplicity can be obtained by a detailed study of the history of science. 
Papineau says, “ I don’t want to appeal to some a priori notion of simplicity ... The 
appropriate notion needs to be filled out by detailed reflection on the progress of science.” 
(Papineau, 1987, p 198.)
The question now arises of how are we to know the progress we are analysing is that of bona 
fide scientific progress and not, for example, that of creation science. It seems we will use a 
tacit notion of simplicity to select simple answers to our scientific questions, and then from a 
historical study of our ‘simple’ scientific answers or simple scientific theories we will try to 
infer what to understand by simplicity. Hence, we will end by merely getting what we started 
with, thus,
Suppose that we have arrived at a number of answers to high-level theoretical 
questions in chemistry, physics, astronomy, etc. Think of the pattern of such high- 
level answers as the experimental data. Then it may be that the only reasonably 
simple account which is consistent with that pattern is that high-level answers are 
in general simple. So we arrive at the conclusion, that high-level answers are 
generally simple, by an inference whose reliability is explained by that 
conclusion itself. (To see that this trick isn’t as empty as it might seem, consider 
people who generally opted for complex answers rather than simple ones. Then 
their general run of theoretical answers would be complex. But such people 
wouldn’t be able to bootstrap themselves to the assumption that the right answer is 
generally complex, for that wouldn’t be a complex account of their pattern of 
discoveries, but a simple one.)
(Papineau, 1987, pp. 197-8.) (Emphasis added.)
Using which standards, and why, does Papineau affirm that the account of the complexity 
seekers wouldn’t be a complex one, “but a simple one”?
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to supposing that our world has contrived a malicious conspiracy against its 
inhabitants. Not necessarily. There are other options. For example, if  we were to 
have an erroneous fully self-vindicating intellectual system instead of concluding 
that one lives in a conspiratory or malicious world, one could conclude that the world 
is so subtle that it appears as conspiratory. We may then go on to wonder whether we 
have tried hard enough to avoid error, or whether our faculties are up to the challenge 
of explaining and predicting such a world. Alternatively, we could question our 
epistemology and its characterization of a ‘fully self vindicating’ intellectual system.
The difference between our sceptic and Papineau may be in the end only a difference 
of temperaments, a distinction between cognitive pessimism and optimism. Papineau 
optimistically assumes that the world is understandable and explainable because so 
far it seems to have been understandable and explainable, and he thinks his rule- 
circular argument gives us reason to trust induction as reliable; while our sceptic is 
more cautious and doubts, because there are no grounds acceptable to him to trust 
induction. Still our sceptic does not deny induction, in fact, he may use induction, but 
since there is no non-circular justification of induction, he cautiously keeps on 
doubting it and accepts induction only passively, that is, without actually believing in 
it. This attitude is not new, Sextus already suggested it in his tropes of ‘Agrippa’.
Now, if belief in induction cannot be justified without circularity, then we find 
ourselves with scientific and common sense conclusions that, if  arrived by induction, 
cannot ultimately be warranted as true. If so, we go through the world hoping for the 
best, since at any moment our hopes could turn out to be radically misconceived.
And although we cannot justify our hope in correct prediction, neither can we say 
that our predictive attempts are hopeless, then we might as well keep trying, and 
recognise that,
Hume was right in asserting that the conclusion of the inductive inference 
cannot be proved to be true; and we may add that it cannot even be proved 
to be probable. But Hume was wrong in stating that the inductive procedure 
is unjustifiable. It can be justified as an instrument... o f positing...
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Now it is clear that, though the inductive rule does not supply knowledge of 
a future event, it supplies a sufficient reason for action: we are justified in 
dealing with the anticipative posit as true, not because we can expect 
success in the individual case, but because If we can ever act successfully 
we can do so by following the directive of induction.
The justification of induction constructed may, therefore, be called a 
pragmatic justification: it demonstrates the usefulness of the inductive 
procedure for the purpose of acting. Actions can be made in the sense of 
trials, and it is sufficient to have a method that will lead to successful 
trials if success is attainable at all...
We adjust our actions to the case of a predictable world -if the world is 
not predictable, very well, then we have acted in vain.
(Reichenbach, 1949, pp. 475-81, 82.) (Emphasis added.)
Reichenbach is saying that i f  nature is uniform, that i f  nature is predictable, i f  there 
is any strategy that will let us make reliable predictions, then the persistent use o f  
induction will let us make reliable predictions. The problem of induction now re- 
emerges, however, as the search for a warrant to this conditional; Reichenbach 
illustrates his argument through the following parable,
A blind man who has lost his way in the mountains feels a trail with his 
stick. He does not know where the path will lead him, or whether it may 
take him so close to the edge of a precipice that he will be plunged into the 
abyss. Yet he follows the path, groping his way step by step, for if there is 
any possibility of getting out of the wilderness, it is by feeling his way 
along the path. And we know: if we can find a way through the future it 
is by feeling our way along this path.
(Reichenbach, 1949, p. 482.)(Emphasis added.)
Still, how does the blind man know these conditionals (cfi, the emphasised phrases in 
the quote above)? To illustrate the difficulties that arise when we want to justify such 
conditionals, consider a simplified case of induction, a case of enumerative 
induction, and suppose that out of a large number of observed instances of some
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property A, all or a large fraction of A ’s (say, P/Q) have been observed accompanied 
with some other logically independent property B. And suppose that the usual 
conditions on legitimate inductions are satisfied, such as that the observed correlation 
between the A’s and the B’s holds over a wide variety of situations and without any 
known exception. Then, for Reichenbach induction is a method to arrive at 
conjectures about the true value, to the value in the world, of the quotient (say, to 
p/q), and these inductive conjectures can go on being corrected as new information 
comes in. The true quotient (p/q) would be the limit of the sequence of observed 
fractions P/Q as the number of observed fractions goes to infinity. The problem is 
that we don’t know the chance of finding such a limit, nor even if there is such a 
limit17.
Reichenbach holds that if there is a limit, then the persistent use of induction by 
enumeration will in the end eventually approximate this limit to any desired degree 
of accuracy. Notice, however, that even if there is a limit we don’t know how many 
attempts it will take to approach this limit to any desired degree of accuracy, so we 
will never know if our present inductive prediction is correct. Otherwise, we will 
never know if we have already found the sought after limit.
Moreover, this difficulty with a specific inductive rule becomes worse once we 
realize that there are indefinitely many other rules (called asymptotic rules) or 
alternative frequency sequences which agree with induction in the long run but 
which may differ widely with induction in the short term. These sequences differ 
from each other by a parameter that tends to zero as the frequency sequences go to 
infinity.
How can then we select the inductive rule (allegedly the best rule) from amongst this 
infinitude of different frequency sequences or rules? Without a criterion to choose 
from amongst these multitude of sequences our predictions in the short run (mainly 
the only predictions of practical and scientific import) would differ widely, and we 
wouldn’t know which predictions to make, we wouldn’t know which of our present 
predictions are correct, and our predictions would be de facto arbitrary. On the other 
hand, any criterion that may be devised to select amongst these various sequences
17 It might be argued that in a world like ours where we have found a past order, or a past 
stable ratio P/Q, it is highly unlikely that the ratio of A’s and B’s has no limit. Otherwise,
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would in turn require justification and the problem of the justification of induction 
would re-emerge under another guise.
In other words, there is an infinitude of rules that may lead in the end to the same -  
and yet unknown- true quotient p/q, and to select amongst these rules we require 
some criterion, for example a criterion of simplicity, or some other alternative 
criterion. Then the problem re-arises, that is, that of justifying without circularity or 
regress the proposed criterion of simplicity, or any other alternative criterion.18 
Furthermore, even if we were granted our criterion, or even if we somehow could 
justify it, we would still need to prove that the criterion of choice would deal 
successfully with paradoxes such as those of Goodman’s projectable predicates, 
because of these difficulties, the pragmatic justification of induction is not 
conclusive.19 Therefore, it seems that at least for the time being, there is no 
alternative to a dogmatic assertion that we know the inductive principle or some 
equivalent.
ON THE JUSTIFICATION OF DEDUCTION
On the other hand, one could imagine a Humean criticising deductive proofs by 
noting that their justification leads to an infinite regress, because whenever we 
assume as correct a deductive step in a proof, we will, if rational, ask for its 
justification as correct, and then for a reason for thinking that this last justification is 
a good one, and so on.
Again, this Humean would then adduce custom and imagination as explanations of 
why we do not take seriously this infinite regress, yet as before, the justification of 
our most basic deductive presuppositions is not a psychological problem, it is rather 
a logical problem.
A deductive justificatory infinite regress was illustrated by L. Carroll (cfi, p.431) in 
his well known 'What the Tortoise said to Achilles' where he deals with a Tortoise's 
unending demands for justification of the deductive rule of modus ponens. Carroll
that given the evidence it is highly unlikely that our world is a chaotic world where there is 
no limit. This argument, however, is itself inductive.
18 Salmon has proposed such an alternative criterion, a criterion o f‘linguistic invariance’.
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shows that if  asked for the justification of a deductive inference we end in an infinite 
regress, since every logical step requires further justification. Let’s listen to a 
fragment of the dialogue between Achilles and the Tortoise while they discuss a 
“little bit” of the argument (“just two steps, and the conclusion drawn from them”) of 
Euclid’s First Proposition. The Tortoise starts the dialogue:
Kindly enter them in your note-book. And, in order to refer to them 
conveniently, let’s call them A, B, and Z:
“(A) Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other.
“(B) The two sides of this Triangle are things that are equal to the same.
“(Z) The two sides of this Triangle are equal to each other.
“Readers of Euclid will grant, I suppose, that Z follows logically from A 
and B, so that any one who accepts A and B as true, must accept Z as true?” 
“Undoubtedly!” (...)
“And if  some reader has not yet accepted A and B as true, he might still 
accept the Sequence as a valid one, I suppose?”
“No doubt such a reader might exist. He might say ‘I accept as true the 
Hypothetical Proposition that, i f  A and B be true, Z must be true; but I don’t 
accept A and B as true.’(...) ”
“And might there not also be some reader who would say ‘I accept A and B 
as true, but I don’t accept the Hypothetical’?”
“Certainly there might” (...)
“And neither of these readers,” the Tortoise continued, “is as yet under any 
logical necessity to accept Z as true?”
“Quite so,” Achilles assented.
“Well, now, I want you to consider me as a reader of the second kind, and to 
force me, logically, to accept Z as true.”
(...) “- an anomaly, of course,” the Tortoise hastily interrupted. (...)
“I ‘m to force you to accept Z, am I?” Achilles said musingly. “And your 
present position is that you accept A and B, but you don’t accept the 
Hypothetical
“Let’s call it C,” said the Tortoise.
19 Cfi, Salmon, ref.
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but you don’t accept.”
“(C) If A and B are true, Z must be true.”
“That is my present position,” said the Tortoise.
“Then I must ask you to accept C.”
“I’ll do so, said the Tortoise, “as soon as you’ve entered it in that note-book 
of yours. (...) “Now write as I dictate:
“(A) Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other.
“(B) The two sides of this Triangle are things that are equal to the same. 
“(C) If A and B are true, Z must be true.
“(Z) The two sides of this Triangle are equal to each other.”
(...) “If you accept A and B and C, you must accept Z.” [Achilles said.] 
“And why must I?”
“Because it follows logically from them. If A and B and C are true, Z must 
be true. You don’t dispute that, I imagine?”
“If A and B and C are true, Z must be true,” the Tortoise thoughtfully 
repeated. “That’s another Hypothetical, isn’t it? And, if I failed to see its 
truth, I might accept A and B and C, and still not accept Z, mightn’t I?” 
“You might,” (...) “So I might ask you to grant one more Hypothetical!” 
“Very good. (...) We will call it 
“(D) If A and B and C are true, Z must be true.
(...) “Now that you accept A and B and C and D, o f course you accept Z.” 
“Do I?” said the Tortoise innocently. “Let’s make that quite clear. I accept 
A and B and C and D. Suppose I still refused to accept Z?”
[... And the Tortoise proceeded to dictate a new Hypothetical]
“(E) If A and B and C and D are true, Z must be true.
“Until I’ve granted that, of course I needn’t grant Z. So it’s quite a 
necessary step, you see?”
“I see,” said Achilles; and there was a touch of sadness in his tone.
At the end, as Lewis Carroll pointed out, we invoke precisely what we are asked to 
justify: modusponens. And we end up like Sextus’s dogmatist by circularly 
reaffirming, by merely repeating, the statement to be warranted. Worrall explains 
Carroll’s dialogue as follows,
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... that someone accepts that p and accepts that p then q but refuses to 
accept q. One might try to convince him as follows:' modus ponens in 
general is truth-transmitting -if p is true then if p then q is true then q must 
be true; here p and p then q are both true so you must infer q '. But clearly 
this is hardly likely to convince: if someone really refuses to infer q from p 
and if p then q, then it will not be surprising if he further refuses to infer that 
he must infer q from the fact that if an argument is of a valid form and he 
accepts the premisses then he must infer the conclusion and the fact that 
modus ponens is a valid form whose premisses he accepts in this instance. 
This latter inference clearly itself (doubly) involves modus ponens.
(Worrall, 1989, pp. 382-3.)
Carroll’s tortoise doesn’t believe in the modus ponens conditional (if you believe p 
and if  you believe ‘p then q’ then you should believe q), a conditional that we expect 
any rational being to believe, hence, we will end by declaring Carroll’s tortoise as 
irrational. The Tortoise, however, could defend itself from the accusation of 
irrationality by arguing that if we don’t justify modus ponens without vicious 
circularity she is not obliged to rationally believe it. To justify the adoption of modus 
ponens in the object language, however, would require of the same rule, or some 
other just as problematic inferential rule, at the meta-level, and then the petitions of 
justification would go on. In other words, to prove that modus ponens is a rule that 
preserves truth in the object language requires some deductive argument in the meta­
language, and this in turn would require that the meta-language has modus ponens or 
some other deductive rules, inferential rules which would in turn require justification. 
Therefore, we cannot prove without circularity or regress that modus ponens 
preserves truth hence we cannot justify deduction. Or else,
The basic point is that justifications of deduction themselves presuppose 
deduction. They are circular because they appeal to the very principles of 
inference that are in question...
Circularity emerges whenever an attempt is made to ground our most 
general notions of validity.
(Barnes and Bloor, pp. 41-3)
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9 0Thus, deduction is circularly self-justifying, and it is to be held dogmatically .
20 Still D. Papineau (Papineau, 1987, chapter EX) and M. Dummett (cfi, Dummett, chapter 
XVII) have offered a vindication of deduction by explaining the meaning of the logical 
constants, that is, by explaining how these constants work in making new sentences out of 
old.
Dummett recognizes that his semantic vindication of deduction employs deductive forms of 
inference, and that it is thus circular. He believes, however, that circularity is acceptable in 
explanations thus,
Our problem is not to persuade anyone, not even ourselves, to employ deductive 
arguments: it is to find a satisfactory explanation of the role of such arguments in 
our use of language.
... Characteristically, in an explanation, the conclusion of the argument is given 
in advance; and it may well be that our only reason for believing the premisses 
of the explanatory argument is that they provide the most plausible 
explanation for the truth of the conclusion. Hence the charge of circularity or of 
begging the question is not applicable to an explanatory argument in the way that it 
is to a suasive argument. A philosopher who asks for a justification of the process 
of deductive reasoning is not seeking to be persuaded of its justifiability, but to be 
given an explanation of it.
... Such an argument will, of course be deductive in character, but that will not rob 
it of its explanatory power: we already engage in deductive reasoning, and 
therefore will be ready to admit that the conclusion of a deductive argument which 
strikes us as valid follows from its premisses; hence, in a suitable case, we shall 
also be ready to admit that the premisses of such an argument provide an 
explanation for the truth of the conclusion, even when the conclusion is to the 
effect that deductive reasoning is justified.
(Dummett, p. 296.)(Emphasis added.)
Dummett has, however, substituted justification with explanation, that is, he has redefined 
justification as explanation.
Papineau in the same spirit offers a biological explanation of the origin of the meaning of the 
logical constants. This biological explanation (not justification) of deduction via the 
biological origin of the semantics of the logical constants, however, also appears as circular. 
It is said that the deductive semantics now present in our minds was allegedly biologically 
selected in the past, and it was selected because this semantics had in the past advantageous 
behavioural effects, behaviour which led to the thriving of our ancestors and to the 
preservation of this semantics. In other words, our deductive habits were selected because 
they led in the distant past to advantageous action. However, how do we know this? Answer: 
we know it via our science, a science that was confirmed and validated by deduction and 
some other belief forming processes (processes such as induction, memory and perception.) 
Papineau’s vindication of deduction then presumes in the end deductive moves, so what 
Papineau is offering is also a circular explanation of deduction. Still, Papineau’s effort may 
not be worthless, since it offers a casual explanation -though not a non-circular justification- 
of the origin of our deductive strategies. Thus, Papineau says,
... the vindications I have given for certain inferential moves will scarcely persuade 
anybody who doesn’t already make deductive inferences to start making them, 
since the vindications themselves proceed via deductive moves,...
(Papineau, 1987, p. 168.)
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A possible rejoinder to the previous criticisms of induction and deduction because of 
their lack of non-circular justification could be,
... (induction) could be irrational only if there were a standard of rationality 
which it failed to meet; whereas in fact it goes to set the standard: arguments 
are judged to be rational or irrational by reference to i t ... When it is 
understood that there logically could be no court of superior jurisdiction, it 
hardly seems troubling that inductive reasoning should be left, as it were, to 
act as judge in its own cause.
Since there can be no proof that what we take to be good evidence really is 
so, (then) it is not sensible to demand one.
(Ayer, pp. 75-81.)
Ayer is saying that it is impossible to judge induction as irrational because induction 
sets the standards of rationality, but that is the crux of the matter. If not, how do we 
know this? In other words, how do we know that induction sets correct standards of 
rationality? Since Ayer does not provide an argument to support his contention, he is 
just taking for granted, as a matter of faith, the correctness, the rationality of 
induction. He assumes without argument that induction is rationally legitimate and 
that there is no higher legitimate “court”; if we grant him this, then of course there 
are no other rational standards that might invalidate induction (or deduction for that 
matter) as irrational. This is just a form of fideism or dogmatism since without 
argument (other than self justification) it is held that induction is rationally correct.
The difficulty with Ayer’s move, as argued by Salmon, is that there are many other 
possible superior courts, besides the courts of induction or deduction, with the same 
jurisdiction. If we leave each form of reasoning ‘to act as judge in its own cause’ 
then there will be many conflicting judgements. For example, consider the following 
argument that gives support to the fallacy of affirming the consequent:
a) If affirming the consequent is a valid form of reasoning, then 2 + 2 = 4.
b) 2 + 2 = 4.
Therefore,
Affirming the consequent is a valid form of reasoning.
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This argument has true premisses, it has the form of affirming the consequent, and it 
asserts the validity of this fallacious form of reasoning. One can analogously 
construct a counter-inductive argument in favour of counter-induction:
On a large number of occasions in the past people have counter-induced and 
have been led to false conclusions. Therefore, we conclude counter- 
inductively that whenever someone counter-induces his conclusion is true.
21This argument supports counter-induction as a method for arriving at truths.
If we knew that induction and deduction were the correct standards of rationality, 
then there would not exist other rational standards which also would be correct but 
which would disqualify the former as irrational. The problem is that we can show 
induction and deduction to be ‘correct’ only with viciously circular arguments, and 
they can share this form of circular defence with many other alternative forms of 
reasoning. Hence, we end with a relativism of various logically possible 
incompatible and dogmatic forms of reasoning, and to avoid this relativism we 
accept as legitimate only some circular defences or ‘courts.’ Nevertheless, why 
should only some forms of reasoning be given the privilege to viciously circular 
judge themselves? It seems that we allow this prerogative only to those of our 
inferential methods that accord with our intuitive prejudices of methodological 
correctness, and in this way, we reiterate our methodological instincts.
It would seem, from the discussion this far, that induction and deduction are in the 
same boat: neither can be justified. Yet, deduction has traditionally been considered 
as more basic, as less problematical and as indispensable whereas, induction has 
been seen (by some such as Popper) as an unnecessary methodological myth. Thus, 
while how hypotheses gain inductive support or confirmation is a subject of ongoing 
debate, that of valid deductive inference is a less controversial issue. Still, one might 
ask, is the exalted status given to deduction a mere prejudice?
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OF THE AIMS OF SCIENCE
We discover analogous difficulties if we look for a rational justification for the value 
of some aims of science, in other words, has a scientist qua scientist correct aims, 
even if these epistemic goals were only implicit? And if so, how does one justify the 
desirability of these scientific goals? On the matter of the selection of goals or aims 
for science, Reichenbach, asked:
What is the purpose of scientific inquiry? This is, logically speaking, a 
question not of truth-character but of volitional decision... If anyone tells 
us that he studies science for his pleasure and to fill his hours of leisure, we 
cannot raise the objection that this reasoning is "a false statement” - it is no 
statement at all but a decision, and everybody has the right to do what he 
wants.... in books and discourses the word 'science' is always connected 
with 'discovering truth', sometimes also with 'foreseeing the future'. But, 
logically speaking, this is a matter of volitional decision.”
(Reichenbach, 1938, p. 10; emphasis added.)
If Reichenbach is correct we cannot show via a logical argument that one 
proposal for the aim of science is better than any other, or else, Reichenbach 
seems to be saying that there is no such a thing as the correct ‘aim of science’.
Popper analogously said about the aims of science:
My criterion of demarcation will accordingly have to be regarded as a 
proposal for an agreement or convention. As to the suitability of any such 
convention opinions may differ; and a reasonable discussion of these 
questions is only possible between parties having some purpose in common. 
The choice of that purpose must, of course, be ultimately a matter of 
decision going beyond rational argument...
Thus I freely admit that in arriving at my proposals I have been guided, in 
the last analysis, by value judgments and predilections.
(Popper, 1959, pp. 37-8; emphasis added.)
21 Cf., Salmon, 1964, The Concept o f Inductive Evidence.
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But why should we follow Popper's value judgments and predilections? Popper 
answers,
It is only from the consequences of my definition of empirical science, and 
from the methodological decisions which depend upon the definition, that 
the scientist will be able to see how far it conforms to his intuitive idea of 
the goal of his endeavours.
(Popper, 1959, p. 55.)
The intuitions of scientists will in the end decide which goal is a legitimate scientific 
goal, then how does one justify these intuitions? Popper seems to assume that most 
scientists share the same intuitions, but if  not, how could a conflict of intuitions be 
rationally resolved? The basic problem here is how to rationally assess goals, 
predilections, intuitions, value judgments, conventions? Or, are scientific goals, 
ultimately beyond rational argument as the Popper of the LSD and Reichenbach 
seem to believe? 22 If so, can Reichenbach and Popper avoid scientific goal 
relativism? That is, can they avoid the thesis that there is no good reason (besides 
taste, intuitions, prejudices or conventions) for preferring some scientific goals to 
others, however, capricious or absurd? Laudan has voiced such concerns,
Clearly, if the mainstream tradition in philosophy of science preaches that 
the methods of science are conventions, and that the aims of science are 
largely matters of personal preference, it does not take much agility to find 
therein the makings for a thick relativist stew.
(Laudan, 1989, p. 371.)
Still, is scientific goal relativism something to be worried about? The answer 
depends on what our theory of scientific method is. If scientific methodological rules
22 One way to argue in favour of some cognitive aims would be to do it pragmatically, that is, 
it would be claimed that those cognitive aims that promote some ulterior pragmatic end, such 
as the biological survival of the species should be preferred. But, even if the means/ends 
relation between the cognitive and the pragmatic ends could be established, whoever
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are thought to be the justified optimum means - amongst those available for 
approaching or attaining our scientific aims - then a relativism of aims could translate 
into a relativism of scientific methodological rules and this in turn could translate 
into a relativism of factual scientific theories23. On the other hand, if our theory of 
scientific method is such that scientific aims are not to have any implications for the 
rational selection or appraisal of our scientific methodological rules and scientific 
factual theories, then a relativism of scientific goals could well be innocuous or 
irrelevant.
II THEORIES OF RATIONALITY 
I will now examine problem P I, that is,
P I : Is rationality rational? Can rationality be self-justifying or 'comprehensive'?
In other words, is a comprehensive rationalism logically possible? Alternatively, is 
rationality defensible rationally, i.e. without regress, vicious circularities, dogmatic 
commitments, or logical paradoxes?
The answer to this problem depends on what one’s requirements for rational belief 
(or rational actions or goals) are, for example,
Showing that a belief is not justified is, in the Cartesian tradition, 
tantamount to showing that it cannot be rationally accepted.
(M. A. Nottumo, p. 94.)
Similarly,
...on an empiricist view, such as Hume's (...) the strongest criticism of any 
particular theory was that it could not be justified or established properly -in 
this case by an appeal to sense experience.
(Bartley, p. 115.)
proposes this prescription, and if rational, would have to justify the desirability -  again, 
without circularity -  of the pragmatic end in question.
23 I will dwell on Laudan’s theory of scientific aims in chapter V, Laudan’s theory 
intends to avoid scientific goal relativism, a relativism that Laudan takes seriously 
since his theory of scientific method assumes that scientific methods are the optimum 
means to the attainment of certain cognitive goals.
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Thus both the Cartesian and the Humean traditions require for a rational belief that it 
be justified as true. These traditions differ only on what they consider as a legitimate 
source of justification. In the Cartesian tradition intellectual intuition -clear and 
distinct ideas- provide justification, while in the empiricist tradition sense experience 
provides justification. A conception of rational belief that demands justifications can 
already be found in Plato's Euthyphro, where,
Plato suggests that although Euthyphro holds strongs views and is willing to 
act on them, he cannot justify either his beliefs or the action based upon 
them...
Once Socrates exposes the lack of justification for his belief, it is both 
irrational and irresponsible for Euthyphro to continue to hold it.
The general idea that emerges from the dialogue is that there is an essential 
connection between being rational in one's beliefs and actions and having 
reasons that justify them.
(Nathanson, p. 4.)
A justificationist view of rationality is also found in Epictetus,
To be a reasonable creature, that alone is insupportable which is 
unreasonable; but everything reasonable may be supported.
(Epictetus, Discourses, Chapter 2.)
Karl Popper has summarized a justificationist doctrine of rationality as follows:
Uncritical or comprehensive rationalism can be described as the attitude of 
the person who says 'I am not prepared to accept anything that cannot be 
defended by means of argument or experience'. We can express this also in 
the form of the principle that any assumption which cannot be supported 
either by argument or by experience is to be discarded. Now it is easy to see 
that this principle of an uncritical rationalism is inconsistent; for since it 
cannot, in its turn, be supported by argument or by experience, it implies 
that it should itself be discarded. (It is analogous to the paradox of the liar,
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i.e. to a sentence which asserts its own falsity.) Uncritical rationalism is 
therefore logically untenable...
(Popper, 1945, p. 217.)
According to Popper the uncritical rationalist intends to answer affirmatively PI but 
he cannot succeed because in the process he contradicts himself, thus uncritical 
rationalism is logically unattainable. Uncritical rationalism can be analysed in terms 
of the following two injunctions:
C l: Anything (belief, action or aim) justified by non-circular argument is to be 
accepted as rational.
C2: Only that which can be justified by non-circular argument is to be accepted as 
rational.
Now, from C2 it follows that if rational one should justify anything one accepts. In 
particular, one should justify Cl and C2, but Cl cannot be justified without 
presupposing it, because if one were to try to justify Cl by arguing in its favour, we 
would be begging the question, that is, we would be presupposing C l. In other 
words, one would be presupposing that argument and experience are rational 
justificatory strategies, precisely what Cl says, that is,
The argument [in favour of Cl] would be generally convincing only to those 
persons who had already adopted the belief that arguments should count. To 
put the point in a stronger form: it is pointless to try to prove something to a 
person who does not accept that proofs should be accepted... It seems that 
an argument in favour of this requirement, in order to be effective, would 
presuppose a commitment to argument.
(Bartley, p. 94.)
Again, only those who already value argument will accept an argumentative defence 
of argument, only those who already believe in the attitude described by Cl will 
accept it. This holds irrespective of which might be the argumentative defence of 
argument.
The rationalist’s attitude is a requisite for valuing argument or experience, and this 
attitude cannot be established by argument or experience, because if we defend Cl
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by argument or experience, we are already assuming C l. Then argument plus 
experience cannot establish itself, it cannot recommend itself, because it requires at 
least one assumption, the assumption that argument is valuable. This premiss can be 
defended by argument only by those that have already accepted a pro-argument 
attitude. Argument is thus limited; it is not self-contained or comprehensive, because 
all arguing presupposes this premiss, and because this premiss must be accepted as 
correct without justification, i.e., dogmatically.
Therefore, Cl and C2 cannot both be true. Let’s first assume we discard Cl and try 
to keep C2. C2 should then be non-circularly justified, but C2 cannot be justified by 
non-circular argument, because if we offer an argument in its favour we are again 
presupposing that argument is valuable as a rational justificatory strategy, precisely 
what C2 says. Therefore, C2 rejects itself, and uncritical rationalism is logically 
impossible.
Another option would be to discard C2 and keep Cl just by itself, this alternative 
doesn’t lead to a contradiction it just says that justified beliefs are rational, but it 
doesn’t require us qua rationalists to justify all our accepted beliefs, actions or goals. 
Rationalism without C2 wouldn’t aim to be comprehensive and it would be a very 
weak form of rationalism, so weak that according to Cl a non-justified (or an 
unjustifiable) absurd belief could still be rational.
Popper tells us that the canon C2 of uncritical rationalism is analogous to the paradox 
of the liar but this is not the case, C2 is just false. Thus if we assume C2 as true we 
arrive to a self-contradiction, while if we assume its falsity we do not arrive to any 
inconsistency. Therefore it differs from the paradox of the liar in that it is not an 
antinomy: "a sentence that it is true if and only if it is false" (Quine, p. 9.)
But even if the principles Cl and C2 required by 'uncritical rationalism' were per 
impossibile both true we would still have to deal (as Sextus, and more recently, as 
Fries showed in his famous trilemma24) with the infinite regress, which a succession 
of demands for justification would lead to25, and these demands would have to be
24 Cf., Popper, 1968, p. 93.
25 That is, if we assume a transitive form of justification such as deductive inferential 
justification.
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satisfied according to this rationalism. One could then try to stop this infinite regress 
with some dogmas -that is, with some unjustified presuppositions- but this last 
alternative would be inconsistent with this rationalist's standards.
A doctrine that is self-referentially inconsistent is not uncommon in philosophy. The 
logical positivist’s verifiability criterion of significance is well known to be self- 
referentially inconsistent.
... according to the logical positivists... Statements testable by the methods 
in the list (the methods of mathematics, logic, and the empirical sciences) 
would count as meaningful; all other statements, the positivists maintained, 
are 'pseudo-statements', or disguised nonsense. An obvious rejoinder was to 
say that the Logical Positivist's criterion of significance which was self 
refuting: for the criterion itself is neither (a) 'analytic' (a term used by the 
positivists to account for logic and mathematics), nor (b) empirically 
testable.
(Putnam, pp. 105-6.)
As is also self-referentially inconsistent Wittgenstein’s assertion that “the totality of 
true propositions is... the totality of natural science.” This statement is inconsistent 
because it itself does not belong to natural science, and if we assume it as true, we 
must conclude that it is false. Thus suppose Wittgenstein’s argument says more 
exactly that,
a. W: a sentence is true iff it is an accredited part of natural science.
And that,
b. W is a true sentence.
Now,
c. W is not itself part of natural science (in particular it cannot, in any 
interesting sense of verification, be verified by observation statements.)
And,
d. W entails that W is true iff it is an accredited part of natural science. We infer 
then from (c) and (d) the falsity of W, but (b) says that W is true, then a 
contradiction.
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CRITICAL RATIONALISM
Popper then proposed a modification of the previous Comprehensive Rationalism, 
Critical Rationalism:
(...) whoever adopts the rationalist attitude does so because without 
reasoning he has adopted some decision, or belief, or habit, or behaviour, 
which therefore in its turn must be called irrational. Whatever it may be, we 
can describe it as an irrational faith in reason. Rationalism is therefore far 
from comprehensive or self-contained.
(...) a critical form of rationalism, one which frankly admits its limitations, 
and its basis in an irrational decision, and in so far, a certain priority of 
irrationalism.
(Popper, 1945, p. 218; emphasis added.)
Critical rationalism in contrast to the previous uncritical one is non-comprehensive, 
and it gives a negative answer to our problem PI. Therefore, for Popper, rationalism 
is ultimately a matter of irrational faith; irrational by its own standards (if it is 
irrational or just non-rational, depends on whether the non-circular justification of 
beliefs, decisions, actions, etc., is a necessary and sufficient condition, or only a 
sufficient one, for an agent being rational. In what follows I will follow the former 
and stronger interpretation.)
Critical rationalism is non-comprehensive because this rationalist admits and is 
conscious of his limitations; he and the irrationalist differ in having different 
irrational commitments, critical rationalism’s fideism can be portrayed as a deliberate 
begging of the question. The critical rationalist is aware of his commitments, while 
the classical comprehensive rationalist was unaware that he required an irrational 
decision, comprehensive rationalism was thus naive.
A crisis of integrity then arises for critical rationalism, since its rational identity 
requires a leap of faith, which by its own lights is irrational or at least non-rational. 
This form of rationality then provides a rational excuse for irrational commitments; it 
supplies the irrationalist with the tu quoque argument, an argument that says:
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... (1) because of logical reasons, rationality is so limited that everyone must 
make a dogmatic irrational commitment; (2) therefore, the irrationalist 
(Christian, or whatever) has a right to make whatever commitment he 
pleases; and (3) therefore, no one has a right to criticize him (or anyone 
else) for making such a commitment...
(Bartley, pp. 272-3.)
This argument provides an excuse to avoid facing criticisms, it tells that given that 
rational argument about basic presuppositions, or ultimate commitments, is 
impossible, then any commitments are rationally possible, and that then even a 
maximal irrationalism is rationally possible. Popper's answer is that critical 
rationalism with his minimum of irrationalism is preferable, because,
The choice before us is not simply an intellectual affair, or a matter of taste. 
It is a moral decision.
... It is my firm conviction that this irrational emphasis upon emotion and 
passion leads ultimately to what I can only describe as crime. One reason 
for this opinion is that this attitude, which is at best one of resignation 
towards the irrational nature of human beings, at worst one of scorn for 
human reason, must lead to an appeal to violence and brutal force as the 
ultimate arbiter in any dispute.
(Popper, 1945, pp. 219-21.)
26In other words, Popper believes that while the rationalist may not be moral , the 
irrationalist is often immoral, and that this gives us one reason to prefer critical 
rationalism (with its minimal irrationalism) to full fledged irrationalism, Popper then 
transfers the decision for critical rationalism to the uncertain domain of moral 
decision. On the other hand, Popper holds that moral decisions can be influenced, 
though not determined, by a rational analysis of the practical consequences of our
26 The rationalist, however, may need to be moral in a minimal sense of morality, given that 
rationality is a cooperative process of inquiry which values dialogue, intellectual honesty and 
humility, respect to other people’s arguments, etc.
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moral decisions,27 and by contrasting these practical consequences with the 
prescriptions of our conscience. Popper says,
(...) a rational analysis of the consequences of a decision does not make the 
decision rational; the consequences do not determine our decision; it is 
always we who decide. But an analysis of the concrete consequences, and 
their clear realization in what we call our ‘imagination’, makes the 
difference between a blind decision and a decision made with open eyes 
(...) in the case of moral theory, we can only confront its consequences with 
our conscience.
(Popper, 1945, p. 220.)
If we assume with Popper that irrationalism, because of its emphasis on passion and 
emotion, can often lead to what most of us call crime28, then it could still happen that 
some consciences would prefer irrationalism even when fully aware of its probable 
immoral consequences, and given this possibility one can only hope that the 
conscience of most of us will as a matter of fact side with critical rationalism, but if 
this were not to happen, that would be the end of the matter for a Popperian.
Our epistemic situation so far is as follows: Popperian critical rationalism considers 
that a consistent theory of rationality must grant that at least its most basic 
commitment (i.e., its commitment to rationality) has to be accepted without 
justification that is it has to be accepted dogmatically or irrationally. We arrived to 
this conclusion because we required of a rational belief or commitment that it be 
justified without circularity, but if instead we were to allow for our most basic 
rational commitment(s) a viciously circular justification.
27 Notice that such a rational analysis already presupposes a favourable valuation of an 
argumentative or rational attitude, therefore a pondered moral decision about whether to be 
critically rational or not will itself presuppose a favourable valuation of an argumentative 
attitude. Thus, this most basic valuation cannot be defended by Popper’s moral argument, 
but this is all as well, since critical rationalism openly admits that it has to assume this 
valuation dogmatically.
28 It is almost a tmism that different individuals or communities often don’t agree on what 
constitutes a crime, this becomes clear when one considers the examples of many Nazi SS 
who would not consider the Auschwitz camp as criminal, or of a XVIII th century slave 
trader or owner who neither would deem his metier as criminal.
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Then we could avoid Popper’s irrationalist conclusion. This option would transform 
our previous C2 to C2’:
C2’: Only that which can be justified by non viciously circular argument is to be 
accepted as rational, except for our most basic rational commitment(s) which can be 
justified by any circular argument.
This way out is logically identical to dogmatism, although psychologically different 
from dogmatism. This because a straightforward circular justification of some belief 
p would argue ‘p because p ’ which is identical to a dogmatic iteration of ‘p \  Now if 
the argumentative circle were to have a wider diameter such as ‘p because q, and q 
because r . .. and z because p ’ then this circular argument would still be logically 
equivalent to a dogmatic iteration of ‘p ’, though this wider argumentative circle 
would be psychologically less obvious. Thus, this alternative to irrationalist 
dogmatism is not really an alternative at all.
The question now arises of how to distinguish a viciously circular from a virtuously 
circular argument. A short answer is that a vicious circular argument is a circular 
argument that intends to be probative, and which is useless as a probative argument, 
because it needs29 to presuppose that which it wants to prove. That is, in this type of 
argument, the premisses are as problematic, or as doubtful, or as implausible as the 
conclusion, and this according to the judgement of the community to which the 
probative argument is being offered30, such a circular argument is not logically or 
probabilistically forceful for those who refuse to step into the circle.
29 In other words, in this vicious form of reasoning, the circularity is inevitable, i.e., there are 
no independent non-circular evidential routes to the conclusion. Otherwise, in viciously 
circular arguments there is no alternative to the circular route to the conclusion, cf., Walton, 
p. 309.
50 Thus,
An argument in persuasion dialogue can be useful to persuade or convince the 
respondent to whom it is directed only if the premisses are already secured as 
commitments of the respondent so that for him they are more plausible than the 
conclusion that he doubts or questions. This is the implementation in persuasion 
dialogue of the probative function of argument...This function generally means that 
in probative reasoning, there is a direction or flow of argument from the premisses 
toward the conclusion. Certainly this is true in persuasion dialogue because the 
premisses must be commitments of the respondent that are, from his point of 
view, more plausible than the conclusion. They must be, to be useful to prove 
the conclusion to him successfully.
(Walton, p. 321.)(Emphasis added.)
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Virtuous circularity, on the other hand, is a circular argument without a probative or 
demonstrative function; a virtuously circular argument is an argument that only 
intends to show how various elements are interconnected in coordinated relations31.
While in a demonstrative argument -such as those of Euclidean geometry- the premisses 
should not only be more plausible, but also,
... be firmly established as better known to be true than the conclusion to be 
proved. This context, or one very like it, appears to be indicated in the remark of 
Aristotle (Prior Analytics 64b 30) where it is required of a demonstration that the 
premisses should be better known or established than the conclusion to be proved 
from them. In other words, Aristotle was saying that a demonstration is a special 
kind of argument where the premisses are better known than the conclusion. 
Therefore, in terms of evidence or knowledge, the premisses are prior to the 
conclusion in a demonstration. Hence it follows that the conclusion cannot be at the 
same time be prior to the premisses. The inquiry or demonstration is even more 
strongly inimical to circular reasoning, and apt to classify it as fallacious, than the 
persuasion dialogue.
(Walton, p. 324.)
31 Nicholas Rescher distinguishes different aspects in the rational enterprise two of these 
aspects are: cognitive rationality and practical rationality. Cognitive rationality is a 
prescription in favour of justifying our beliefs, while practical rationality or means/ends 
rationality is the aspect of rationality dealing with actions and can be summarized by the 
prescription:
If you are going to be rational about your actions, then choose the available 
justified optimum means M (where justified signifies that the reasons in favour of 
the belief in the optimality of M should be stronger than the reasons in the belief in 
contra) to reach your valuable end(s) E.
Rescher then argues (chapter III) that an example of virtuous circularity is provided by an 
argument from practical reason in favour of cognitive reason. Rescher’s argument goes as 
follows:
i) A valuable cognitive end E is to find rational answers to our questions, answers that are 
coherent with the available evidence and which are coherent with our well established 
theories.
ii) A policy of justifying our beliefs or answers is the justified best available strategy or 
means for reaching E.
iii) Therefore justifying our beliefs is the rational action to follow for reaching E, thus 
means/ends rationality recommends the justification of our beliefs or answers, that is, 
practical reason can be used to justify cognitive reason.
This argument in favour of justifying our beliefs presupposes an aspect of reason, practical 
reason, to argue in favour of another aspect of reason, cognitive rationality. Practical reason, 
however, in turn presupposes cognitive reason when it asks us to justify our belief in the 
optimality of M (notice the ‘justified’ in italics in premiss (ii) above.) Thus this argument is 
circular Rescher believes, nevertheless, that this argument is virtuously circular, because this 
argument shows how different aspects of rationality are inter-related and how these different 
aspects mutually support each other. According to our characterization of virtuous 
circularity, one would say that this argument is virtuously circular as long as it is only
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For instance, a rhetorical circular argument that intends to be merely persuasive, 
another case of virtuous circularity is provided by causal argumentation, where there 
can be diachronic loops that indicate mutual causal relationships among a set of 
variables. Thus,
... it might be argued that an increase in population in a city causes an 
increase in modernization, which in turn increases migration to the city, 
which results in an increase in the number of people in the city. This 
reasoning is circular, but if it reflects a real situation where mutual causal 
influences are at work, it should be not be condemned as a fallacious 
sequence of reasoning.
(Walton, p. 254.)
Now an argumentative justification of a belief in the value of an argumentative 
attitude is a circular argument that intends to be probative and that presupposes that 
which is to be proved -  i.e., it has premisses as plausible as their conclusion- 
therefore such an argument is viciously circular32.
POPPER’S NON - JUSTIFIC ATIONISM
An influential element of Popper's thought (specially of his later thought) is its 
idiosyncratic non-justificationism, that is, Popper believed that the method of science
intended as an explanation of how the rational enterprise forms a coherent web. Moreover, 
one would say that this circular argument is not virtuous if it pretends to have a probative or 
demonstrative function, since its premisses are as doubtful as its conclusion.
On the other hand, notice that Rescher’s practical argument in favour of cognitive reason 
already presupposes the justificatory value of argument; precisely what was the ultimate 
dogmatic assumption of the Popperian critical rationalist, and as the critical rationalist 
argued, this key supposition cannot be argued for without presupposing it.
32 Otherwise,
...The overall justification of rationality must be reflexive and self-referential. To 
provide a rationale of rationality is to show that rationality stands in appropriate 
alignment with the principles of rationality. From the angle of justification, 
rationality is a cyclic process that closes in on itself, not a linear process that 
ultimately rests on something outside itself...
(N. Rescher, p. 43.)
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and philosophy was mainly (if not wholly) negativist and non-defensive. This is 
clarified when Popper says,
...there is a method which (...) is the one method of all rational discussion, 
and therefore of the natural sciences as well as of philosophy. The method I 
have in mind is that of stating one's problem clearly and of examining its 
various proposed solutions critically.
I have italicised the words 'rational discussion' and 'critically' in order to 
stress that I equate the rational attitude and the critical attitude. The point is 
that, whenever we propose a solution to a problem, we ought to try as hard 
as we can to overthrow our solution, rather than defend it.
(Popper, 1959, p. 16.) 
Moreover, to criticize a theory is not the same as showing that it cannot be 
justified, that is, that there are no positive reasons for it. Popper believes that 
these notions have often not been separated, criticism traditionally meant 
showing that some statement, goal, or method was not properly justified.
... the very idea of criticism is often misunderstood by justificationist 
philosophers: they tend to whittle down the idea of valid criticism to the 
narrow task of proving the invalidity of certain attempts to justify certain 
beliefs...
(Popper, 1983, pp. 26-7.)
Popper's critical approach is illustrated by his theory of science; a theory that rejects 
induction (for Popper induction is a mythical and defensive or justificationist 
method), an approach that accepts deduction as the only rational method, as the only 
organon of criticism (for Popper all of our reasoning is deductive or can be 
reconstructed as such.)
In Popper’s view, empirical science grows by a process of conjecture-refutation, 
where conjectures are guessed answers to scientific questions or problems33, and 
where a refutation is an inconsistency between a 'basic statement' and some
33 Scientific problems arise, for example, when a previously accepted conjecture or 
hypothesis is refuted.
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consequence of our conjectures -plus some initial conditions. The search for 
refutations is what Popper understands by scientific criticism, though refutations are 
rarely conclusive. This because observational statements are fallible, and because 
when a scientific theory is refuted, we have in fact refuted only a complex network 
of suppositions, and then an ambiguity arises when trying to assign to any of these 
suppositions the responsibility for the refutation (this is the famous Duhem-Quine 
problem.)
Now, Popper was not in his ‘Open Society’ a full negativist as shown by his belief 
that non-justified presuppositions are irrational, and that therefore critical rationalism 
was with its dogmatic ultimate commitment minimally irrational.
W. W. Bartley thought it was possible to reform Popperianism into a consistent and 
comprehensive theory of rationality (Bartley first called it a ‘Critical 
Comprehensive’ rationalism (or CCR), and later on he named it a ‘Pan Critical’ 
rationalism (or PCR), I will use these two appelatives indistinctly), into a theory that 
allegedly does not lead into a fideism of ultimate commitments. In other words, 
Bartley proposed a new rational identity one that allegedly would not lead into 
conflicts of rational integrity.
PAN CRITICAL RATIONALISM
The pan critical rationalist can be characterized as one,
... who is willing to entertain any position and holds all his positions, 
including his most fundamental standards, goals, and decisions, 
and his basic philosophical position itself open to criticism; one 
who protects nothing from criticism by justifying it irrationally;
one who never cuts off an argument by resorting to faith or irrational 
commitment to justify some belief that has been under severe critical 
fire; one who is committed, attached, addicted, to no position.
(Bartley, p. 118; emphasis added.)
This pan critical rationalist justifies nothing and allegedly criticizes everything even 
his own rational attitude or position, he is not committed to any position, not even to
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a belief in the value of argument. This doesn’t mean that the PCrationalist is without 
convictions, but only that he is willing to submit his convictions to critical 
consideration.
Now, since the PCrationalist intends to abandon all justification there are no 
foundations, justification is substituted by criticism and this last is an open-ended 
endeavour. Thus, whatever is used to criticize is hold only tentatively and it can in 
turn be open to criticism, the process is thus potentially infinite.
This perspective admits without any tremors that the principles and standards of 
rationality cannot be justified rationally, nor does it attempt to justify anything at all 
using these standards, as a result nothing at all is justified, and there is no such a 
thing as justified belief inside this perspective.
The PCrationalist holds tentatively all his positions while she goes on searching for 
their failures, this is why she cannot now specify the form criticism might take in the 
future, or specify whether some position will be ever successfully criticized (which it 
might not be, because some positions could, in fact, be correct). Moreover, criticism 
of a theory or conjecture, can take the following forms:
We have at least four means of eliminating error by criticizing our 
conjectures and speculations. These checks are listed in descending order 
according to their importance and the rigor with which they may be applied.
(1) The check of logic: Is the theory in question consistent?
(2) The check of sense observation: Is the theory empirically refutable by 
some sense observation? And if it is, do we know of any refutation of it?
(3) The check of scientific theory: Is the theory, whether or not it is in 
conflict with sense observation, in conflict with any scientific hypothesis?
(4) The check of the problem: What problem is the theory intended to solve? 
Does it do so successfully?
(Bartley, p. 127.)
It has been affirmed by Musgrave that PCR has a very weak account of rational 
belief, that for PCR rational belief is merely criticizable belief, and thus according to 
Musgrave a PCrationalist would believe,
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... that the moon is made of green cheese, since this is eminently criticizable. 
(How do I know ? Because it has been thoroughly criticized.) PCR is so 
weak that its bound to be rational by its own standards. The adherent of 
PCR has a 'Heads I win, tails you lose' strategy. If no criticism of PCR is 
produced, it remains criticizable and hence rationally believed. And if an 
excellent criticism of PCR is produced, this gives further proof that it is 
criticizable, and hence rationally believed.
(Musgrave, p. 296.)
Musgrave, however, is misconstruing PCR, because Bartley explicitly says:
A position may be held rationally without needing justification at all - 
provided that it can be and is held open to criticism and survives severe 
examination.
(Ibid, p. 119.)
While comprehensive rationalism was justificationist and comprehensive and 
therefore ultimately contradictory and naive, and critical rationalist was non- 
comprehensive (since she admitted her limitations, since she admitted the need for an 
irrational kernel) but then provided an excuse for dogmas. Pan critical rationalism is, 
on the other hand, allegedly comprehensive and non-justificationist, and his answer 
to our PI is affirmative. For the PCrationalist all positions are criticizable in the 
sense that:
... (1) it is not necessary, in criticism, in order to avoid infinite regress, to 
declare a dogma that could not be criticized (since it was unjustifiable);
(2) it is not necessary to mark off a special class of statements, the justifiers, 
which did the justifying and criticizing but was not open to criticism;
... (4) the criticizers -the statements in terms of which criticism is conducted 
-are themselves open to review.
(Ibid, p. 244.)
According to this position rationality is not logically limited, since there is no logical 
necessity for dogmas, or leaps of faith. The PCrationalist believes that rationality is
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not ultimately impossible, since PCR is not inconsistent or false and because 
allegedly it is itself rational by its own lights. If so, then the tu quoque thrown at 
critical rationalism can be avoided by PCR, and with it PCR can also avoid arbitrary 
dogmatic ultimate commitments, because PCR doesn’t allow a rational excuse for 
irrational commitment. Thus,
... for a pancritical rationalist, continued subjection to criticism of his 
allegiance to rationality is explicitly part of his rationalism.
...If a pancritical rationalist accuses his opponent of protecting some belief 
from criticism through irrational commitment to it, he is not open to the 
charge that he is similarly committed.
(Bartley, pp. 120-1.)
PCR being a generalization of the Popperian approach, inherits from it all of its 
characteristics except its non-comprehensiveness, and its lack of integrity. Our new 
intellectual hero is an all out fallibilist, a full methodological negativist, with one 
basic aim: to eliminate as much intellectual error as possible. He
...holds his claims open to review even when... he is unable to imagine, let 
alone specify, what would count against them.
(Bartley, p. 234.)
An obvious question now arises, what would be a criticism of PCR, what would 
count as a criticism of its principle of rationality i.e. of the statement: that all 
positions are open to criticism. Bartley answers,
...someone could devastatingly refute this kind of rationalism if he were to 
produce an argument showing that at least some of the unjustified and 
unjustifiable critical standards necessarily used by a pan critical rationalist 
were uncriticizable to boot, that here, too, something had to be accepted as 
uncriticizable in order to avoid circular argument and infinite regress.
(Bartley, p. 120.)(Emphasis added.)
This challenge has been taken up...
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CRITICISM OF PCR
To get a flavour of the paradoxical character of PCR consider the following 
argument, due to Bartley himself and inspired by a critique of J. F. Post, an argument 
that Bartley finds unobjectionable:
(A) All positions are open to criticism.
And because of PCR’s intended comprehensiveness it then follows,
(B) A is open to criticism. And,
Since (B) is implied by (A), any criticism of (B) will constitute a criticism 
of (A), and thus show that (A) is open to criticism. Assuming that a 
criticism of (B) argues that (B) is false, we may argue: if  (B) is false, then
(A) is false; but an argument showing (A) to be false (and thus criticizing it) 
shows (B) to be true. Thus, if (B) is false, then (B) is true. Any attempt to 
criticize (B) demonstrates (B); thus (B) is uncriticizable, and (A) is false. 
(Bartley, p. 224.) (Emphasis added.)
Hence, PCR is refuted34 and this conclusion is a result of the self-referential 
character of PCR -a theory that intends to be a theory of all theories itself included, 
and recalls similar difficulties of classical rationalism, which also wanted to be 
comprehensive. These difficulties are akin to the paradox of the liar, Bartley reacts 
by saying,
I am, however, neither surprised nor disturbed to find that a semantical 
paradox of this sort can be produced from my statement of pancritical 
rationalism... My position refers to itself as criticizable: i.e., it is “self-
34 According to Post this argument is unsound,
...because it relies at one point on the unstated assumption that if a position is false, 
then there is an argument showing it to be false...(which) is logically equivalent (by 
contraposition) to 'If there is no argument showing a position to be false, then it is 
true'. This principle is (...) in any case inconsistent with a realist conception of 
truth.
(Post, 1987, p. 265.)
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referential”. Moreover, my position employs, although not exclusively, an 
interpretation of criticizability in terms of possible falsity -and thus involves 
the semantical concepts of truth and falsity. Finally, my position has always 
been expressed in natural language: i.e., it has not been formalized.
(Bartley, p. 219.)
Bartley believes, however, that the paradoxical nature of PCR could be dealt,
...by type and language-level solutions, Zermelo-type solutions, category 
solutions, radical exclusion of all self reference...
(Bartley, pp. 219-20.)
This is too vague, mere possibilia, and Bartley doesn’t give any specifics of how his 
previous argument can be invalidated. Post has pointed that such a way out would 
entitle the acritical comprehensive rationalist to use it too. Thus,
... in response to Bartley’s argument (or the tu quoque) that justificationism 
is not itself justified, and therefore is self-referentially inconsistent, the 
justificationist may reply that such a result really comes as no surprise, in 
view of the inevitable inconsistency of natural language, within which such 
a theory as his must be expressed. He m ay... adopt a language-level 
solution to the paradoxes, according to which he should not be interpreted as 
holding a literally self-applicable position in the first place, so that it is 
unfair to demand a justification for justificationism itself.
... the justificationist could rightly reject the whole of Bartley’s self 
referential argument against justificationism, so that much of the Retreat to 
Commitment would make no sense.
(Post, 1987, pp. 265-6.)
On the other hand, Bartley argues that the conclusion of his argument that (B) is 
uncriticizable doesn’t turn (B) into a dogma to which a PCrationalist must be 
committed, because (B) could be made criticizable once the paradox is dealt with by 
the means suggested in the previous quote thus,
48
The mere possibility o f such a solution to the semantical paradoxes makes 
(B) criticizable after all: it suggests a potential means for invalidating the 
argument that produces the conclusion that (B) is uncritizable.
(Bartley, p. 225.)
J. Post retorts that such a strategy would decrease the content of PCR and it would go 
against PCR’s goal of being a theory of all theories itself included, Post says that 
Bartley,
... would avoid the refutation, but at the expense of the decreasing the 
content of the theory, thus making it less criticizable. For a theory about all 
theories including itself obviously has greater content than a theory about 
all other theories, and obviously takes the greater risk o f refutation... this 
sort of revision... is inconsistent with the aims of PCR...
(Post, 1971, pp. 52-3.)
Bartley’s answer is that,
An argument about content cannot be used to eliminate in advance any 
language-level route out of the paradoxes. High content... is indeed an 
important desideratum of any theory, but obviously does not possess 
overriding force.
(Bartley, p. 226.)
Furthermore, Bartley argues that even if  it were to prove impossible to avoid the 
paradoxical character of PCR, Bartley would not have to abandon the claim that all 
positions are criticizable,
... My characterization of the rationalist would remain essentially 
intact...The only “uncriticizable” statements he would harbor would be 
“uncriticizable” in a different sense: those forced on him by semantical 
paradox in the course of rational argument using natural language; and he
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would neither be committed to these nor have been led to them by faith. Nor 
would they have been forced on him by the need to stem an infinite regress. 
... nothing in the semantical paradoxes invokes limits to rationality or 
requires ultimate commitment-not even to the statement (B) that is 
“uncriticizable ”
...The uncriticizability of (B) would in no way show that the rationalist 
must be committed to it, or that he must make a dogma out of it, or that 
he could use it to cut off argument about some contested position.
...Previously, the question was whether something had to be accepted as 
uncriticizable in order to stem infinite regress and avoid circular argument. 
Whereas the kind of uncriticizable statement that is forced on one by the 
semantical paradoxes is of no use in stemming infinite regress and circular 
argument.
Even if someone did make an article of faith or dogma out of (B), there is 
virtually nothing he could do with it. (B) has insufficient content to be used 
to justify other claims.
(Bartley, pp. 230-l.)(Bolds added.)
When Bartley says that the “uncriticizability of (B) would in no way show that the 
rationalist must be committed to it” he is characterizing criticizability as a 
psychological attitude, as a way of thinking, as a mental object in Popper’s World II. 
We are being told that one can have a critical attitude towards statement (B) even 
when one is fully aware that (B) is a statement that must remain objectively 
uncriticizable if one is to avoid paradox. But then how can the PCrationalist hold 
open to criticism a statement that she already knows is in fact uncriticizable? This 
looks as only a psychological possibility, but to properly answer this last question it 
is necessary to further explore what Bartley understands by criticizability.
WHAT TO UNDERSTAND BY CRITICIZABILITY
Bartley has characterised a PCrationalist as “one who is willing to entertain any 
position and holds all his positions... open to criticism.” The PCrationlist is then not 
enamoured of any position and for him no position has privileges or benefices vis a
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vis criticism, whenever and in whatever form criticism might eventually arise. The 
question then surfaces of how a PCrationalist could hold open to criticism what she 
already knows is objectively uncriticizable, items such as: the previous statement
(B), empirical truisms35, necessary truths, the central deductive logic required by all 
criticism, or the most basic methodological assumption of the PCrationalist, i.e., the 
value of argument for criticism. Bartley provides an answer,
... one of the merits of pancritical rationalism... that it presents a theory 
about people, not statements... statements are intrinsically neither rational 
nor irrational... rationality is not a property of statements but is a matter of 
the way in which a statement is held, and also of the history of that 
statement, of the way in which the statement has been examined.
Thus pancritical rationalism does not involve, and I have never developed, a 
theory of rationality as a property of statements.
(Bartley, pp. 233-4.)
Hence, PCR is the attitude; it is the mental disposition of certain ideal persons, of the 
rational ones, of those persons that take argument seriously, for the PCrationalist,
... all statements are criticizable -not just the rational and noninferential 
ones, (...) all positions (including necessary truths) are criticizable,...
(Bartley, pp. 238-9.)
Now, since necessary truths are held to be criticizable it follows that for PCR 
criticizability and possible falsity are not always linked, otherwise, it is not always 
the case that for a statement to be criticizable, it is for it to be possibly false, 
although,
35 Empirical truisms are statements such as: “I have a head” and “the present living Queen 
Mother is more than ten years old,” these are statements of which we are certain, these are 
statements which we are incapable of psychologically doubting, cf., Watkins.
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... for a large range of statements one main thing that one does in criticism is 
indeed to attempt to show falsity, and that one therein usually does assume 
possible falsity. That is, for a large class of statements, to hold a statement 
open to criticism is to conjecture or guess that the statement may be wrong 
and that some day some effective criticism, the nature of which we cannot 
even imagine today, may be produced against it. But that is not all there is to 
criticism.
(Ibid, p. 240.)
What else is there?
...[Criticism] may be also a matter of the revision, the narrowing or 
stretching and adjustment of concepts...Or it may be argued that someone 
did not prove what he set out to prove -not that what was proved was false 
or possibly false. Or that the statement of an argument or proposition is 
inelegant or uneconomical.
(Bartley, p. 240.)
For Bartley a position is an unrevisable or fixed presupposition of PCR if it cannot be 
abandoned without weakening critical argument,
A position would be unrevisable (in argument) if and only if there are no 
circumstances under which it can be abandoned without weakening the 
exposure of the system as a whole to criticism. Such unrevisable positions, 
if any, would mark the absolute presupposition of critical argument.
(Ibid, p. 253.)
These fixed positions are nevertheless still potentially criticizable, although they will 
never be successfully criticized, because to argue, to criticize them per force we will 
require them. How can we, for example, criticize the core or most basic principles of 
deductive logic? Do not we have to assume them dogmatically? (As Lewis Carroll 
pointed with his 'Achilles and the Tortoise'.) Isn’t then the PCrationalist committed 
to deductive logic? Bartley grants that a minimal logic (he calls it logic I) is
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presupposed by all argument,36 and that it is thus unreviewable, unrevisable, but he 
insists that logic I is not uncriticizable37; therefore, he concludes that Logic I is not 
hold dogmatically after all. Thus,
The fact that argument presupposes a minimal logic as unrevisable in no 
way identifies a commitment on the part of a pancritical rationalist. To be 
sure, the practice of critical argument and logic are bound up together. One 
can no more argue without a minimal logic than one can live without 
breathing or speak without language. None of these three -living, speaking, 
arguing- require irrational commitment to a dogma...
(Ibid, p. 260; emphasis added.)
We could of course reject 'logic I', but only if we reject the practice of argument with 
it. Now, Bartley appears to be confused when he says: "... in no way identifies a 
commitment on the part...” Bartley has a voluntarist theory of criticism in which 
criticism is the will to doubt every thing, and hence he understands commitment as a 
subjective state of mind, as an entity of Popper's World II. The interesting question 
is, however, whether this minimal logic is an objective dogmatic presupposition, i.e., 
whether it is a dogmatic presupposition in Popper’s World III. In other words, does 
PCR need logic I as an ultimate, uncriticizable, and objective presupposition, even if 
unconscious? Again, the question is not whether the PCrationalist is in love with 
logic I, but whether he needs it to conduct any criticism, Bartley answered in the 
affirmative, when he said in his last quote that logic I is unrevisable.
36 Bartley’s minimal logic includes, for instance, modusponens, modus tollens and the law 
of no contradiction; these presuppositions are part of Logic I because they cannot be 
abandoned without hindering our ability for criticism.
37 So for Bartley revisability and criticizability mostly agree except in for example the case 
of Bartley’s minimal logic, which is not revisable but allegedly is still criticizable. Worrall 
has argued that ultimately there is only one universal and timeless fixed kernel of principles 
of rational, or scientific, assessment (something like Bartley's Logic I, plus a few other rules 
such as:' whenever possible, theories should be tested against plausible rival theories.' Cf., 
‘The Value of a Fixed Methodology’, p. 273.) This kernel would be shared by the nuclei of 
all scientific research programs; Worrall asserts that this common minimal kernel is 'strictly 
fallible' but not 'seriously corrigible’. Worrall's position is then stronger than Bartley's on 
Logic I, which though subjectively criticizable it is not revisable.
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Moreover, how can one be critical of logic I if one knows beforehand that it is 
uncriticizable? To say that one is subjectively critical of something one already 
knows that is objectively uncrititicisable looks like a rhetorical way of saying that 
one is not enamoured of logic I (or of necessary truths, or of our previous statement
(B)). It is a rhetorical way of saying that one wants to be open minded even about 
what one knows as objectively uncriticizable.
The PCrationalist wants to say that she is ready to keep on criticising logic I even 
when she knows that she cannot succeed because logic I is objectively uncriticizable, 
even though, the PCrationalist already knows that criticising logic I is a futile 
enterprise.
In other words, the PCrationalist knows that to successfully criticize logic I is an 
impossible goal, furthermore this is an impossible aim that can neither be 
approximated, because one either successfully criticizes logic I or one doesn’t. Goals 
known both to be impossible to attain and to approximate are likely to be irrational, 
even if they are hold to be valuable38. Therefore, when the PCrationalist says that she 
can go on being critical of logic I she is aiming at an irrational goal and hence she is 
not being rational.
As another example, imagine that I realize that ‘p or not p ’ is a logical truth, and that 
I therefore realize that this logical truth is not objectively criticizable (i.e., that I 
know that no criticism of this truth can be successful or even partially successful) it 
is then irrational to insist in criticising it.
Furthermore, would Bartley say that someone acquainted with the objective 
uncriticizability of necessary truths and who therefore strongly believes in the truth 
of ‘p or not p ’ is irrational? Bartley would probably answer ‘yes’, since this person 
would have made a subjective commitment in favour of this disjunction. Now, to call
38 More precisely, rational goals are valuable aims that are either reachable, or if known to be 
unreachable are then continuously or asymptotically approachable, this because impossible 
and not continuously approachable goals are aims for which there wouldn’t be any methods 
to reach or approximate them, and such methods should be available if one is going to be 
means-ends rational. Means-ends rationality or practical rationality is captured by the 
following conditional scheme:
If you are going to be means-ends rational, and if you want to attain or approximate 
a valuable goal G, then choose the optimum means* amongst those means 
available to you to reach G.
* The belief in the optimality of the means chosen should be also a rational belief; the 
rationality of aims will be further discussed in chapter five.
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somebody irrational for strongly believing in the truth of a proposition after realizing 
that it is a necessary truth (or an empirical truism) is at least counterintuitive.
Bartley’s minimal logic constitutes then a fixed presupposition for the PCrationalist 
and it is analogous to what Wittgenstein called a 'hinge':
... the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some 
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which 
those turn.
{On Certainty, 341.)
This even though Bartley says,
... we deny that it is logically necessary to trust something -a  “hinge” as it 
were- that is beyond doubt.
(Bartley, in Radnitzky & Bartley, p. 212.)
There is no ‘hinge’ beyond doubt, if  doubt is taken as an abstract volitional state of 
mind, as a state of open mind ness, but as Lakatos has pointed out:
... the basic weakness of this position is its emptiness. There is not much 
point in affirming the criticizability of any position we hold without 
concretely specifying the forms such criticism might take.
(Lakatos, footnote 29, p. 264.)
A ‘hinge’ is beyond doubt once it is realized that the practice of critical argument 
logically requires some fixed presuppositions, this becomes specially clear when one 
goes to ask how would the PCrationalist criticize his most fundamental 
methodological assumption: that argument is valuable, since argument is the crucial 
requirement of any criticism. Any rational criticism of this crux methodological 
assumption would per force use arguments; therefore it is not possible for the 
PCrationalist to successfully criticize the practice of argument. In conclusion, in spite
55
of Bartley, it appears that PCR has uncriticizable components or assumptions and 
that therefore PCR cannot be comprehensive or pancritical.
POST’S REFORMULATION OF THE PARADOX
J. Post (Cf., Post, 1987, pp. 262-4) has proposed an alternative formalisation of PCR, 
a formalisation that is a revised version of Post’s older criticism of PCR (cf., Post, 
1971) and which has taken into account numerous objections of Bartley to Post’s 
older paper.
Post’s new formalisation takes into account, for example,
...matters of personal and historical context and that [PCR] is not really a 
theory about statements in the first place, but about one’s attitudes and/or 
positions even when the latter are not expressible in statements.
(Post, 1987, p. 261.)
This new formalisation can be summarized as follows:
(Al) Consider a person P, a context K, a time t, and an attitude, belief, or 
position X (expressible or not) which is problematic (or up for possible 
revision) for P in K at t. Then P holds X rationally in K at t only if: P holds 
X open to criticism at t, and (so far as P can then tell or guess) X has at t so 
far survived criticism.
In addition, Al entails B1:
(Bl) P holds X rationally at t only if P holds X open to criticism at t.
Let P* be the PCrationalist, now if P* is to hold Bl rationally at t, that is, if  P* is 
going to hold Bl open to criticism at t, he will conjecture that Bl may be wrong and 
that,
(Cl) There is a (potential) criticism of B l, which might someday be 
produced and be seen to be successful.
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But if Cl is to be held rationally by P*, then by B l, P* must hold Cl open to 
criticism, and thereby conjecture that there is a (potential) criticism of C l, which 
might someday be produced and be seen to be successful, in addition,
... if criticism were to persuade P* that Cl fails -that there is no (potential) 
criticism of Bl - then he could not genuinely hold Bl open to criticism, 
which is what Cl says. Hence in the present K, for P* a failure of Cl to be 
correct would mean that Bl fails to satisfy its own standard ... Thus in K, for 
P* every consideration which counts against Cl would count against B l, so 
that for P* every criticism of Cl is a criticism of Bl.
(Post, 1987, pp. 262-4.)
That is,
(1 *) For P* every criticism of Cl is a criticism of B l, whether or not the 
criticism might someday be produced and be seen to be successful.
Furthermore,
(2*) For P* no criticism of Bl is a criticism of C l.
This because,
P* would recognize that the existence of a (possibly successful) criticism of 
Bl would entail Cl (since that is what Cl says), so for P* this criticism of 
Bl could hardly count also as a criticism of Cl.
(Post, 1987, p. 263.)
Now,
From (1*) and (2*) it follows at once that for the Critical Rationalist P*, 
there is no (potential) criticism of Cl after a ll,... then for P* Cl is a strict 
counterexample to B l, which therefore is false (or invalid) even for P*...
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(Ibid, p. 264.)
Post then concludes:
Next, suppose P* has good reason to hold A l in K (say because P* rightly 
holds that Al has so far survived criticism). Then P* has good reason to 
hold Bl and C l, assuming he knows that A l entails Bl and agrees that in K, 
Bl implies C l. But Cl is either rational for P* by A l’s standards or not. If it 
is, then Bl is invalid for P*, as just seen, as is A l, and P* must conclude 
that A l does not survive the present criticism; hence Al would be self- 
referentially inconsistent as regards survival. If Cl is not rational for P* by 
A l’s standards, then Cl is an example of something which P* has good 
reason to hold if he has good reason to hold to A l, but which P* does not 
rationally hold by A l’s standards; hence Al would be incomplete, and 
inherently so (since Al implies Cl). Thus we are forced to conclude that 
unless the Critical Rationalist P* has no good reason to hold Al in the first 
place, Al is either self-referentially inconsistent or inherently incomplete...
(Post, 1987, p. 264.)
Where self-referentially inconsistent means,
A is a self-referential theory which implies that it possesses a certain 
property -the property of having survived criticism- which A turns out not 
to possess after all. Such a theory is said to be "self-referentially 
inconsistent.”
(Post, 1971, p. 228.)
And where inherently incomplete means,
We call a principle or theory of rationality incomplete iff there is a 
statement we have good reason to hold but which it is not rational to hold 
according to the theory's standards. We call the theory inherently incomplete
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when there is such a statement not "external" to theory but implied by the 
theory itself (as C is implied by A via B).
(Post, 1987, p. 254.)
Bartley reacted to this new formalisation of PCR by protesting (ibid, p. 238) that Post 
had not yet grasped the core of his position, and that therefore his theorem was 
irrelevant for PCR. Bartley argues that Post’s Al differs from the core statement of 
Bartley’s PCR, that is,
(A’) Every position which is held open to criticism and survives severe 
examination may be held rationally. (And there is no need to go into the 
question of its justification.)
(Bartley, p. 237.)
Bartley says that Post’s Al and his A ’ differ, because Post’s Al “reverses and 
crucially alters” A’ and then,
Post’s B does not follow from my A’. Nor does a reversed version of B 
follow from A’.
(Bartley, p. 237.)
Bartley also mentions that while he considers openness to, and survival of, criticism 
as sufficient conditions for rationality, Post regards them also as necessary, Post does 
this because,
... suppose criticizability and survival of criticism were not necessary but 
only sufficient for rationality. Then indeed it would be possible to be a 
rationalist. In fact it would be all too easy to be one. For then arbitrary 
dogma, shielded from every criticism, could not be condemned as irrational 
on the ground that it is uncriticizable; dogmatists and fideists could 
legitimately claim to be rationalists. This absurd outcome can be avoided 
only if one's theory of rationality states some necessary condition that 
arbitrary dogmas and leaps of faith will not satisfy.
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(Post, 1987, p. 267.)
Bartley, however, avoids this last debate by saying that,
The question whether these criteria are necessary or sufficient could be 
argued at length. I do not propose to do so here. For as I have shown [cf., 
Bartley’s previous argument showing the paradoxical nature of PCR] a 
similar paradox can be generated without reference to this question.
(Bartley, p. 238.)
MILLER’S DEFENCE OF PCR AS NON PARADOXICAL
Let’s recall Bartley’s shortened version of PCR at the start of this section, Bartley 
characterized PCR as:
(A) All positions are open to criticism.
And since PCR intends to be comprehensive it then follows,
(B) A is open to criticism.
This characterisation of PCR leads to self-referential paradox, as discussed 
previously in the first part of this section. Now, David Miller outlaws self-reference 
(and in this way he avoids PCR’s paradoxical nature) by distinguishing between 
positions and statements and declaring that (B) is just a statement -and not a position- 
and as such it is not in the domain of (A), that is (B) being a mere statement it 
doesn’t have to be criticizable on its own,
...I reject the thesis that criticizability is an automatic property of all 
statements. It is not an intrinsic property of statements at all, but an honour 
that must be bestowed on them by the development of appropriate methods 
of criticism. How, it may be asked, is this to be done? In many cases the 
answer can be only: by a consideration of the problems that provoked 
them... Those statements that are the response to no problem are accordingly 
the statements that it may be most difficult to criticize.
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...CCR must not be understood to hold that every statement that a 
comprehensively critical rationalist counts as true (rationally accepts) is on 
its own criticizable.
...As far as statements... are concerned, what is important for the rationalist,
I suggest, is that each statement that he accepts either is itself criticizable or 
follows from a statement that he accepts that is citicizable. Any position 
adopted must be criticizable, but it is no concession to the irrationalist to 
allow that some logical consequences of the position may not be 
criticizable.
(Miller, pp. 86, 89.) (Emphasis added.)
Miller's proposal is motivated by the fact that falsifiable statements can entail 
unfalsifiable ones,
All falsifiable hypotheses have amongst their consequences a host of 
unfalsifiable statements (ranging from tautologies and unrestricted 
existential statements to meaty metaphysics) that enter science as it were on 
the coat-tails of their parents. But these unfalsifiable consequences -to  the 
extent that that is all that they are- are not scientific in their own right; their 
title is one of courtesy. If their parents are rejected from the realm of 
scientific knowledge, they will have to be rejected too.
(Miller, p. 10.)
Metaphysical determinism is, for example, a consequence of Newtonian theory, and 
in the case at hand, mutatis mutandi, an uncriticizable statement is allegedly entailed 
by a criticizable position,
The comprehensively critical rationalist may not take up any position that he 
is not prepared to subject to critical examination. But though the critical 
examination of a hypothesis is normally conducted by critically examining 
some of its consequences, it is not conducted by examining them all. The 
rationalist is not at all obliged to try to criticize all the consequences o f his 
ideas, and if, as may happen, some of them are not open to criticism at all -
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which may mean no more than that he cannot think of any way, even 
potentially, of criticizing them -that need not disturb him...
In these terms [(A)] is a position that Bartley recommends that we adopt, 
and it is essential that it be criticizable. But [(B)] is just a consequence of it 
-an interesting consequence, in the light of what CCR says, and (one hopes) 
a true consequence; but it cannot be taken up as an independent position ... 
although [B] is a possible position on its own (though a strange one), it 
cannot be adopted at the same time as [(A)] is. Nor, of course, is there 
the slightest need for it to be adopted along with [(A)], which brings it 
along for nothing.
(Miller, p. 90.)(Emphasis added.)
Miller claims that to believe otherwise is to be victim of a philosophical prejudice, a 
prejudice that takes for granted the transmissibility assumption, an assumption that 
holds,
...that all properties, measures, and tokens of intellectual value or merit are 
transmitted from premisses to conclusion, in the same manner as truth, 
through the relationship of logical derivability or deducibility.
(Bartley, p. 261.)
Truth and probability are of course logically transmissible from premisses to 
conclusion via the deducibility relationship, but this is not the case of many other 
epistemic virtues or properties, such as falsifiability and criticisiability.
Miller’s demotion of (B) to statement status looks, however, suspiciously like an ad 
hoc manoeuvre or a stipulation that has to be accepted dogmatically. Why should we 
not take (B) as a position simultaneously to (A)? In other words, is there are a 
criterion that will allow us to distinguish between positions and statements? Still, 
when do positions entail positions, and not just statements? And which statements 
are criticizable on their own, and why? Furthermore, when Miller says that there is 
not “the slightest need for (B) to be adopted along with (A), which brings it along for 
nothing”, he seems to be giving up the comprehensive intention of PCR, a critical
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comprehensiveness which was PCR’s claim and aim and which distinguished it from 
the older non-comprehensive Popperian critical rationalism.
If PCR abandons its comprehensive character it is giving up what was allegedly its 
great virtue, what was its main advantage over critical rationalism, and this 
diminished PCR could then be confronted by a new tu quoque,
If you pancritical rationalist don’t hold criticizable some of your 
assumptions (or if you prefer statements), then neither I, an irrationalist, 
need open to criticism some of my dogmatic suppositions or statements.
If there is no adequate answer to these questions (and none is offered by Miller39) 
then it looks that the matter will be settled by someone’s (either an individual’s or a 
community’s) idiosyncratic judgment. It thus appears that Miller has transformed (B) 
into a dogma (or to use Miller’s euphemism a “statement”) only to avoid paradox. 
Bartley’s and Miller’s various moves look as what I. Lakatos used to call a 
degenerating problem-shift, a stubborn defensive strategy whatever the cost.
Ill RELATIVISTIC IMPLICATIONS
Several theories of rationality have been reviewed so far and we have found all of 
them wanting or at least in difficulties, thus:
i) We concluded that classical comprehensive rationalism was false because it was 
inconsistent.
ii) We found that critical rationalism was non-comprehensive and hence open to the 
attack of the tu quoque argument.
39 In contrast, Popper proposed a theory of falsifiability in which, for example, ‘pure 
existential’, ‘all-some’ and tautological statements were unfalsifiable due either to their 
syntactical or semantical structure (cf., Popper 1959, section 66.) Miller, on the other hand, 
has not offered any theory of criticizability that would provide some sort of demarcation 
criterion between positions and non-criticizable statements. Except for a hint at a pragmatic 
criterion, thus Milller claims that while positions are created as possible solutions to 
problems statements don’t intend to solve any problems And what is a problem is 
something to be decided by the argumentative context at hand (private communication.) The 
criticism of statements or positions can only be done by a ‘consideration of the problems 
that provoked them.’ (Miller, p. 86.)
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iii) Finally, we discovered that pan critical rationalism was paradoxical. It seems then 
that,
Any rationality theory is rationally acceptable by its own lights (circularity), 
or by other lights (potential infinite regress and actual circularity again), or 
is not rationally acceptable at all (irrationalism).
(Musgrave, p. 297.)
We also found ourselves with unjustified basic scientific methods (that is, with 
methods without a non vicious circular justification), methods such as induction and 
deduction. As Wittgenstein said:
At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded.
{On Certainty, 253.)
Or, as John Worrall has put it:
Indeed not only must the basic principles of scientific method ultimately be 
adopted dogmatically, so must those of deductive logic...
... if the sceptic really presses, then the only option is, I believe, the honest 
admission that ultimately we must stop arguing and 'dogmatically' assert 
certain basic principles of rationality. If (...) this honest admission entails 
relativism, then relativism wins.
{Fix it and be Damned, pp.382-3.)
Worrall's position40 is similar to that of Popper's critical rationalism with its 
sophisticated faith in reason. If rationality and science require, however, of dogmatic
40 One possible way to understand Worrall’s position is to consider all of science as a 
scientific research program:
Even science as a whole can be regarded as a huge research programme...
(Lakatos, p. 132.)
Worrall would then claim that in the nucleus of this huge SRP will be some fixed 
methodological principles and cognitive values, this core, however, will have a dogmatic
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presuppositions, this leads to relativism, because Popper’s and Worrall’s minimal 
dogmatism exposes the rationalist to the irrationalist’s tu quoque argument, and this 
provides a excuse for diverse unjustifiable dogmas. All these dogmas will be 
irrational and arbitrary in the eyes of Reason41, and one then ends with the possibility 
of a Babel of mutually inconsistent dogmas, all viciously circular self-justifying, all 
alleging to be right -though only by their own lights. And since all of one’s rational 
positions are ultimately justified or defended via these dogmas, one ends with a 
relativism of foundations, a relativism which can infect the whole intellectual 
structure resting on them. The process that leads to this foundational relativism might 
be summed up as follows:
i) Whenever rational agents (or a scientific community) assess theories, they 
presuppose some standard (implicit or explicit) according to which these theories are 
judged to be true or false.
ii) The question then arises of how to assess the standards themselves, and we 
discover that this leads us into a regress, and we discover that in the end, there is no 
further standard to which appeal can be made in order to determine if our most basic 
standards are correct.
iii) Where the condition described in (ii) obtains, it is nonsense to speak of basic 
standards as non-circularly correct, such fundamental standards can only be 
dogmatically reiterated and described.
iv) Hence, a decision to accept or reject some fundamental standard (once vicious 
circularity is excluded as a justifying strategy) must of necessity be arbitrary and a 
relativism of standards follows.
Thus, imagine two communities C and C* of which it is the case that there is a 
difference of fundamental standards. It follows that one cannot assert without vicious 
circularity that C (or C*) provides the proper standard, to do so would be 
illegitimate, and it also follows that there is no other way in which C can be judged 
superior to C*. Premiss (i), might be avoided by doing without standards, but then 
we would have subjectivism. One could also argue that though differences in 
ultimate standards are a logical possibility they are a psychological impossibility, but
character because it cannot be justified without vicious circularity, and not because of a 
conventional decision of some negative heuristic.
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‘scientific creationists’ show that it is not psychologically impossible to have 
different ultimate epistemic standards, hence foundational relativism seems to be 
both logically inevitable and a psychological reality.
CONCLUSION
Why should we take the two questions at the beginning of this chapter seriously?
We should, if we want to clarify to ourselves why the methods of inquiry, in general, 
and of science, in particular, have any thing to recommend them, if  we want to 
understand the nature of rationality (and in particular, of scientific rationality.) But 
then, why is it important to understand the nature of rationality? Because, rationality 
is:
... a crucial component of the self-image of the human species, not simply a 
tool for gaining knowledge or improving our lives or society. Understanding 
our rationality brings deeper insight into our nature and into whatever status 
we possess.
(R. Nozick, p. xii.)
And because these sceptical doubts threaten our responsibility as inquirers. Assume, 
for instance, that we were compelled to adopt certain goals or to pursue them in a 
certain way, this would question our confidence that we are free and fully 
responsible agents.
Further, if we were not able to give an adequate answer to these problems it would 
seem that the rational project, in particular, the project of science, cannot be carried 
out in a wholly reflective manner, then either of three choices would be left:
A maximal irrationalism -which as argued by Popper might be morally 
unacceptable. Or the conformism of a radical suspension of judgment, in which we 
passively accept traditional beliefs and behaviours without actively believing or 
supporting them. Or the resigned acceptance that we cannot rationally justify 
rationality, that we cannot be, even in principle, wholly rational agents, that dogmas 
are logically inevitably and necessary. Therefore, we would end with a more modest
41 These dogmas are arbitrary only from the perspective of Reason and not in an absolute 
sense, since they may be governed by accidental social or biographical circumstances.
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appraisal of ourselves as inquirers, that is, a more modest appraisal of the 
possibilities of argument.
Whatever our answer, to these problems, they may help us to arrive to a cognitive 
position with less self-deception, with less self-complacency. But even, if no answer 
were to be arrived at, the search would have been worthwhile since: the search, the 
struggle, is of itself valuable.
The search says more than the discovery.
(St. Augustine.)
The search of justification is limited because there cannot be a presupposition less 
starting point, and this logical fact is independent of any pragmatic limitations to the 
search of justifications. All our justificatory chains lead into an infinite regress, 
which can only be stopped with vicious circularity or dogmatism, because of this 
situation in the end our most basic beliefs are in fact dogmatically taken for granted.
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CHAPTER II
CAN A LOCALIST AND DESCRIPTIVE NATURALISM AVOID 
DOGMATIC FOUNDATIONS?
...In my naturalism, I recognize no higher truth than that which science 
provides or seeks.
(W. V. Quine.)
I
It could be argued that our approach was unreasonably over ambitious when 
discussing the logical limits to the justification (or criticism) of rationality and 
scientific methodology in the previous chapter, since we looked for answers to global 
questions, since we searched for ultimate justifications for our theories of rationality 
and for our scientific method(s) and aims. It could be argued that instead, one should 
have stayed contented with limited, with particular, or local problems, because our 
science, and the methods presupposed by it, have generally been successful. 
Therefore, it could be claimed that it is unreasonable to entertain global doubts about 
our science and its methods and aims, and that it is then unreasonable to ask for 
ultimate justifications for these methods and aims.
Otherwise, it could be argued that since our science and its methods have been 
overall effective in predicting, in giving us control over, some aspects of nature; that 
since our science has in general provided us with reliable knowledge, why doubt our 
science and its methods, why search for their global or ultimate justifications? 
Especially, since these sought justifications are likely to be unavailable.
A recommendation for local, for restricted questions, can be aptly illustrated by the 
well known metaphor of Neurath's, of a boat that is constantly repaired and improved 
while always navigating in the open sea; and never being taken to port for a complete 
overhaul. This boat can only be changed or repaired piece meal and this is done only 
when required; the proposal is that we do the same with our system of knowledge,
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that we question and revise it only here and there and only if serious doubts were to 
demand it. The localist believes that local or particular justification is all we need to 
be rationally justified about our corpus of knowledge.
Localism is epistemologically optimist since it believes in potential unlimited 
improvement: it assumes that our methods, goals and beliefs can in principle proceed 
indefinitely with a continuous and gradualist process of betterment. Localism then 
assumes that there are no large-scale errors or gaps in our current corpus of 
knowledge. Localism assumes that in general, our background knowledge is correct, 
it has to assume this, because this is the prerequisite to go on with a reformist 
approach. This conservative assumption of localism is the prerequisite for not doing 
a general overhaul; this optimistic assumption is the prerequisite for ignoring global 
questions. Thus,
We can change it [our conceptual scheme] bit by bit, plank by plank, though 
meanwhile there is nothing to carry us along but the evolving conceptual 
scheme itself.
(Quine, 1953b, p. 78.)
And in case our conceptual scheme were to be confronted with anomalous empirical 
evidence, then the localist conservatively recommends to accommodate the empirical 
anomalies with a minimum of alteration to our conceptual scheme.
Our boat stays afloat because at each alteration we keep the bulk of it intact 
as a going concern.
(Quine, 1960, p. 4.) (Emphasis added.)
Thus, we revise some of our particular beliefs while taking for granted the general 
validity of the bulk of our scientific procedures and results, while taking for granted 
our everyday common sense beliefs. These basic common sense presuppositions are 
akin to the ship's hull, they are what keep the boat afloat; thus, local questions 
(scientific and normative epistemic ones) are examined against background 
knowledge, a background that at least for the time being is considered as non­
problematic and as consensual. For example, particular features of our methods of
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inquiry may be evaluated against a framework of accepted common sense beliefs, 
scientific theory, and some basic methods (such as induction and deduction.) This 
framework is not questioned: i f  the ship keeps on navigating we just tinker with it. 
The assumption is made that those of our beliefs and methods that as a matter of 
consensus have worked can be taken for granted; that they are presumptively true or 
correct. That is, it is assumed that they are innocent until proven guilty, it is thought 
that to question them would be an unnatural and unfounded doubt. Thus,
We cannot begin with complete doubt... A person may, it is true, in the 
course of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but 
in that case he doubts because he has positive reason for it, and not on 
account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy 
what we do not doubt in our hearts.
(Charles S. Peirce, pp. 228-9.) (Emphasis added.)
Peirce's idea appears to be that we should do not take seriously doubts that we cannot 
entertain psychologically (i.e., “in our hearts”), and Peirce believes that we should 
avoid global or complete doubt, he also claims that doubts must be justified. 
According to Peirce, when one has a genuine doubt, it is because one has specific 
reasons for doubting, and then one can examine these reasons to find whether they 
are good reasons for doubting. Pierce’s proposal is to deal with real (i.e., local or 
restricted) and justified questions or problems, rather than with invented wider 
problems which we cannot entertain psychologically, as those wider doubts proposed 
by Descartes in his First Meditation. 42
42 For the pragmatist tradition, even amongst restricted questions, deliberation can be 
excessive, because too much deliberation interferes with a successful life; hence, some 
rashness is necessary for survival. Thus,
There is no more miserable human being than one in whom nothing is habitual but 
indecision, and for whom the lighting of every cigar, the drinking of every cup, the 
time of rising and going to bed every day, and the beginning of every bit of work, 
are subjects of express volitional deliberation.
(W. James, p. 122.)
Deliberation is for the pragmatist primarily a means of solving particular human problems 
and it is not carried for its own sake.
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The pragmatist tries to avoid (or is it evade?) the sceptical questions of the last 
chapter by focusing exclusively on local or particular questions. The localist advises 
us to emulate the alleged attitude of Kuhnian ‘normal’ scientists who take the 
presuppositions of their paradigm for granted, and only doubt their paradigm if they 
have good reasons for doubting it, reasons which for normal scientists can be 
persistent and numerous important anomalies. The localist wants to reform 
philosophy so that it imitates normal science by proceeding in a piecemeal fashion, 
that is, by taking for granted those background assumptions that have the backing of 
experience, by taking for granted those assumptions that have the backing of 
scientific tradition.
If we call a ‘normal world’ a world that is consistent with our general common sense 
beliefs about how the world is, then the localist is saying that we should be interested 
in doing science and philosophy in ‘normal worlds’. The localist is prescribing that 
we should not be interested in the difficulties of acquiring knowledge in some bizarre 
logically possible world inhabited by a malicious Cartesian demon, or in an 
outlandish world of brains in vats.
II
Quine has defended a holist thesis, and as result of his holism, Quine has questioned 
the synthetic-analytic distinction,
If (holism) is right... it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic 
statements, which hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements, 
which hold come what may. Any statement can be held true come what 
may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. 
Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision.
(Quine, 1953, p. 43.)(Emphasis added.)
Hence, for Quine, any statement is revisable, this implies that for Quine 
philosophical beliefs are also modifiable by experience, and then the boundary 
between science and philosophy (and in particular, between science and 
epistemology) becomes blurred. On the other hand, it is thought that science
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proceeds by asking local or particular questions, and that when doing so, science 
takes for granted its background knowledge and methodology (except if  good 
reasons to doubt some of its background presuppositions were to appear here or 
there.) Moreover, the pragmatist highly values science and its restricted 
investigations because of their practical results. As a result, Quine claims that a 
gradualist localism is the way to proceed in all our investigations, such as 
epistemological and scientific ones, and epistemology is to be appraised by the 
method(s) of science. And since science and philosophy are thought to form a 
continuum, sceptical challenges should arise within science, and we should use 
science to respond to them. Thus,
... skeptical doubts are scientific doubts (...) Epistemology is best looked 
upon, then as an enterprise within natural science. Cartesian doubt is not the 
way to begin.
(Quine, 1975, p. 68.) (Emphasis added.)
For Quine there is no ‘first philosophy’, that is, for Quine there is not a philosophy 
that is logically prior to any empirical knowledge. For Quine, there are not extra- 
scientific methods to assess from some place outside science, the epistemological 
merits of scientific theories, thus,
... Naturalism: abandonment of the goal of a first philosophy. It sees 
natural science as an inquiry into reality, fallible and corrigible but not 
answerable to any supra-scientific tribunal, and not in need of any 
justification beyond observation and the hypothetico-deductive 
method... Naturalism does not repudiate epistemology, but assimilates it to 
empirical psychology (...) [The naturalist] tries to improve, clarify, and 
understand the system from within. He is the busy sailor adrift on Neurath's 
boat.
(Quine, 1981, p. 72.) (Emphasis added.)
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Epistemology becomes the study of science from within science, and in this way 
epistemology loses its special character, for this doctrine (from now on ‘naturalism’) 
the empirical sciences43, their methods and results are what guide philosophy. Thus,
Science itself, in a broad sense, and not some ulterior philosophy, is 
where judgment is properly passed, however fallibly, on questions of 
truth and reality.
(Quine, 1982, p. 295.) (Emphasis added.)
Epistemological naturalism44 considers human knowledge a natural phenomenon to 
be studied the same way as any other aspect of nature, epistemological naturalism 
does not answer the philosophical sceptic; rather it says that Cartesian scepticism is 
psychologically and scientifically implausible. The naturalist takes for granted what 
the sceptic questions.
Naturalism could be characterized as the rejection of transcendental argument, that 
is, of non-empirical epistemological argument, naturalism recommends replacing a 
priori philosophy with scientific theory; and it claims that epistemology is just the 
study of science from within science.
Ill CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE LOCALIST-NATURALIST THESIS
I f  the localist-naturalist approach is used to justify our scientific methods it is 
circular
Quine tells us in a quote above that science is in no need for “any justification 
beyond observation and the hypothetico-deductive method”, hence Quine values 
observation and the hypothetico-deductive method, which he considers as the correct 
research methods, since he also claims that science is “where judgment is properly
43 Which empirical sciences are privileged as the archetypes to follow depends on the 
naturalist philosopher.
44 In summary, Quine’s naturalism appears to be the result both of his holism and of the high 
value he gives to science and to its localist research strategy. Quine’s high valuation of 
science is shown, for example, in Quine’s last quote above, where he claims: “science 
itself,..., is where judgement is properly passed.”
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passed... on questions of truth and reality.” The question now arises of how does 
Quine know that this is the proper method to judge “on questions of truth and 
reality”.
On the other hand, since Quine claims that natural science “is not answerable to any 
supra-scientific tribunal” (since there is no room for an “ulterior philosophy”), then 
for Quine any justification for what he takes to be scientific method has to come 
from within science. And given that the sciences in turn are selected and validated by 
scientific method, the justification of scientific method has to come, in Quine’s 
approach, ultimately from scientific method itself. Hence, we end by circularly 
justifying scientific method with scientific method, because there is no 'first 
philosophy', because epistemology is just an activity within natural science, because 
science is the only tribunal where questions of truth and reality are 'properly' settled. 
If it were answered, for example, that the available evidence, say the evidence 
provided by the history of successful science, warrants belief in scientific method, 
then this argument would be circular. Because we use scientific method to select 
what is to be taken as bona fide successful science, and to decide that the historical 
evidence so selected supports a belief in scientific method. We cannot validate in a 
non-circular way the methods of empirical science by appeal to some empirical 
science, Quine is aware of this fact, thus,
If the epistemologist goal is validation of the grounds of empirical science, 
he defeats his purpose by using psychology or other empirical science in the 
validation.
(Quine, 1969, pp. 75-76.)
Hence, for a Quinean, epistemology instead of seeking an alleged quixotic 
justification for our most basic methods and presuppositions will search to describe, 
to explain, to understand, via empirical science, the origin of our beliefs and the 
conditions under which we take them to be justified. In particular, it will seek to do 
this for our scientific beliefs and methods. Thus,
If we are out simply to understand the link between observation and science, 
we are well advised to use any available information, including that
76
provided by the very science whose link with observation we are 
seeking to understand.
(Quine, 1969, p. 76.)(Emphasis added.)
Epistemology thus becomes part of natural science, in the sense that the only 
legitimate epistemological questions are questions answerable or resolved by 
scientists using the methods of the empirical sciences, and any other epistemological 
questions are seen as traditional idle philosophical queries.
In this manner, Quine is trapped in a web of belief since he tries to ’’improve, clarify, 
and understand the system from within,” he is a prisoner of one of many possible 
Neurath boats. He takes for granted, as the localist that he is, his scheme's 
background knowledge (in particular, his scheme’s methodological assumptions), as 
well as the assumption of no large-scale errors or gaps in his scheme. Furthermore, 
when he claims that science is where, “judgment is properly passed,” Quine is 
making an unjustified normative claim.
It may be retorted that our demands of justification for what Quine takes to be 
scientific method means that we doubt this method, and that these doubts must be 
insincere, because to doubt the hypothetico-deductive method is impossible 
psychologically,45 or as Peirce would have said, because we cannot doubt it “in our 
hearts.” The answer is that the psychological impossibility of these doubts is 
irrelevant, because the important question is whether these doubts are logically 
cogent. This was the point made by Hume about our almost irresistible inductive 
psychological propensities, propensities that nevertheless lack logical justification, so 
Peirce's advice is misdirected, since it doesn't distinguish the psychological context 
from the logical one. Moreover, Peirce’s recommendation is itself unjustified, if  not, 
why should one rest contented with only local or particular questions?
The pragmatist might answer: ‘because local problems are solvable, while global, 
ultimate ones are insolvable’, the pragmatist’s injunction would then be: if you want
45 Though, ‘creation scientists’ who propose an alternative scientific methodology exemplify 
that these doubts are not psychologically impossible.
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to be means/ends rational, then deal only with solvable problems.46 The pragmatist 
will insist that to ask for justification all the way down to the ‘bedrock’ is 
unreasonable, that it is unreasonable because methodological bedrock non-viciously 
circular justifications cannot be provided. In other words, the pragmatist 
recommends: don’t ask what cannot be provided, stick to fruitful local questions, 
such as those of science.
Our sceptic will then go on to clarify that he is fully aware that our ultimate global 
questions are unsolvable, and that his aim is not to solve these questions, but only to 
point out that any answer to our ultimate methodological or axiological queries will 
require of some dogmas. Our sceptic wants to stress that even our criterion of 
rational identity itself has to be accepted dogmatically. He wants us to honestly 
recognize this logical fact, without masking it (say) with alleged virtuous rule 
circularity, or by surreptitiously substituting the search for justification with that of 
explanation.
For our sceptic, the naturalist’s advice is self-complacent and it allows us to ignore 
uncomfortable questions, it allows us to forget that we require of some dogmatic 
ultimate presuppositions.
Then again, the sceptical doubts in the previous chapter, were backed by simple 
logical arguments, so at least in this way they were not gratuitous. Moreover, those 
doubts were motivated by the fact that there are irrationalists (for example, scientific 
creationists, who question some of the sciences and their methods), because of these 
irrationalists, the need then arises for justifying our scientific methods. Furthermore, 
those doubts were also motivated by the need to understand the nature of rationality 
and its logical limits, so as to better understand ourselves.
Two points now demand further analysis:
46 Instrumental or means/ends rationality allegedly advises that, if  one wants to be rational, 
and if one wants goal A, then one should lookfor the justified optimal means, amongst those 
available to us, to attain or continuously approximate the desirable and sought goal A. 
Therefore, if A is an impossible and not continuously approximable goal, then there won’t be 
any means available to attain or get close to A, and then A would be means/ends irrational. 
This point will be further discussed in chapter V.
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1) Does a localist-naturalist meta-methodology intend only to describe and 
explain how scientists proceed when revising their scientific theories and 
methods?
2) Does a naturalist theory of scientific method recommend that we follow a 
piecemeal procedure?
Does a localist-naturalist meta-methodology intend only to describe how scientists 
proceed when revising their scientific theories and methods?
If a naturalist scientific meta-methodology were merely to describe the methods and 
goals of some of the sciences, or if it were just to describe how scientists proceed 
during their scientific investigations, then this would not be enough to answer our 
traditional epistemological questions, since we also want to know if scientists ought 
to follow any of their described research strategies.
The normative aspect of methodology is illustrated by the fact that in the past 
methodologists have criticized some aspects even of the leading scientific theories of 
their time, they criticized them because these past dominant scientific theories failed 
according to these methodologists’ canons. For example, Einstein qua methodologist 
thought that scientific theories should be deterministic even though quantum 
mechanics (the dominant theory in its field) is -  at least prima facie - not 
deterministic.
Furthermore, if we were to try to get the 'ought' of normative epistemology from the 
'is' of psychology (or some other empirical science) we could be suspected of 
committing the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ (a fallacy famously discussed for example by G. 
E. Moore.) Thus, a purely descriptive approach is not possible, because description is 
itself a cognitive activity with a normative dimension. For example, one selects for 
description those theories with characteristics that one considers as desirable in a 
scientific theory.47 The theories chosen as archetypical scientific are deemed worthy 
of description, and from this description, the naturalist hopes to infer methodological 
standards. In sum, the naturalist requires -  if rational - some methodological 
standards to select his substratum of putative scientific theories, and then from a
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descriptive study of this substratum he infers methodological standards, the whole 
process is circular, and so the naturalist ends getting only those norms that he started 
with. In other words,
In a naturalistic epistemology, theories are selected as scientific if they 
vindicate entrenched methodological assumptions; and we decide which 
methods to accept in accordance with a descriptive study of those selected 
theories48.
If not, why not describe the work of creation scientists and from an analysis of this 
description infer scientific method? Since this last option will be very likely 
considered unpalatable the naturalist would have to justify his selection of putative 
scientific theories, that is, he would have to justify the methodological canons that 
led him to his theoretical selection. Hence, Quine should tell us why what he 
considers as archetypes of the sciences are genuine sciences. Quine, however, claims 
that,
Naturalization of epistemology does not jettison the normative and settle for 
the indiscriminate description of ongoing procedures. For me normative 
epistemology is a branch of engineering. It is the technology of truth- 
seeking, or, in a more cautiously epistemological term, prediction. Like any 
technology, it makes free use of whatever scientific findings may suit its 
purpose. It draws upon mathematics in computing standard deviation and 
probable error ... It draws upon experimental psychology in exposing 
perceptual illusions, and upon cognitive psychology in scouting wishful 
thinking ... There is no question here of ultimate value, as in morals; it is 
a matter of efficacy for an ulterior end, truth or prediction.
(Quine, 1986, Reply to M. White, p. 665.)(Emphasis added.)
47 These desirable theoretical characteristics could be known only tacitly.
48 This is a m odification o f  the following quote,
[In a naturalistic epistemology] methods are accepted if they vindicate entrenched 
theoretical assumptions; and we decide which theories to accept in accordance with 
accepted methodological standards.
(Hookway, 1990, p. 223.)
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Again, how does Quine know that what he takes to be “scientific findings” are bona 
fide  scientific results? How does he know that “truth or prediction” are valuable 
cognitive ends? Quine believes he knows this because he surely has applied, even if 
only tacitly, some methodological standards to decide this matter, and then the 
normative aspect of methodology creeps in when deciding which results to call 
scientific. Tacit norms also creep in when Quine decides that “truth or prediction” 
are valuable cognitive ends.49
Quine will probably argue that a descriptive study of the empirical sciences will 
show that these are their aims, but again since the sciences don’t select themselves, 
how were the sciences selected? If the sciences were selected using some methods 
efficacious for the attainment of some cognitive ends, then the ends of the sciences 
were already there, in the methods and ends that helped to select them50, thus we end 
discovering and describing the very same methods and ends that we prejudged are 
the methods and ends of science.
In sum, Quine's naturalism cannot be wholly descriptive, because a full-bloodied 
descriptivist naturalism would be incapable of getting started, since all description 
requires some methodological standards, or norms, to recognize what is relevant and 
valuable of description. Or else, a descriptive naturalism requires some super- 
naturalistic cognitive methods and goals, it requires a vantage point outside science, 
it needs a moderate first philosophy.
This becomes especially clear, once one realises that even if the successful (say, in 
pragmatic terms, i.e., the empirically adequate) scientific theories were to somehow 
select themselves, a couple of questions would remain:
i) That of whether the methods presupposed by these pragmatically successful 
scientific theories are the proper scientific methods, and
ii) That of whether these pragmatically successful scientific theories constitute 
knowledge.
49 By the way, these are two very different cognitive aims, which of the two is the genuine 
scientific end? That it is important to decide whether the goal of science is truth or 
prediction, is shown by the on going debates between realists and instrumentalists, for 
example, in Chapter V, we will see that Laudan claims that truth is an irrational cognitive 
goal.
501 will develop this point in Chapter V, when discussing Laudan’s theory of scientific aims.
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Quine assumes an affirmative answer to these last questions, but by doing so, he is 
taking for granted, in spite of himself, a priori philosophy: pragmatism.51
Does a naturalist theory o f scientific method recommend that we follow a piecemeal 
procedure?
If naturalism is a normative injunction in favour of a piecemeal procedure, that is, if 
it is an injunction for dealing with problems only when they arise, without 
questioning entrenched theoretical and methodological assumptions; if naturalism 
recommends a tinkering localism when dealing with philosophical and 
epistemological questions (because allegedly this is how science proceeds), then how 
does naturalism justify his prescription for localism?
The localist-naturalist might answer that such demands for justification are precisely 
the kind of questions that localism excludes, if so, localism appears as a self-serving 
prescription. For the sceptic, naturalism is an ad hoc strategy that avoids what it 
cannot answer, thus, the naturalist asks us to,
... rest content with a policy of piecemeal tinkering whose legitimacy as a 
way of approaching truth cannot be established. If this is all that can be said,
51 Thus, Quine claims that,
We cannot detach ourselves from [our conceptual scheme] and compare it 
objectively with an unconceptualized reality. Hence it is meaningless, I suggest, to 
inquire into the absolute correctness of a conceptual scheme as a mirror of reality. 
Our standard for appraising basic changes of conceptual scheme must be, not a 
realistic standard of correspondence to reality, but a pragmatic standard. 
Concepts are language, and the purpose of concepts and of language is efficacy in 
communication and in prediction. Such is the ultimate duty of language, science 
and philosophy, and it is in relation to that duty that a conceptual scheme has 
finally to be appraised.
(Quine, 1953, p. 79.) (Emphasis added.)
Hence, even though Quine maintains that we cannot say which conceptual scheme is 
objectively correct or true (and in this sense none are better), he claims that we can still 
compare conceptual schemes in terms of their shared aim for efficacy in prediction. In the 
case of scientific conceptual schemes, this comparison can also be made because Quine 
believes conceptual schemes also share some basic methodological strategies, such as the 
hypothetico-deductive method. In other words, Quine believes that all scientific conceptual 
schemes share some basic methodological and axiological presuppositions, but how does 
Quine justify this belief of his?
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naturalistic epistemology appears to acquiesce in skepticism rather than 
try to overcome it.
(Hookway, 1990, p. 223.)(Emphasis added.)
Again, why should we accept the naturalist's advice: only local questions! Consider 
that traditionally, it has been considered philosophically legitimate to ask whether 
scientific procedures as a whole are justified. The localist will likely retort as 
follows,
Yes, inquiry can be a risky and fragile process, we must to certain extent 
trust to luck. However, do we have some positive reasons for mistrust in our 
process of inquiry? Or else, is this justification required for the growth of 
knowledge? If it is not, should we care to have this justification?
The answer is that this justification is required if  we want to know whether our 
process of knowledge acquisition is reliable. Moreover, the arguments of the 
last chapter could be seen as providing some reason for mistrusting our process 
of inquiry, since they showed logical deficiencies -for example, 
inconsistencies or self referential paradoxes- in our theories of rationality, and 
also because they showed that our most basic cognitive methods, deduction 
and induction appear to be justifiable only via viciously circular arguments.
The naturalist could still retort that,
... given the success of science so far it seems more prudent to doubt 
our theories of rationality, or the criticisms made to them, than to 
distrust our science.
And the naturalist would recommend that,
... science is innocent unless proved guilty while our metascience is guilty 
unless proved innocent.
(Carnap, as paraphrased by Hookway, 1988, p. 198.)
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But, why is the naturalist strategy more prudent? Is this evaluative judgement 
also going to be taken for granted? The naturalist will likely insist that,
The ship keeps navigating, how it does it, we still don't fully understand, but 
this is no reason to undermine our hope in its going on and in eventually 
understanding it better. It is true that this hope lacks positive reasons to back 
it (except for a history of some successes), but at least it also lacks negative 
arguments against it, except for the absence of a non-viciously circular 
justification.
However, how do we know that the ship will keep on navigating? It could well 
sink at any moment, on the other hand, how does the naturalist know that what 
he considers a history of some scientific “successes” is really that, i.e., a 
history of objective scientific successes, and not a history of something else.
In other words, how does the localist know that our world is a ‘normal’ one?
All we know is that so far our world seems to have been normal, from this to 
conclude that it has in fact been normal is taking for granted a prejudice. But 
even if  our world has in fact been normal, will it keep being normal? The 
naturalist’s belief in the normality of our world -  and in the persistence of this 
putative normality - may be natural or spontaneous, but so are the sceptic’s 
doubts, this as shown by the fact that these traditional sceptical questions keep 
on recurring.
For the Quinean our most basic cognitive methods are in no need of justification, 
what require justification are, instead, the 'unnatural' doubts of the sceptic: to doubt 
what has served us so well for so long requires a justification. The Quinean holds the 
following conditional principle P:
P: If it works, don’t justify it, because it doesn’t need a justification.
However, how do we go in P from the antecedent to the conclusion? How is this 
principle going to be justified? Either this principle is an a priori prescription, or it 
can be justified empirically. Now, to justify it empirically we would require of the
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very same methods (such as the hypothetic-deductive method) that this principle 
claims don’t need justification. The principle is then in the end saying that it itself 
doesn’t need of an empirical justification, then P has the character of a stipulation, of 
an a priori prescription, a character which goes against the Quinean dislike for ‘first 
philosophy’. Moreover, the Quinean appears to advise: Forbidden to ask questions 
which we cannot answer! Forbidden to question, what we consider obvious! But,
... believing something to be obvious does not obviate the need to defend it, 
or at least the need to acknowledge that belief as an assumption ... that one 
makes.
(Worrall, 1999, p. 348.)
The need to justify the obvious becomes especially pertinent when one 
considers that according to an evolutionary perspective it could be biologically 
advantageous (energy and time wise) to find obvious what is strictly wrong, 
but close enough (survival wise) to the truth.
Thus, consider that biological evolution selected our cognitive system for optimal 
efficiency vis a vis promoting biological survival and reproduction in a prehistoric 
terrestrial environment of middle-sized objects, and that as our investigations take us 
into the micro and macro cosmos, farther and farther away from our original problem 
situation, our cognitive architecture could prove insufficient. In other words, it is 
doubtful that the cognitive capacities that proved adequate to hunt a mammoth will 
also be sufficient to explore Mars, to do philosophy, and to develop a unified field 
theory in physics. In this way,
A naturalized epistemology begins by setting aside the classical 
justificatory questions of the adequacy of our knowledge-gathering 
practices, but ends up providing the basis for a new suspicion that there 
are deep limits for our knowledge in all but the most implausibly 
homogeneous and manageable of possible worlds. Indeed, it would be an 
odd accident if our subjective canons of scientific acceptability turned out to 
match in all respects the objective character of the universe. Why should our 
cognitive capacities be adequate for all domains? ... We are... unlikely to
85
have entirely correct and complete theories; our innate cognitive biases 
may cause us to accept some falsehoods and reject some truths.
... There seem to be possible worlds that would be too complicated for us or 
a society of experts to represent feasibly... The breadth and depth of 
putatively possible knowledge may be intrinsically too great for a both 
manageable and complete world view...
(Cherniak, pp. 127-9.)(Emphasis added.)
This conclusion becomes more plausible once one recalls that evolution selected 
those of our ancestors with cognitive capacities correct enough to promote their 
biological survival and reproduction, and that evolution did not necessarily select 
reliable truth producing and truth transmitting cognitive capacities even for dealing 
with the middle sized objects of our ancestor’s primeval savannah . Therefore, our 
contemporary biology undermines two of naturalism’s key assumptions:
i) That piecemeal improvement can proceed indefinitely.
ii) That there are no large-scale errors in our conceptual scheme.
The naturalist criticized the sceptic for entertaining unjustified or idle doubts, and 
ironically we now discover that science itself provides justified sceptical doubts, 
doubts analogous to those of the old sceptic.53 Now, to reject these last doubts 
someone could speculate on,
... a particular type of cosmology, one that ensures a preestablished 
harmony of man with the universe. It would be a peculiar coincidence in 
need of much explanation if, for every domain, every one of the interesting 
true theories, and all of them together, should just happen to be simple 
enough to be usable by, and intelligible to, us.
(Cherniak, p. 129.)
52 This because, natural selection, being interested only in survival, had to cut comers to save 
energy and time.
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And he could go on to make an assumption of veracitas Dei (as Descartes and 
Thomas Reid did) to underwrite his belief in a pre-established harmony of man’s 
mind and the cosmos, to back his hope that our cognitive means are adequate for our 
cognitive ends. These conjectures, however, will likely be unsavoury to the 
naturalist, because of their speculative metaphysical character.
IV IS JUSTIFICATION ONLY ARGUMENTATIVE?
The localist-naturalist can still argue that behind the sceptic’s doubts examined so far 
lurks the assumption that justification is only argumentative i.e., the belief that a 
proposition is justified by inferring it -say, deductively or inductively - from some 
premisses, and only thus. Therefore, it follows that if there are logical limits to 
argumentation, then there will be also logical limits to justification. Our sceptic has 
confined justification only to inferential relations amongst propositions and our 
sceptic has required that the justified believer have a conscious reason54 for thinking 
that his belief is true.
The naturalist, on the other hand, also welcomes ‘externalist’ non-argumentative 
justifications, such as those provided by, say, some psychological unconscious 
processes. It is claimed, for example, that beliefs caused or generated by overall 
reliable truth generating psychological processes (or beliefs transmitted, from 
previously justified beliefs, by generally reliable belief transmitting processes), in an 
environment normal for the formation or transmission of such beliefs, are justified. 
For this doctrine, reliabilism, beliefs would be justified even if the subject were 
unaware of the belief generating and transmitting processes or faculties going on in 
his mind, and because of this unawareness of the justiflcans the believer will in 
general have no reason for thinking that his beliefs are true or likely to be true, but 
will nonetheless be justified in accepting his beliefs. Examples of possible reliable 
‘source’ processes are perception, memory, reasoning and intuition, while examples
53 The consequences of some sceptical arguments provided by evolution theory will be 
further explored in chapter III.
54 Or at least, the justified believer should have his beliefs justified by reasons that can be 
made conscious -after adequate self examination or reflection- that is, the justifying reasons 
should be capable of becoming conscious.
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of possible reliable ‘transmitting’ or inferential processes are deduction and 
induction.
Reliabilism deals successfully with a scepticism concerning observational 
statements, since for reliabilism observational or basic statements can be justified if 
they are generated by some reliable non-inferential psychological processes, such as 
the processes of perception of a healthy subject in a standard situation. While in the 
argumentative conception of justification, only other statements can justify basic 
statements, a requirement which leads us into the familiar sceptical quandary: an 
infinite regress of justificatory statements, and to stop the regress of statements, 
circularity or dogmatism. Popper, for example, deals with this trilemma by 
concluding that a form of conventional dogmatism is unavoidable, that is, some basic 
statements have to be taken as true pro tern by a convention made by a scientific 
community. A conventional agreement, though, that could be revised and substituted 
by another conventional agreement55, if serious criticism of the first conventional 
basic statement were to arise. Still, the basic statements at which we stop the regress 
have the character of dogmas in the sense that they are accepted as true -again, even 
if only temporarily- without an argumentative justification. Popper arrives at this 
doctrine of his, because he believes that statements can only be justified by other 
statements, and therefore he believes that psychological processes even if  reliable 
can at most cause or motivate our decision to accept some basic statements, he would 
say that the reliabilist confuses justification with causation or motivation56.
Every test of a theory, whether resulting in its corroboration or falsification,
must stop at some basic statement or other which we decide to accept.
... The basic statements at which we stop, which we decide to accept as
satisfactory, and as sufficiently tested, have admittedly the character of
55Assuming the scientific community can reach an agreement about which basic statements 
are not problematic for the time being.
56 Popper’s position can perhaps be clarified via an ethical analogy, thus imagine a criminal 
who would causally explain his crime by showing that his action was the result of an 
emotional process (say, love or benevolence) that in general, and in standard situations leads, 
to good actions. Would we say that this causal explanation justifies as good his crime? Many 
of us would find an affirmative answer as counterintuitive. On the other hand, the adage 
says: to know all, is to forgive all, forgive perhaps, but not justify as good or right.
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dogmas, but only in so far as we may desist from justifying them by further 
arguments (or by further tests).
... Experiences can motivate a decision, perhaps decisively, and hence an 
acceptance or a rejection of a statement, but a basic statement cannot be 
justified by them -no more than thumping the table.
(Popper, sections 27-9.)
Hence, it seems that reliabilism can avoid an scepticism of basic statements, while 
the traditional argumentative or internalist doctrine of justification cannot avoid 
scepticism.
The reliabilist, however, has to deal with sceptical difficulties of his own once the 
sceptic asks for a justification of the beliefs in the reliability of the so-called reliable 
processes. Thus, the justification for the beliefs about the reliability of some 
processes will be provided by some other belief generating ‘reliable’ processes, and 
to stop a regress the reliabilist, like the argumentative internalist before him, will end 
with circularity or dogmatism concerning the reliability of some process. The 
reliabilist will stop the regress by arguing that our cognitive processes, such as our 
inductive processes, are reliably self-supporting,57 or by arguing that various of our 
cognitive processes are supported by some more basic self-supporting cognitive 
processes, or by arguing that our cognitive processes mutually (i.e., circularly) 
support each other,
An important component of a reliabilist theory of knowledge would surely 
be a list of reliable faculties: perception, memory, introspection, inference, 
and perhaps others. But how could one justify the addition of a faculty to the 
list except by use -direct or indirect- of that very faculty? And is that not 
as viciously circular as declaring a source reliable by accepting its 
reports at face value and inferring that it issues truth? Such reasoning 
is unreliable and in any case unacceptable. We may perhaps avoid 
vicious circularity by allowing a faculty to gain support from the use of 
other faculties. But these would need support of their own and how could 
they gain it except by each leaning on the others? Reliabilism is thus driven
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to seek refuge in a wide enough circle, which it must regard as benign, 
perhaps in virtue of its wide diameter.
(Sosa, E., p. 95.)(Emphasis added.)
However, both a viciously circular argument with a wide diameter and one with a 
small diameter are equally logically unacceptable, if there is any difference between 
these two circles it would be just a matter of psychological obviousness. The wide 
diameter circle may be regarded as “benign” (i.e., as a bona fide probative argument) 
only because its circularity remains hidden, only because its fault is not apparent, but 
if so, this looks as a deceptive or hypocritical strategy, it looks like a simulation 
game.
For example, assume that one has belief B that our memory has been in general a 
reliable belief producing cognitive process. Now, if someone asks for a justification 
of B , we could justify it by saying that belief B is generated by our memory cognitive 
processes. That is, we would justify B by invoking our memory - i.e., circularly - and 
if in addition, we were to infer that our memory cognitive processes will probably 
continue being reliable, we would have to assume also that our inductive cognitive 
processes are reliable.
Moreover, the reliabilist assumes that a belief B is justified in case cognitive 
processes that are in general reliable produce B (or transmit B from other justified 
beliefs.) Now, if the reliabilist is in turn going to justify his theory of justification he 
will argue either:
i) That the reliabilist theory of epistemic justification is justified because possible 
overall reliable cognitive processes, such as reasoning plus imagination, generate the 
reliabilist’s theory of justification. It is, however, problematic to argue that reasoning 
and imagination -once taken beyond our strongest intellectual intuitions- are by 
themselves in general reliable belief generating cognitive processes, given that it is 
almost a truism that reasoning and imagination have often lead us into absurd 
theories or beliefs.
Or,
57 Cf., chapter I above, for Papineau’s reliabilist rule circular justification of induction.
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ii) The reliabilist will end up with an argumentative internalist justification of his 
theory of justification, an argumentative justification that will ultimately lead again 
into the sceptical trilemma, of infinite regress, circularity, or dogmatism. Hence, in 
the end, the reliabilist finds himself in the same sceptical muddle from which he tried 
to extricate himself.
RECAPITULATION
Epistemological naturalism criticizes the sceptic for entertaining unjustified global 
doubts and naturalism tries instead to avoid scepticism by taking for granted as non 
problematic our background scientific knowledge and by recommending only a 
localist or piecemealist correction of our corpus of knowledge, these corrections will 
be motivated by limited and justified questions or problems.
It was argued that epistemological naturalism is the result of a holist thesis plus a 
high valuation of empirical science and it was argued that the epistemological 
naturalist:
i) Cannot justify without vicious circularity the most basic methods of science nor 
epistemological naturalism’s localist recommendation.
ii) That if epistemological naturalism intends to be a description of genuine scientific 
methods then naturalism tacitly takes for granted (i.e., without circular justification) 
some epistemic norms.
iii) That natural science itself (i.e., evolutionary biology) produces traditional sceptic 
doubts, and that therefore epistemological naturalism cannot avoid scepticism.
iv) That naturalism can neither avoid sceptic doubts by substituting an argumentative 
theory of justification with a reliabilist theory.
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CHAPTER THREE
CAN OUR COGNITIVE FACULTIES BE GIVEN A BIOLOGICAL 
LEGITIMISATION?
Darwin's theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other 
hypothesis in natural science.
L. Wittgenstein
What is wrong with evolutionary epistemology is not that the scientific facts 
are wrong, but that they don't answer any of the philosophical questions.
H. Putnam
INTRODUCTION
We concluded in a previous chapter that the search for an argumentative justification 
of our most basic cognitive methods ultimately led us into Sextus’ trilemma: infinite 
regress, circularity or dogmatism, in spite of this, some naturalist philosophers have 
claimed that,
... the methods of science are rooted in selective necessity,... The nature 
and development of science is constrained and informed by the 
biologically channelled modes of thinking imposed on us by evolution -
a consequence of the reproductive struggles faced by humans today, and 
even more a consequence of those struggles faced by humans in the past.
... In other words, in order to understand why science is as it is -  why laws, 
why predictions, why falsifiability, why consiliences - we need to look at 
the principles of scientific reasoning or methodology ... what I argue is that 
these principles have their being and only justification in their Darwinian
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value, that is in their adaptive worth to us humans -or, at least, to our 
proto-human ancestors. In short, I argue that the principles which 
guide and mould science are rooted in our biology,...
(Ruse, 1986, pp. 149,155.)(Emphasis added.)
C Q
I will examine in this chapter whether it is possible to justify as reliable our 
cognitive capacities from an evolutionary perspective, I will argue that an 
evolutionary justification is not possible without vicious circularity, and I will argue 
that what evolution theory can instead hope to do is to explain the origin of our 
intellectual faculties. Whether evolution can provide a genetic explanation of the 
reliability of our cognitive capacities, however, is also debatable, since there are 
reasons to doubt the rationality59 of a belief in an evolutionary explanation of our 
intellectual powers.
We have several cognitive faculties or intellectual capacities: inferential capacities 
such as inductive and deductive capacities, and ‘source’ capacities such as memory, 
perception and intuition60. We consider these capacities of ours, when functioning
58 A cognitive faculty is reliable if the great majority of its deliverances are true when it 
functions properly and in a standard situation.
59 As will be discussed further below, a belief in an evolutionary explanation of the reliability 
of our cognitive capacities is suspect of being a-rational, if not irrational.
60 Intuitive judgements are pre-analytic judgements but not arbitrary ones, and intuitive 
judgements can be improved by training and by gaining in expertise. The following 
examples will help illustrate the important role played by our cognitive intuitions.
a) A first example is provided by Nelson Goodman's projectable and non-projectable 
predicates. Goodman showed that it was not possible to rule out predicates like ‘grue’ on 
purely formal grounds. And this then left common sense, and finally intuition, as the only 
possible way for scientists to distinguish between projectable predicates and non-projectable 
ones.
b) Duhem also argued for scientists' intuitions or 'good sense' as a necessary addition to 
deductive logic. Good sense would provide, for instance, a way to decide what to preserve 
and what to reject when a lattice of hypotheses is empirically refuted as a whole.
These motives which do not proceed from logic and yet direct our choices, these 
'reasons which reason does not know' [...] constitute what is appropriately called 
good sense.
(Duhem, p. 217.)
c) Furthermore, intuitive judgements are also found in the subjective Bayesian approach, 
which requires inputs of prior probabilities, these priors, however, can be unreasonable and 
lead to bizarre results:
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properly61 and in an adequate environment, as reliable either as transmitters, or as 
expanders and as sources of truth. The problem now arises of how to justify this 
belief in the reliability of our cognitive faculties. The quest for the justification of 
the methods, or criteria, of science is not an idle one as shown by the fact that the 
methods of science are nowadays challenged by alternative cognitive standards, for 
example, those of creationism. Moreover, creationism’s alternative standards deny 
much of the framework of accepted scientific knowledge, hence it is important to try 
to justify as correct the cognitive standards of science.
I will examine in what follows the influential answer to this problem provided by 
‘evolutionary epistemology’, a constellation of doctrines under the name of 
evolutionary epistemology, however, appears in the literature. This constellation can 
be analysed as consisting of two related but different families (cf., M. Bradie.) One 
family looks for analogies between the evolution of life and that of the history of 
ideas, in particular, that of the history of our changing science. The doctrines in this 
first subset are mainly interested in understanding the growth of knowledge, on an 
individual or on a species basis. And for this they invoke analogies to natural 
selection. The other subset (EE for short), the one to be discussed here, intends to 
understand, explain and justify our basic mental cognitive abilities and innate
... differences in the prior probability function can lead to violent differences in the 
actual degrees of support assigned to theories,..., these differences can amount to 
what would ordinarily be considered as gross irrationalities ( ...)  The extent to 
which this is true is in fact rather shocking. Arthur Burks has in fact shown that 
there are even 'counter inductive prior probability functions'. That is, there is a 
certain logically possible prior probability metric such that if a scientist had that 
metric then as more evidence came in for a hypothesis (using the term more 
evidence on the basis of our normal inductive judgments) then the scientist would 
assign lower and lower weight to the hypothesis for a very long time.
(Putnam, 1981, p. 192.)
The need then arises to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable priors and for this, 
the scientists' intuitive judgements have to be welcomed. This because,
There does not seem to be any good reason to think that there would be a set of 
rules which could distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable priors and 
which would be any simpler than a complete description of the total psychology of 
an ideally rational human being.
(Putnam, 1981, p. 192.)
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A 2methodological propensities as only the result of evolutionary mechanisms as 
nowadays understood. The focus is now on the understanding of the development of 
these innate methods of thesis substantiation amongst the organisms in a lineage 
rather than on that of the evolution of the factual theses themselves.
EE claims that biological evolution has predisposed us to think in a way that 
is constrained by a certain fixed adaptive mental architecture, or at any rate, the 
claim is that if this mental architecture is not entirely fixed then it remains changeless 
for periods of historical magnitude. It is claimed that our most basic cognitive 
methods are reflections of innate dispositions and the result of natural selection 
working on the products of some chance events, such as random mutations. Natural 
selection discards most of these mutations, because they prove deleterious to the 
organism where they appear, but some are kept because they have survival value, 
some are kept because they enhance fitness, and as result, these selected mutations 
spread through the population.
According to this evolutionary view the emergence of man -including her intellect- is 
the result of the natural selection of the biologically best adapted or fittest over a 
span of many generations. These fittest have characteristics or adaptations that 
enable them to survive and to reproduce better than the unfit do. EE claims that 
reality shapes reason via evolution and that this in turn explains the reliability of our 
reason when dealing with the real.
Reason tells us about reality because reality shapes reason, selecting for
what seems “evident”.
(Robert Nozick, p. 112.)
In other words, the shaping of our reason by reality could help explain the success of 
our science and the apparent, or actual, partial harmony of our mind and the world. 
This evolutionary view is a distant echo of an illustrious earlier view: Plato's theory 
of anamnesis, where the modem cognitive intuition would correspond to the ancient 
recollection.
61 How to characterise ‘proper function’ is a difficult problem, cf., for example, Plantinga’s 
chapter 11.
62 That is, without invoking any other possible natural or supernatural causal agents.
96
The claim is that there is a constant, genetically transmitted, underlying uniformity to 
human thought, it is maintained that our science is constrained and channelled by our 
biology.
Otherwise, the thesis of evolutionary epistemology (EE) is that we have innate 
capacities and dispositions to understand, discover or learn, let's say, Peano's axioms 
and some principles of logic (such as the laws of identity, and non-contradiction.) It 
is also claimed that we have an innate methodological propensity to make right 
inductions (for example, that we have a predilection for projectable predicates) and 
that we have an inborn fondness for theoretical simplicity and for consilience (that is, 
for hypotheses with greater explanatory power.)
EE holds that we have these capacities and dispositions only because they proved 
biologically advantageous to our ancestors, otherwise, EE holds that these capacities 
and dispositions had a clear survival value to our ancestors in the struggle for 
existence and therefore were biologically selected and passed on to us. Now, this 
selection could have been specific or an unintended by-product of other selected 
traits, for example, consider the case of pleiotropic genes,
.. .in which one gene affects two or more distinct traits or systems. It will 
sometimes be the case that a gene has positive effects in one system and 
negative effects on another... The genes of albinism in arctic animals 
provide a nice example. The white coats these genes produce are obviously 
adaptive. However, the same genes typically produce serious eye problems, 
and albino animals generally can’t see as well as their coloured 
conspecifics.
(Stich, p. 65.)
One could then imagine our intellectual capacities to have been linked to some 
selected positive trait via (a) pleiotropic gene (s) and we could imagine this gene 
having been selected by virtue of its link to this positive trait. The biologically 
negative or indifferent intellectual attributes then could have become perpetuated by 
virtue of their link with the positive trait via the pleiotropic gene. Hence, the most we 
can really conclude is that our cognitive instincts are not biologically grossly
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maladaptive to undermine the adaptive value of any positive traits they may be tied 
to. Ruse, however, comments,
I would still be uncomfortable about supposing that so fundamental an 
aspect of human nature as our reasoning abilities was entirely a non- 
adaptive by-product of the evolutionary process. This is simply not the way 
that evolution works. When you have major features which seem to have 
adaptive virtues -and if reasoning does not have such virtues, I do not know 
what would- then you expect to find natural selection has been at work.
(Ruse, 1995, p. 173.)
Whatever might be the case, primitive hominids, which by some accident ended with 
some cognitive capacities and intellectual preferences -or so the evolutionary story 
goes- were more successful at reproduction. Hence these hominids eventually 
predominated, or at least were to be well represented, and became our likely 
ancestors, and consequently, these faculties and preferences are now innate in our 
descendants and us. These putative faculties now manifest themselves as half 
conscious intellectual abilities, intuitions, aversions and drives: as cognitive instincts. 
Notice that it is not being claimed that our mathematics, logic, philosophy or our 
empirical science were biologically selected. This biologisation is maintained only 
for a small methodological foundation, and our knowledge claims would be an 
epiphenomenon resting on this small foundation. Notice also that all that we are told 
about these innate capacities is that they lie behind scientific methodology, and that 
they lie behind some intellectual human drives and aversions, and notice that all the 
evidence about their existence comes from some behavioural regularities of ours, 
methodological or otherwise.
If correct, this evolutionary epistemology may help explain the ontological ‘tunnel 
vision’ claimed by Quine as a characteristic of human science,
... a physical theory of radically different form from ours, with nothing even 
recognizably similar to our quantification or objective reference, might 
still be empirically equivalent to ours, in the sense of predicting the same
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episodes of sensory bombardment on the strength of the same past episodes 
... our science has developed in such a way as to maintain always a 
manageably narrow spectrum of visible alternatives among which to choose 
when need arises to revise a theory. It is this narrowing of sights, or 
tunnel vision that has made for the continuity of science, through the 
vicissitudes of refutation and correction. And it is this also that has 
fostered the illusion of there being only one solution to the riddle of the 
universe.
(Quine, 1975, p. 81) (Emphasis added.)
Contra Quine, there could well be only one solution to the riddle of the universe, 
otherwise, how does Quine know that this alleged “tunnel vision” is an illusion? On 
the other hand, the existence of a tunnel vision is debatable given what we know of 
theoretical change (for example, in the conceptual and ontological axes) during 
scientific revolutions and, some would add, given also what we know of scientific 
methodological and axiological change during the development of science . 
Otherwise, since it is uncontroversial that change in scientific theories, and also to 
some degree in scientific methods and goals, has happened in the sciences, in what 
sense can we still talk of a tunnel vision?
Still, if  we were to grant to Quine the existence of this tunnel vision, EE could then 
help explain this tunnel vision via EE’s claim that human culture, and science in 
particular, are constrained and channelled into certain fixed paths, by mental 
capacities and dispositions programmed in our minds by biological evolution. If so, 
our biologically constrained modes of thinking must be wide or flexible enough to 
allow for the recorded variations in scientific concepts, ontology, methodology and 
aims. These cognitive instincts of ours must deal only with the most general features 
of our scientific reasoning and not with the specifics, the minutiae, of alternative 
methodologies, this must be so, since there is no consensus about fine 
methodological points.
63 For example, L. Laudan in his Science and Values argues that all scientific theories, 
methods and aims can change.
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The existence of these cognitive instincts gets some empirical support from 
anthropological, psychological and ethological studies, thus:64
i) The existence of innate human abilities is suggested by the universal capability of 
healthy humans for language, for musicality, and for basic arithmetic 
conceptualisations and operations.
ii) We seem to have hereditary inclinations to think causally and analogically. So,
We show untaught appreciations of similarity and difference, as are needed 
in order to think analogically. Likewise in the case of causality and other 
modes of thinking. (...) Humans, like other primates, automatically associate 
heights with falling, snakes with danger, (...)
(Ruse, 1986, p. 165.)
iii) We seem to have congenital conceptualisations, thus all healthy humans 
unconsciously classify colours in four basic categories, blue, green, yellow, and red. 
Thus,
...unconsciously, we break colours up into four basic categories,... People 
of radically different cultures, thinking quite unrelated languages, use much 
the same classificatory schema.
(Ruse, pp. 143-4.)
The conclusion is that we are not bom with passive tabula rasa minds, and that 
instead we are bom with some innate inclinations to certain thinking patterns and to 
certain patterns of behaviour.
Now, from the perspective of EE, our innate capacities have a contingent character; 
EE tells us that these instincts could all be strictly wrong and improved. That is, 
according to EE given different chance mutations, our present intellectual capacities 
might not have arisen, and even if these chance mutations had already arisen, these 
capacities might not have been selected given a different sequence of primitive 
habitats, because they could have been of little or no use in such habitats.
64 Cf., Ruse (1986) pp. 141-68.
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On the other hand, our most basic logical intuitions provide for us the conditions for 
thinking rationally, and the rational denial of these deep-seated logical intuitions of 
ours is very difficult to conceive, if at all65, then impasse. Either EE is wrong or we 
are the victims of confusion, a confusion to which we are inevitably urged by our 
prehistoric biological programming.
Taking an evolutionary perspective, we must acknowledge the contingency 
and explicability of our present ways of thinking, and in particular our 
present ascriptions of necessity. But if we do regard some things as 
necessarily true we thereby deny their contingency and cannot countenance 
the possibility of alternatives to them. We must simultaneously appreciate 
the contingency of the fact that the limits of our thought lie just where they 
do while remaining unable to think beyond those limits. It is not easy to 
hold consistently to both points of view simultaneously, and we inevitably 
find ourselves moving back and forth somewhat unsurely between them. 
That is perhaps inevitable when we try to stand outside the evolutionary 
process and see it as a whole, sub specie aeternitatis, while the terms we use 
to try to understand that process and our place in it are themselves products 
of the very process we are trying vainly to transcend.
(B. Stroud, 1981, pp. 247.)
Is it possible to understand human beings as part of nature and still maintain that we 
have cognitive access to a priori correct norms? That is, do we have the putative 
ability to know some truths or some methodological norms based on reflection 
alone? EE claims that what we consider a priori norms or truths is only so from a
65 One might speculate, for example, that there could exist alternative evolved intelligent 
beings somewhere else with bizarre ultimate methodological rules and aims. But, could we 
argue, and even communicate, with beings that would reason with a collection of basic 
cognitive intuitions disjoint from ours? While a partially differently wired rational mind may 
be conceivable (a mind, for instance, that would not reason numerically), one that would 
deny the necessary truths that we hold, one that would have ultimate cognitive principles 
contradictory to ours, would be considered by us to be confused or insane, or if not, as 
ineffable and unintelligible. A minimal set of cognitive intellectual strategies and intuitions 
shared with ours is going to be a necessary characteristic to ask of any understandable 
rational agent, of any agent with whom we could debate. Our most basic cognitive instincts, 
therefore de facto function as if they were universally binding, as if they were the objective 
right ones, which, on the other hand, they could well be.
101
synchronous psychological perspective, EE claims that a priori knowledge is the 
result of a contingent ancestral evolutionary implant; on the other hand, a priori 
truths appear to us to have a necessary character, a necessity which they could 
objectively have.
Now, if it were granted that our cognitive capacities have a biological origin, would 
this evolutionary genetic explanation of the programming of our brains or minds 
justify as correct the content of the program itself?
I
In what follows, I will argue for a negative answer to the last question, but first, I 
will try to articulate what an argument from EE in favour of a belief in the reliability 
of our cognitive capacities, as transmitters or producers of truths, would look like. 
The justificatory EE argument would go as follows:
a) We have good reasons to hold that our cognitive system, and in particular our 
scientific methods, are on the whole reliable as producers (for example, of 
true observational statements) and as transmitters (i.e., as inferential rules) of 
truths.
b) It is rational to believe that the theory of evolution is if not strictly true, at 
least is probably close to the truth (or if not, that it is at present, amongst all 
its competitor theories, the empirically most adequate theory.) The belief in 
the theory of evolution is rational, because this belief has been well 
corroborated or confirmed by the empirical evidence -as produced, selected 
and interpreted by our in general reliable cognitive system.
c) The theory of evolution claims that we are the result of natural selection, of 
biological evolution.
EE adds to these premisses the following ones:
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d) Our cognitive system is only a result of the evolutionary mechanisms 
entertained by contemporary biological evolution theory 66.
e) Organisms selected as fittest for survival have close to optimal characteristics 
or systems 61.
f) An evolutionary optimal cognitive system would be an overall reliable 
cognitive system. 68
It now follows from premisses (a) through (f) that,
C: It is rational to believe that our cognitive system is in general a reliable cognitive 
system.
Let’s take, for the time being, all the previous premisses for granted and focus in the 
structure of this argument. We notice that premiss (a) is equivalent to the conclusion 
C, and we discover that to obtain C we require of (a), because without (a) we 
wouldn’t obtain (b), and this last premiss in conjunction with (c), (d), (e) and (f) 
provides C. Hence, there is circularity and this circularity is inevitable given that in 
this argument there is no alternative evidential route leading to C, that is, without (a). 
Furthermore, the argument is viciously circular because: i) being circular it intends 
to be probative, i.e., it pretends to have a justificatory character, and ii) because at 
least one of its premisses [premiss (a)] is as problematic, as doubtful or as 
implausible as the conclusion C. Thus,
66 Thomas Nagel has challenged this premiss, he claims that there is no reason to believe 
that “every noteworthy characteristic of human beings, or of any other organism, must have 
a Darwinian explanation”. Nagel adds,
Why not take the development of the human intellect as a probable counterexample 
to the law that natural selection explains everything, instead of forcing it under the 
law with the improbable speculations unsupported by evidence?
(Nagel Thomas, 1986, p. 81)
But then how to explain our intellectual faculties and their possible reliability? Nagel finds it 
incredible that the appearance of our minds is a natural accident (cf., Nagel, 1997, p. 132), 
and therefore Nagel speculates that our cognitive capacities are the result of so far unknown 
natural laws and constraints.
67 This premiss and the following one have been disputed by P. Stich, cf., pp. 63-70, he 
argues that the denials of these two premises are wholly compatible with contemporary 
evolutionary theory, and not unlikely with respect to it.
68 This last premiss has also been questioned by A. Plantinga, his argument is discussed 
further below.
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An argument in persuasion dialogue can be useful to persuade or convince 
the respondent to whom it is directed only if the premisses are already 
secured as commitments of the respondent so that for him they are more 
plausible than the conclusion that he doubts or questions... Certainly this 
is true in persuasion dialogue because the premisses must be commitments 
of the respondent that are, from his point of view, more plausible than the 
conclusion. They must be, to be useful to prove the conclusion to him 
successfully.
(Walton, p. 321.)(Emphasis added.)
On the other hand, in a demonstrative argument -such as in those of Euclidean 
geometry- the premisses should not only be more plausible, but also,
... be firmly established as better known to be true than the conclusion to be 
proved. This context, or one very like it, appears to be indicated in the 
remark of Aristotle {Prior Analytics 64 b 30) where it is required of a 
demonstration that the premisses should be better known or established than 
the conclusion to be proved from them. In other words, Aristotle was saying 
that a demonstration is a special kind of argument where the premisses are 
better known than the conclusion. Therefore, in terms of evidence or 
knowledge, the premisses are prior to the conclusion in a demonstration. 
Hence it follows that the conclusion cannot be at the same time be prior to 
the premisses. The inquiry or demonstration is even more strongly inimical 
to circular reasoning, and apt to classify it as fallacious, than the persuasion 
dialogue.
(Walton, p. 324.)
A viciously circular argument is then pointless both as a persuasive and as a 
demonstrative argument. In the previous argument from EE in favour of a belief in 
the reliability of our cognitive capacities, these capacities, and the scientific method 
they make possible, are used to justify {via the biological theory of evolution) these 
same capacities and scientific method. Thus, the theory of evolution is identified as 
scientific, it is tested, and it is evaluated with the help of the very same methods we
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would like to justify, at the end, what has been done is to show that some scientific 
methods are behind the very same scientific methods. The argument is viciously 
circular because it purports to give a reason for trusting our cognitive methods, but 
the argument itself is trustworthy only if those cognitive methods (at least those 
required by the premisses of the argument) are indeed trustworthy. Hence, we only 
get back what we put in. If not, how do we know which are the archetypes of reliable 
scientific theories? If not, why not use 'creation science' instead of Darwinism to 
provide us with the answer about the origin, and with the justification, of our 
cognitive instincts?
The EE theorist has presupposed that we know that Darwinism is a well-corroborated 
essentially correct bona fide scientific theory. But this conclusion of his, if rational, 
must have been inferred by applying methodological rules, the very same rules he 
wants to justify via Darwinism. Therefore, there is here a vicious argumentative 
circle: we assume as a premiss the conclusion to be proved, and hence the premiss is 
as doubtful, as problematic as the conclusion. This reasoning, if used to accredit our 
methodological principles, is fallacious, and this would be the case even if  the 
argumentative circle were not obvious because it were very broad and inclusive.
The circularity is especially clear in the case of induction; thus, the evolutionary 
perspective assumes that the cognitive intuitions that worked in the past will go on 
working in the future. However, why so? Because, of an inductive inference. The 
inclination to make inductive inferences exists in our minds (EE would say) because 
of its past survival value, and this inductive inclination of ours in turn predisposes us 
to assume that induction’s survival value will be conserved in the future. The 
inductive bias of ours, however strong, cannot justify itself, because,
That past facts led to assumptions being built into us that fit them does not 
mean that those facts will continue to hold and those assumptions will 
continue to serve us.
(Nozick, 1993, p. 123.)
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We are back to a situation akin to Hume's psychological explanation of our inductive 
or causal reasoning, though this time the explanation is biological. We are told that 
we have been pre-programmed with certain thinking patterns, but from this putative 
biological destiny, we cannot conclude that we are rationally justified in employing 
these thinking patterns. That is, there is no non-circular evolutionary reply to the 
sceptic who would question our inductive intuitions.
Still some 'circularities' have been defended arguing that we sometimes find them in 
standard explanatory or causal sequences such as autocatalytic reactions (i.e., 
chemical reactions where a reaction product catalyses at some time tl its own 
generation at a later time t2.) So,
... circles of explanation may be perfectly acceptable. My being good at 
tennis explains my desire to play, which explains my hours of practice, 
which explains my being good at tennis.
(A. H. Goldman, p. 45.)(Emphasis added.)
That is, my being good at tennis (at tl)  explains my desire to play (at t2), which 
explains my hours of practice (at t3), which explains my being even better at tennis 
(at t4), where tl<  t2 < t3 < t4. Now this sequence is not circular, it is rather a causal 
diachronic chain. Similarly, Goldman’s following argument again is not a circular 
justificatory argument, but rather a causal explanatory chain.
Use of the principle of inference [to the best explanation] explains our belief 
in natural selection and its metaphysical framework, which explains how 
that cognitive mechanism evolved for its capacity to preserve truth, which 
explains both why we use the principle and why we ought to use it.
(A. H. Goldman, p. 45.)(Emphasis added.)
Again, use of the principle of inference to the best explanation (at tl)  explains our 
belief in natural selection (at tl), which explains how the principle of inference to the 
best explanation evolved (at tO.) And this in turn explains why we use the principle 
(at tl), where tO < t l . Goldman’s last argument may explain why we use the principle
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of inference in question but it does not answer, “why we ought to use it”. Where does 
the ‘ought’ come from? It is not provided by the evolutionary causal explanation, 
except if it could be shown that the principle in question preserves truth, and EE 
cannot do this without circularity. Otherwise, a causal explanation of the principle of 
inference to the best explanation doesn’t prescribe that a rational agent ought to 
believe this form of inference.
The most we can infer from these examples of Goldman’s is that causal diachronic 
chains (not circles of explanation) are standard explanatory strategies. Let’s recall, on 
the other hand, that what we are looking for is not for explanations but for 
justifications of our cognitive capacities, and that our question was whether circular 
justifications were acceptable.
EE may offer causal or genetic explanations for the innate contents of our minds, EE 
may explain how our mental capacities arose, but EE does not provide us with 
grounds for accepting the validity or reliability of our intellectual faculties. A 
question then arises:
Ought we to follow the dictates -if any- of evolution’s mind programming? 
Otherwise, can the crucial normative aspect of epistemology be validated 
biologically?
This question is pertinent, because if we were to blindly follow the intellectual 
intuitions and drives encoded in the collective subconscious of our phylogenetic line 
in a remote past, we would be mere automata. Thus, one would believe in logic 
merely because one was biologically programmed to do so, and not because logic is 
correct. Thus,
I can have no justification for trusting a reasoning capacity I have as a 
consequence of natural selection, unless I am justified in trusting it simply 
in itself -that is, believing what it tells me, in virtue of the content of the 
arguments it delivers.
... the recognition of logical arguments as independently valid is a 
precondition of the acceptability of an evolutionary story about the source 
of that recognition. This means that the evolutionary hypothesis is 
acceptable only if reason does not need its support. At most it may show 
why the existence of reason need not be biologically mysterious.
(Nagel, 1997, p. 136.)
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Again, Goldman’s last argument doesn't prove or logically support the principle of 
inference to the best explanation, because to justify this principle as correct is 
different from causally explaining its origin, that is,
Evolutionary epistemology commits a mode of genetic fallacy. The "genetic 
fallacy" confuses the course of historical development with one of probative 
justification, for example, by arguing from the fact that a doctrine has a 
somewhat reputable (or disreputable) origin that it must be tenable (or 
untenable). The Darwinian epistemologist in effect argues in just this way, 
moving from historical survival to the presumptive correctness of methods. 
Surely no such transcategorical inference from the factual issue of 
historical considerations to conclusions regarding the issue of the normative 
validation of a method can possibly be valid. One cannot move from the 
historical order of temporal development to the logical order of probative 
concatenation.
(Rescher, p. 135.)
In contrast, the origin of a group of cognitive faculties can sometimes provide a 
reason to doubt the reliability (i.e., provide a ‘defeater’69) of such a group of 
intellectual capacities. For example, suppose I were to believe that I was created by a 
malevolent Cartesian demon, a demon that designed me so that I believe mostly false 
beliefs. Then this belief about the origin of my beliefs will provide me with a 
defeater for my spontaneous belief in the reliability of my cognitive capacities.
Now, to have a defeater for my belief in the reliability of my cognitive capacities (R, 
for short) it is not necessary that I believe that in fact a Cartesian demon interferes 
with my mind, to have a defeater it is enough that I could not pronounce myself, one 
way or the other, about such a demonic scenario. In such an agnostic situation, I 
would have a reason to be agnostic about R and about any beliefs generated with the 
help of my cognitive capacities.
69 A ‘defeater’ of some belief is roughly a reason (or possibly also an experience) to doubt 
the reasons for that belief, for a better characterisation of the concept of defeater, consult 
Plantinga’s forthcoming paper, in Beilby (ed).
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And we discover that belief in EE provides a defeater for R just as the Cartesian 
demon did in the fanciful previous scenario. Thus, let’s grant that our cognitive 
capacities were selected to promote our survival, our survival, however, can be 
promoted by cognitive capacities that have as an aim something less than truth, this 
because truth is not always biologically useful, i.e., cognitive capacities that had as 
an aim truth could be uneconomical time and energy-wise.
If our intellectual capacities have a biological origin then these capacities are the 
result of selective compromises, of dirty adaptations. Natural selection, biological 
evolution, is not interested in true belief but in appropriate behaviour, that is, in 
behaviour conducive to fitness, i.e., in behaviour maximising survival and 
reproduction.
Hence, even if it could be somehow proved that our minds are bom wired with some 
epistemic and axiological presuppositions, and furthermore, even if it could be 
shown that this programming was a result of Darwinian natural selection, this would 
not be enough to show that these innate mental contents of ours are the right, the
7 0correct ones . Because,
Complete veridicality is probably not, in evolutionary terms, cost effective. 
Organisms that must act to survive must process information. They must do 
so reasonably well, and reasonably fast. Quick computing cuts comers... 
Both physiological and cognitive adaptation is asymptotic; the residual gap, 
however small, renders all 'knowledge' uncertain.
(N. Tennant, p. 33.)(Emphasis added.)
Consequently, about the correctness of our cognitive instincts, some agnosticism 
might be pmdent,
... the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, 
which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any 
value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a 
monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?
(Charles Darwin.)
70 For example, wishful thinking could well be the result of biological evolution, given its 
adaptive value in terms of emotional well being.
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And because of the rapidity with which cultural change has proceeded our present 
brain must have got its present capabilities very early in its evolution. Hence, an 
evolutionary explanation of our cognitive faculties would warrant serious doubts 
about the reliability of our cognitive faculties when theorising beyond a limited 
domain.
The question is whether not only the physical but the mental capacity 
needed to make a stone axe automatically brings with it the capacity to take 
each of the steps that have led from there to the construction of the 
hydrogen bomb, or whether an enormous excess mental capacity, not 
explainable by natural selection, was responsible for the generation and 
spread of the sequence of intellectual instruments that has emerged over the 
last thirty thousand years.
(Nagel Thomas, 1986, p. 80.)
Therefore, there would be no reason to trust the results of our intellectual capacities 
in endeavours such as biological evolution. Hence, an evolutionary explanation of 
our cognitive capacities would then also warrant serious doubts about the correctness 
of this evolutionary explanation itself. EE is then self-undermining, self-defeating.
II
The probable unreliability of our cognitive faculties -if these capacities were to have 
only a Darwinian origin- merits more attention. Thus, there are contrary opinions 
about the value of the probability (P) of our cognitive capacities being reliable (R) 
overall, when functioning properly, and conditional on the correctness of EE: 
P(R/EE). Which opinion is favoured about the value of P depends in turn on which
71theory is held about the causal connections between beliefs, desires and behaviour , 
if one holds, for example, that from adaptive behaviour nothing follows about the
71 Cf., Plantinga’s chapter 12 for more on these conflicting positions.
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truth-value of beliefs then we will favour a low value for P(R/EE). Contrariwise, if 
adaptive behaviour makes probable true beliefs, then P will have a high value.
Quine believes that P has a high value, because he thinks that belief and behaviour 
are linked closely, in such a way that abundant and basic false beliefs will lead to 
radical maladaptive behaviour and extinction, thus,
Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but 
praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind.
(Quine, 1969, p. 126.)
While others like Darwin (cf., Darwin’s quote above), and Patricia Churchland 
appear to believe that the value of P is low, possibly because they think that 
behaviour and belief are only weakly connected. Thus,
Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to 
succeed in the four F’s:
feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principal chore of nervous 
systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the 
organism may survive... Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an 
evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so 
long as it is geared to the organism’s way o f life and enhances the 
organism’s chances o f  survival Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the 
hindmost.
(Churchland, P., p. 548.)
Nevertheless, one can speculate that it is unlikely that our methodological instincts 
can be far from the mark, that they can be seriously wrong:
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i. Because our cognitive capacities appear to have served us well72 in the study of
multiple aspects of the world, and in evaluating an enormous range of 
different hypotheses of diverse generality and depth. Moreover, our cognitive 
instincts seem to form a coherent web.
ii. If evolution is not understood as just searching for adaptation, but rather as 
searching for adaptability,73 and if such a reinterpreted Darwinism were 
correct, then the innate contents of our minds would have been selected 
because they provide us with adaptability to a wide spectrum of possible 
niches and not merely adaptation to some primitive circumstances. That is, 
our mental cognitive capacities would not be just the right-enough ones for 
some narrow set of habitats. And since, one would suppose that the ideally 
right intellectual expectations and rules of method provide the most 
adaptability value, we could expect our deepest cognitive intuitions and 
inclinations to be the correct ones, or at least not to be far from the correct 
ones74.
iii. The prospects for evolution to have landed on the best or the correct 
method(s) are high when one considers that the selective process of 
methodological evolution has a relatively reduced range of methodological 
possibilities from which to choose. Because the range of possible ultimate 
methods of thesis evaluation is relatively small, when compared with the 
astronomical number of possible substantial theses to be evaluated.
Given the conflicting good arguments about the value of P(R/EE), it seems sensible - 
it seems rational- to opt for agnosticism about P(R/EE). Agnosticism about P(R/EE) 
implies agnosticism about R75, which in turn implies agnosticism about any belief B 
generated with the help of R. In particular, agnosticism about P(R/EE) implies
72 However, to rationally assert that, “our cognitive capacities have served as well” we need 
these same cognitive capacities, and again there is circularity, therefore this argument is not 
conclusive.
73 C. H. Waddington, Hahlweg and Hooker defend evolutionary progress as increased 
adaptability.
74 One must keep in mind, however, that the development of cognitive capacities is just one 
of the many possible strategies open to a biological lineage in its way to more adaptability. 
Thus, other species have achieved high adaptability by emphasising efficient reproduction 
(i.e., brief gestation periods with abundant offspring) instead of intelligence.
75 If one is a believer of EE, and if there is no argument against agnosticism about R.
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agnosticism about belief in EE itself. The rational recommendation is, therefore, to 
suspend judgement about EE, in other words, it is being said that it is a-rational to 
hold a belief in EE. This argument can be analysed as follows:
7 f%a) The probability P(R/EE) that our cognitive capacities are reliable given EE 
cannot be known.
b) We then have a good reason to suspend judgement about R itself, that is, 
about the reliability of our cognitive capacities (assuming there is no further 
evidence in pro or against the reliability of all or some of our capacities.)
c) However, if somebody doubts R then he has a good reason to doubt any
7 7beliefs validated by R, in particular, one has a good reason to be agnostic 
about EE. This reservation about the correctness of EE will hold, except if 
there were some ulterior argument (a ‘defeater’) undermining the reasons to 
doubt EE. Now, any such defeater argument will involve at least some belief 
B, as a premiss, and any such belief B will also be doubtful, because R itself 
is doubtful. That is, B will be also the result of our doubtful cognitive 
capacities, and consequently B will be in doubt, as will be, the defeater 
involving B. Thus, in the end, EE defeats itself and this self-defeat is
76 This premiss is a simplification since it is well possible that the reliability of some of our 
cognitive capacities is less doubtful than that of others. Plantinga recognizes this and says,
... we have been lumping together all of our cognitive faculties, all of our sources 
of belief, and all the sorts of beliefs they produce. But perhaps these different sorts 
of faculties should be treated differentially; clearly the argument can be narrowed 
down to specific faculties or powers of belief-producing mechanisms, with 
possibly different results for different cases. And surely the argument does apply 
more plausibly to some cognitive powers than to others...
... even if you think Darwinian selection would make it probable that certain belief- 
producing mechanisms -those involved in the production of beliefs relevant to 
survival- are reliable, that would not hold for the mechanisms involved in the 
production of the theoretical claims of science, such beliefs, for example as E, the 
evolutionary story itself.
(Plantinga, pp. 232-3.)
Consequently, the believer in EE ends if not with a defeater for any belief, yes with a 
defeater for belief in EE itself.
77 It may appear as too strong to say that any beliefs backed by R would be doubtful, since 
then even a belief in necessary truths would also be doubtful. Well, if R claims that all our 
cognitive capacities are reliable, and if R is doubtful, then there would appear reservations 
also about those cognitive capacities that permit us to discover the irresistibility of necessary 
truths.
113
undefeated. In summary, there is no way to defeat our doubts about EE, once 
we become aware that EE throws doubts on R (i.e., on the reliability of our 
cognitive capacities) and on any beliefs generated via R.
d) EE then undermines itself, because if EE were true, then we would have 
reasons to doubt it.
e) Therefore, the rational recommendation is to suspend judgement about EE.
Otherwise, it is a-rational to hold a belief in EE, notice that what is a-rational to 
believe is evolutionary epistemology (the thesis that biological evolution, as 
nowadays understood, can by itself explain the reliability of our cognitive capacities.) 
And that it is not being said that it is a-rational to believe in biological evolution 
itself. On the other hand, from the a-rationality of a belief in EE it doesn’t follow that 
EE is false, not even that it is rational to believe in the falsity of EE.
Now, if  one believes -as most of us do because of an instinctive faith- that our 
cognitive faculties are in fact overall reliable78, then we get a contradiction with the 
previous agnostic recommendation about R. An agnostic recommendation we 
ultimately got from EE, this contradiction would then provide an argument against 
the correctness of EE, i.e., an argument for the irrationality of a belief in EE.
If the recommendation for agnosticism about EE is granted, then the problem arises 
of how to explain the origin, and how to justify our cognitive capacities. Concerning 
the origin of our intellectual faculties we are left with only three main alternatives: 
a) Leave it as a mystery, b) a supematuralist (theist or deist) explanation, or,
c) Nagel’s speculation about some yet unknown natural processes or laws of nature 
as responsible of our cognitive capacities.
As for the justification of our capacities, one must conclude that EE fails to provide a 
non-viciously circular justification for our cognitive capacities, and that even if it 
did, this justification would be dubious given the suspicion on EE of a-rationality 
(and even of irrationality). Then, either the justification is to be found somewhere
78 This animal faith in R could be expressed by asserting that R has intrinsic warrant, i.e., by 
saying that R doesn’t get its warrant on the evidential basis of any other beliefs, in particular 
not from a belief in EE. In other words, it would be held that R has so much intrinsic warrant 
that R cannot be defeated by the fact that P(R/EE) is inscrutable. But this is another way of
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else79, or we might have to resign ourselves to accept our cognitive capacities as 
reliable without a non-viciously circular justification, that is, dogmatically.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DOES LAUDAN’S META-METHODOLOGY PROMISE MORE 
THAN IT CAN DELIVER? (PART I.)
This chapter is the first of two chapters in which I will examine Laudan’s more 
recent theory of science (the one he published on and after 1984.) To facilitate 
analysis, I will focus on the methodological aspect of Laudan’s proposal in this first 
part, while I will concentrate on its axiological facet (i.e., on Laudan’s theory of 
scientific aims) in the next chapter.
INTRODUCTION
A traditional problem of the philosophy of science is that of providing a rational 
explanation for scientific theory change, i.e., an explanation that avoids relativism. In 
this context, there are two different forms of relativism to be avoided:
a) Historical relativism. This doctrine asserts that the history of science is 
punctuated by distinctive phases, and it asserts that these various scientific phases (or 
paradigms) cannot be rationally compared or evaluated as better or worse vis a vis 
each other, therefore which scientific phase or paradigm one prefers is something 
decided by extra rational considerations. For the historical relativist scientific change 
is akin to a change of fashion or to a change of collective taste.
Historical relativism could happen if the transition between different scientific 
phases were to happen, for example, with scientific substantial theories, methods and 
cognitive values all changing at the same time to different and incompatible ones, all 
changing simultaneously to those idiosyncratic of a subsequent phase. In such a case, 
scientific inter-paradigmatic change would be such that there would not be a fixed 
methodological or axiological fulcrum or ‘hinge’ from which to evaluate rationally 
the claims made by the various paradigms.
In other words, historical relativism can be the result of a holist view of scientific 
change, a view where transitions between scientific phases involve simultaneous and 
significant variation in scientific theories, methods and aims. In such a case, it will
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make no sense to ask which of these different scientific paradigms is the best one as 
viewed from nowhere, i.e., to ask which is the best one as viewed from an objective 
standpoint. Nor will it make sense to talk of trans-paradigmatic scientific progress 
towards some supra-paradigmatic goal, since there is no such inter-paradigmatic 
goal. For this historical relativist, all scientific paradigms are equally correct, and any 
paradigm is only the best one from its own perspective, that is, each paradigm is only 
the best one during its own period of hegemony; each paradigm is only the best one 
when examined by its own community of believers.
Nonetheless, historical relativism could happen even if there were some inter- 
paradigmatic a-historical methodological standards. Thus, historical relativism will 
still follow if these inter-paradigmatic, a-temporal, standards (when applied singly) 
were to provide a too ambiguous advice about scientific theory preference, or if these 
various standards, when applied together, were to advise conflicting theory choices. 
In such scenarios, trans-paradigmatic rational standards would be insufficient to 
advice by themselves scientific theory preference, and theory choice would then 
require of subjective criteria.
b) Foundational relativism, this form of relativism is the result of accepting as correct 
and without a non- circular justification science’s ultimate methodological or aim 
presuppositions. These unjustified ultimate foundations then have a dogmatic or 
axiomatic character. Relativism follows because it is logically possible to have many 
alternative dogmatic foundations all of which would be equally respectable or 
disrespectable from reason’s point of view, or else, which of these unjustified 
alternative scientific foundations to prefer would be rationally arbitrary. Now, from 
this rational arbitrariness it doesn’t follow that a rational agent or rational community 
would be indifferent about which scientific foundation to accept. A scientific 
community could prefer, for example, some dogmas to others, because of some 
psychological drives, or because of some historical or sociological accidents.
Notice that one can end with foundational relativism, even if one were to have trans- 
paradigmatic ahistorical standards, and even if these standards were unambiguous, 
and even if they wouldn’t provide conflicting advice, foundational relativism will
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still follow, if these inter-paradigmatic standards were accepted as correct without a 
non viciously circular justification.
I will argue that Laudan has tried, unfortunately without success, to provide a theory 
of scientific change that avoids both types of relativism. In Laudan’s diagnosis, both 
of these relativistic consequences of previous meta-methodologies, were the result of 
assuming a tiered or hierarchical model of rational justification, relativistic 
consequences that were accentuated when to the hierarchical supposition was added 
a second assumption: that of a holist view of scientific change.
THE HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC CHANGE
The hierarchical model distinguishes three different scientific levels: at bottom, the 
level of factual theories, then a level of methodological rules, and above the other 
two levels, a tier of scientific aims. According to this hierarchical model the upper 
levels justify - and can sometimes bring to rational closure differences of opinion at - 
the lower levels, thus, in this hierarchical model justification always flows in a 
descending direction.
It is sometimes possible, for example, to rationally close scientific debates at the 
factual level by invoking shared methodologies, while differences of opinion at the 
methodological level -which Laudan believes have been widespread throughout the 
history of science80 -can be brought sometimes to a rational end by appealing to 
shared goals. This last assertion is the result of methodological rules being thought of 
as the justified optimal means for the achievement of some scientific ends.
Scientific goals sit in this hierarchical model at the top echelon as supreme judges, 
this privileged place of scientific goals means that if any differences concerning 
scientific aims were to arise between different scientific groups, then there would be 
no extra justificatory levels to which to appeal to. Hence, in this hierarchical model 
rationality cannot close debates about scientific aims, because without a referee to 
arbitrate goal differences, different and incompatible goals can be all equally correct,
80 John Worrall questions this supposition, Worrall argues that there have been 
methodological differences amongst scientists only if one characterises methodology very
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and goal relativism follows. Hence, this hierarchical tradition doesn’t provide a 
proper way to close scientific disagreement at the goal level,
... there is a point where the model [the hierarchical model] breaks down 
badly and repeatedly: specifically, when scientists disagree about (some of) 
their basic cognitive aims or goals. Since those goals are at the top of the 
justificatory ladder in this model, there is apparently no recourse, no court 
of independent appeal, when scientists differ about axiological matters. Yet 
differ they do.
(Laudan, 1984, p. 42-3.)
This goal relativism could then infect with relativistic consequences the lower levels, 
consider, for example, some scientific community promoting a set of scientific goals 
G l, and a different scientific community propounding an incompatible set G2, then 
the first community could end justifying methods Mi, while the second community 
could end justifying a different set of methods mi81. These methodological 
differences could in turn translate as differences at the factual-theoretical level, 
theoretical differences, which would be without a rational solution.
Laudan distinguishes two main inherited hierarchical models of scientific change, 
these are:
i) The model of logical positivism cum Popper, and
ii) The holist model of Kuhn et al.
Laudan believes that the logical positivists cum Popper held a gradualist or piece 
mealist hierarchical model of scientific change82, in this view, scientific change
laxly and if one doesn’t distinguish between genuine -which could be only implicit- and 
explicit methodological pronouncements. Cf., Worrall (1988) pp. 268-72.
81 It is not sure that two scientific communities with different goals would end with different 
methodological rules, because different sets of scientific goals can sometimes correspond to 
the same collection of scientific methods. For instance, instrumentalists and realists although 
they differ on some scientific goals (say, truth vs. empirical adequacy) frequently share the 
same methodological rules.
82 Worrall (1988) p. 268-9, questions that positivists held a hierarchical model as described 
by Laudan, Worrall argues that the positivists didn’t hold that axiology governs 
methodology.
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usually involves one level at a time, and scientific change rarely happens 
simultaneously at the three levels of factual theories, methods and goals. Moreover, 
Laudan points out that for the positivist tradition scientific aims were a matter of 
convention or subjective volitions83, thus if divergences in cognitive goals were to 
arise the positivist tradition couldn’t solve these differences rationally, and as a 
result, the hierarchical positivist tradition couldn’t avoid both a historical and 
foundational relativisms.
On the other hand, in Kuhn’s model of scientific development (as described in his 
classic, ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’), there are periods of scientific 
consensus -or of ‘normal science’- followed by periods of disagreement, or of 
‘scientific revolution’. Episodes of scientific revolution are in turn followed by other 
periods of consensus and so on, and a hierarchy of goals, rules and factual theories, 
all relative to a paradigm, has supremacy during the periods of consensus. Kuhn’s 
conception is a hierarchical model with a non-gradualist view -  i.e., with a holist 
view - of scientific change. Kuhn’s holism (or the ‘big-picture’ view of scientific 
change) asserts that all three levels of the hierarchical model change ‘all at once’ and 
significantly during scientific revolutions.
But paradigms differ in more than substance, (...) They are the source of the 
methods, problem-field, and standards of solution accepted by any mature 
scientific community at any given time. As a result, the reception of a new 
paradigm often necessitates a redefinition of the corresponding science (...) 
The normal-scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is 
not only incompatible but often actually incommensurable with that which 
has gone before.
Just because it is a transition between incommensurables, the transition 
between competing paradigms cannot be made a step at a time, forced by 
logic and neutral experience. Like the gestalt switch, it must occur all at 
once (though not necessarily in an instant) or not at all.
(Kuhn, 1970, pp. 103, 150.)(Emphasis added.)
83 Cf., Reichenbach’s , Popper’s and Laudan’s quotes on this topic, in the section ‘Of the 
Aims of Science’ at the end of 1.1 in Chapter I, above. Also, Laudan (1984) pp. 48-9.
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Leaving aside the apparent inconsistency between a change that occurs “all at once,” 
“though not necessarily in an instant”, this Kuhnian holism entails that there is no 
fixed point from where to evaluate the various paradigms, and historical relativism 
then follows. Historical relativism follows, because there are no a-temporal supra- 
paradigmatic standards from where to evaluate the various paradigms, the ultimate 
standard is the changing assent of the relevant scientific community . Thus,
When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice, 
their role is necessarily circular. Each group uses its own paradigm to 
argue in that paradigm’s defense... Yet, whatever its force, the status of the 
circular argument is only that of persuasion. It cannot be made logically or 
even probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to step into the 
circle. The premisses and values shared by the two parties to a debate 
over paradigms are not sufficiently extensive for that. As in political 
revolutions, so in paradigm choice -there is no standard higher than the 
assent of the relevant community.
(Kuhn, 1970, p. 94.)(Emphasis added.)
84 In the Postscript to his ‘Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ and later in chapter 13 of his 
‘The Essential Tension’ Kuhn claims, however, that there are some objective supra- 
paradigmatic standards, scientific aims such as empirical accuracy and scope, consistency, 
simplicity and fruitfulness. Kuhn adds, though, that these goals are insufficient to govern by 
themselves theory choice, and thus in Kuhn’s view theory ranking will always be partly the 
result of subjective factors. The objective standards are insufficient because they are claimed 
to be ambiguous, that is, they can be interpreted in different subjective ways, and because it 
is also claimed the various standards can give conflicting advice, and therefore these 
standards require of weights, weights that will be decided also subjectively. In other words,
... every individual choice between competing theories depends on a mixture of 
objective and subjective factors, or of shared and individual criteria.
... there are always at least some good reasons for each possible [theoretical] 
choice.
(Kuhn, 1977, pp. 325, 328.)
Because of this insufficiency, because of this weakness, of Kuhn’s objective standards, a 
relativism of scientific theory choice cannot be avoided even with the help of Kuhn’s 
objective standards. One could then envisage bizarre ‘rational’ theory rankings with, for 
example, Einstenian Relativity ranked after Newtonian Physics, or even after Aristotelian 
Physics, and these absurd rankings would be as rational for Kuhn as the orthodox ordering of 
Einstein’s theory better than Newton’s, and Newton’s theory better than Aristotle’s. For 
more on Kuhn’s relativism, consult J. Worrall (2000), in particular, section 3.
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Kuhn’s relativism is especially clear when one recalls that Kuhn also claims that 
those scientists that after a revolutionary period decide to hold to the old paradigm 
are as rational as their colleagues that opt for the new paradigm, otherwise,
On Kuhn’s view, ‘neither proof nor error is at issue’ in these cases, there 
being ‘always some good reasons for every possible choice’ -  that is, both 
for switching to the revolutionary new paradigm and for sticking to the old. 
Hence the hold-outs cannot, on his view, be condemned as ‘illogical or 
unscientific’. But neither of course can those who switch to the new 
paradigm be so condemned.
(Worrall, 2000, p. 126.)
Thus, for Kuhn everyone is right, the ‘elderly hold-out’ and the revolutionary alike, 
and there is no “point at which resistance becomes illogical or unscientific.”85
On the other hand, the Kuhnian theory has difficulties explaining rationally how a 
new consensus -a new period of normal science- arises after a period of revolutionary 
turmoil. The question is how and why do the various revolutionary factions -into, 
which a scientific community has fragmented- coalesce into loyalty to a new 
reigning paradigm. Thus,
Because he [Kuhn] believes that interparadigmatic dialogue is inevitably 
partial and incomplete, and because he thinks that the partisans of different 
paradigms subscribe to different methodological standards, Kuhn can 
readily explain why many scientific debates are protracted and inconclusive 
affairs. (...) What it cannot explain so readily, if  at all, is how -short of sheer 
exhaustion or political manipulation- scientific disagreements are ever 
brought to closure. If rival scientists cannot understand one another’s point 
of view, if they have fundamentally different expectations about what 
counts as a “good” scientific theory, it seems utterly mysterious that those 
same scientists should ever (let alone often) reach a point where they agree
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about which paradigm is acceptable. But without such agreement, the onset 
of normal science, whose existence Kuhn went to such lengths to document, 
becomes utterly unintelligible.
(Laudan, 1984, pp. 16-7.)
I LAUDAN’S RETICULATED MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC CHANGE
Laudan has proposed an alternative theory of scientific change, his reticulated model, 
a theory that intends to overcome the alleged deficiencies in the positivist and 
Kuhnian explanations of scientific change. Laudan’s reticulated model intends to 
provide a rational explanation for the transitions, in the empirical sciences, between 
periods of consensus and dissensus, and vice versa. This reticulated model 
supposedly does all this, while eluding both historical and foundational relativism .
85 Cf., Kuhn, 1970, p. 159.
86 That Laudan desires to avoid historical relativism is made clear when he criticizes, for 
example, the Kuhnian approach for its historical relativistic consequences. Thus,
... the immediate point to stress is that Kuhn portrays paradigm changes in ways 
that make them seem to be abrupt and global ruptures in the life of a scientific 
community. So great is this supposed transition that several of Kuhn’s critics have 
charged that, despite Kuhn’s proclaimed intentions to the contrary, his analysis 
inevitably turns scientific change into a nonrational or irrational process. In part, 
but only in part, it is Kuhn’s infelicitous terminology that produces this 
impression.
(...) When scientific change is construed so globally, it is no small challenge to see 
how it could be other than a conversion experience.
(Laudan, 1984, pp. 70, 72.) (Emphasis added.)
And that Laudan desires to avoid foundational relativism is made clear when he criticizes 
Worrall for ignoring foundational relativism, thus,
The central claim of the epistemic relativist, at least where standards and methods 
are concerned, is not that those standards change but that -whether changing or 
unchanging- those standards have no independent, non-question begging rationale 
or foundation. Even if man had been using exactly the same inferential principles 
ever since the dawn of science, the relativist would doubtless ask, and properly so, 
‘What is their justification?’
I believe that there is an answer to the relativist’s challenge to show how 
methodological or epistemic principles can be justified; indeed, much of 
Science and Values was an attempt to sketch out one such response.
... I thus categorically reject the suggestion that the thesis that the methods of 
science change in itself gives aid and comfort to relativism. What does give 
comfort to relativism is a failure to address the question: ‘How are 
methodological rules or standards justified?’
(Laudan, 1989, pp. 369-70.) (Emphasis added.)
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On the other hand, Laudan’s reticulated model intends to be a naturalised meta­
methodology of science,
I do hold that methodology can be and should be as empirical as the 
natural sciences whose results it draws on. (That is precisely what I mean 
by a “reticulated” view of scientific rationality.)
(Laudan, 1987b, p. 231 .)(Emphasis added.)
Laudan’s meta-methodology, even while intending to be a naturalised meta­
methodology, also aims to keep the normative character of traditional epistemology, 
thus,
Quine, for one, seems to accept that there is little if any place for normative 
considerations in a suitably naturalized epistemology. I daresay that Quine 
regards his relegation of epistemology to a sub-branch of “descriptive 
psychology” as a matter of boldly biting the naturalistic bullet; but in my 
view, the abandonment of a prescriptive and critical function for 
epistemology - i f  that is what Quine's view entails- is more akin to using 
that bullet to shoot, yourself in the foot.
(Laudan, 1990b, pp. 45-6.)
Because of these desiderata, Laudan also calls his reticulated model a ‘normative 
naturalism’ (cf., Laudan 1987a.) and he claims that his meta-methodology provides,
... a sketch of a naturalistic theory of methodology which preserves an 
important critical and prescriptive role for the philosopher of science, and 
which promises to enable us to choose between rival methodologies and 
epistemologies of science. What it does not promise is any a priori or 
incorrigible demonstrations of methodology; to the contrary, it makes 
methodology every bit as precarious epistemically as science itself.
(Laudan, 1987a, p. 29.) (Bolds added.)
Laudan’s reticulated model is a gradualist non-hierarchical model of scientific 
change. It is gradualist in that it is not holist, and it is reticulated in that its view of
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justification is non-hierarchical. Moreover, this reticulated model considers scientific 
methodological rules as the most efficient means available (efficient on light of the 
historical evidence) for achieving some rational cognitive ends. Let’s analyse these 
assumptions:
1.1 Laudan’s reticulated model keeps the same triad of the hierarchical model: 
scientific factual theories, methods, and goals. For Laudan’s reticulated model, as for 
the older hierarchical one, the relevant aspects of scientific change can be explained 
just by the elements of this trio and their interactions. But the reticulated model 
differs from the hierarchical one, in that it abandons the hierarchical’s idea of an 
unidirectional justificatory flow, it discards the idea of justification only flowing 
downwards from scientific goals to scientific methods, and then from scientific 
methods to factual theories. For the reticulated model, both justification and 
scientific change can flow in any direction, for example, from theories to methods 
and from these to goals.
Laudan proposes, for example, the following reticulated historical scenario:
Newton’s corpuscular theory of light had reigned unopposed for some time, when the 
wave theory of light emerged, and after a transition period, the wave theory became 
the new dominant optical conception. And this change from Newton’s corpuscular 
theory to the wave theory of light in turn promoted a change from a Newtonian 
inductive methodology to the hypothetico-deductive one characteristic of the wave 
theorists. Finally, this change of methodology next promoted a change of epistemic 
goals, a change from an epistemic goal that condemned directly unobservable 
theoretical entities -a condemnation supposedly characteristic of Newtonian 
inductivism- to a new epistemic axiology that accepted, under certain circumstances, 
directly unobservable scientific concepts.
In other words, the reticulated story claims that we started with the Newtonian 
theories-methods-goals triad of (Tl, M l, G l) and ended with the wave triad of (T2, 
M2, G2). And this transformation supposedly followed the following steps: (Tl, M l, 
G l) to (T2, M l, Gl), then to (T2, M2, Gl), to finally end with (T2, M2, G2). Notice 
that the overall change from (Tl, M l, G l) to (T2, M2, G2) is thought to have 
happened gradually with only one element of the triad changing at a time. Scientific
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change is not hold to happen, as the holist model will have, with the all the elements 
of the trio changing simultaneously87.
1.2 Both Laudan’s reticulated model and the hierarchical model (this last, as 
portrayed by Laudan) view the methodological rules of science as hypothetical 
imperatives, as conditionals Q, of the form:
Q: I f  you value epistemic goals Ai, then follow M, because the historical evidence 
shows that M  is the available optimum88 strategy for the attainment ofA i. 89 
Now, if I accept the antecedent of conditional Q, why should I accept the 
consequent? Otherwise, then, why should I follow method M? The answer is found 
in a more basic conditional presupposed by the previous conditional Q, this more 
basic conditional S says:
S: I f  you are going to be rational, then use that method - amongst the methods 
available to you - that you have good reasons to consider as optimal fo r  the 
attainment o f  your valued goals.
This last conditional, which describes a conception of means-ends rationality, is 
behind all of Laudan’s conditional Q’s. Thus we can re-state Q as:
Q’: I f  you are to be rational, and i f  you value epistemic goals Ai, and i f  M  is the 
empirically warranted optimum method (of those methods available to you) for the 
attainment ofAi, then follow M, because this is the rational strategy to follow.
87 Cf., Laudan, 1984, pp. 56-60, for various putative historical examples.
88 Justification of some means as optimal is a requirement, because methods are rational not 
because they deliver the goods, but because they are justified as optimum for the delivery of 
the goods. Thus, one could imagine someone arriving at his goals by the most effective 
method possible and still reaching them in a non-rational way. His best method, for instance, 
could have been found by accident, or it could be the result of unquestioning tradition, this 
method would then be lacking the endorsement of reasons. On the other hand, a method 
justified as optimal is not the same as the optimal method, hence, an action or method might 
be the optimal one but not be justified as optimal, and a method can be justified as optimal 
and still not be the optimal method.
89 This cognitive utilitarianism has been characterized as follows,
First, one specifies something as the goal of science. That is, scientists are taken as 
aiming at the production of theories of some particular kind... Second, some 
principle or set of principles are specified for comparing rival theories against a 
given evidential background. Such principles (frequently referred to as a 
methodology) rate the extent to which theories actually achieve or are likely to 
achieve the goal in question.
(Newton-Smith, p. 4)
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This view of methodological rules as hypothetical imperatives makes them 
criticizable, or testable, empirically via the history of science -given a set of desirable 
cognitive aims - now, if methodological rules are empirically criticizable, then these 
rules can be changed empirically. Thus, Laudan claims methodological rules are as 
conjectural and fallible as the theories of the empirical sciences.
One difference concerning methodological rules, between the older hierarchical 
model and Laudan’s alternative, is that while in the older model, goals were a matter 
of conventions or volitional decisions, Laudan instead provides an embryonic theory 
of rational epistemic goals.90 Laudan believes that his theory of cognitive goals 
permits us -at least sometimes- to rationally choose, or exclude, some scientific 
aims.91 For example, Laudan believes that scientific goals can sometimes be 
empirically criticized and changed by examining the historical evidence to find 
whether these goals have been realized, and ergo to find whether these scientific 
goals are realizable. If there were good reasons, for example, to conclude that some 
desirable scientific goal is unrealizable, then Laudan would say that this fact provides 
a good reason to abandon it.
1.3 On the other hand, in Laudan’s model, methodological rules have a normative 
character, even if only a conditional or hypothetical one, thus, Laudan’s 
methodological rules tell us which strategy we ought to follow, in case we value 
means-ends rationality, and in case we value some cognitive aims.
Since methodological rules are taken by Laudan’s reticulated model to be empirically 
criticizable, and since these rules are held to have a hypothetical normative character, 
Laudan has recently re-named his model ‘normative naturalism’ (Cf., Laudan, 1990.) 
The term naturalism refers to Laudan’s pretension that his reticulated model provides 
a theory of scientific method as empirical as science itself. He claims that the
90 Laudan’s theory of scientific aims will be discussed in the following chapter.
91 Laudan has a maximal approach to means-ends rationality, that is, he understands 
rationality in what Newton-Smith (cf., p. 258) calls a maximal way: action to be rational 
requires besides instrumental value, of a positive endorsement of the goals and procedures 
involved.
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assumptions of the methodology of science should92 be adjudicated the same way 
that scientific claims are adjudicated. Thus Laudan says:
Crediting or discrediting a methodological rule requires us to ask ourselves 
whether the universe we inhabit is one in which our cognitive ends can in 
fact be furthered by following this rule rather than that. Such questions 
cannot be answered a priori; they are empirical matters. It follows that 
scientific methodology is itself an empirical discipline which cannot 
dispense with the very methods of inquiry whose validity it investigates.
(Laudan, 1984, p. 40.)(Emphasis added.)
Laudan recognises, however, that such an empirical methodology would be a circular 
enterprise since it “cannot dispense with the very methods of inquiry whose validity 
it investigates.” Laudan has added recently,
Epistemic naturalism ... holds the claims of philosophy are to be adjudicated 
in the same ways that we adjudicate claims in other walks of life, such as 
science, common sense, and the law. More specifically, epistemic 
naturalism is a meta-epistemological thesis: it holds that the theory of 
knowledge is continuous with other sorts of theories about how the natural 
world is constituted. It claims that philosophy is neither logically prior to the 
other forms of inquiry nor superior to them as a mode of knowing. 
Naturalism thereby denies that the theory of knowledge is synthetic a 
priori (as Chisholm would have it), a set of “useful conventions” (as 
Popper insisted)...
(Laudan, 1990b, p. 44.)(Emphasis added.)
II CRITICAL COMMENTARIES
I will concentrate my critical comments in this chapter on two elements of the 
reticulated model’s triad: on theories and methods (T, M). Moreover, my criticism in
920ne wonders, though, how this prescription is going to be justified, it looks as an a priori
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this chapter will focus on whether Laudan’s reticulated model succeeds in avoiding 
both historical and foundational relativism. This is something one would expect 
Laudan’s reticulated model to accomplish, since Laudan criticizes Kuhn for the 
historical relativistic consequences of his theory of science, and since Laudan also 
censures the positivist cum Popper, and also J. Worrall, for not dealing with, what I 
have called, foundational relativism.
II. 1 Can Laudan’s reticulated model avoid foundational relativism?
Normative naturalism makes various methodological presuppositions, which cannot 
be warranted without circularity, an infinite regress, or dogmatism. And this 
contradicts normative naturalism’s main purported goal: to justify our cognitive 
methods, in particular,
a) Laudan’s view of methodological rules as hypothetical imperatives presupposes 
scheme S, above, but how are we to justify this conditional? That this conditional 
needs justification is made clear by considering alternatives to it, for example, one 
could propose the following absurd looking alternatives:
S ‘i f  rational look fo r  the justified least optimal means to your valued ends. ’ Or, 
S ”: ‘i f  rational pray to attain your valued ends. ’ Or,
S ’”: ‘i f  rational let chance -say, by playing at dice- decide which is the best means 
to your valued ends. ’
Laudan does not justify his scheme for means-ends rationality, and therefore, his 
position assumes without justification one of many possible conceptions of means- 
ends rationality. This conception of means/ends rationality plays a crucial role in 
Laudan’s scientific meta-methodology, since Laudan’s reticulated model requires 
Laudan’s means-ends rationality scheme to warrant, and to empirically criticize, 
scientific methodological rules.93 This crucial assumption is left unjustified, possibly 
because a non-circular justification of this assumption is unlikely to be available.
injunction, and if so, it goes against the spirit of naturalism.
93 Laudan’s scheme for means-ends rationality is also required by him to conclude that 
unrealizable scientific aims are irrational (cf., next chapter.)
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One would end by saying, ‘but it is obvious that the rational thing to do is to follow 
S!94 The alternatives S’, S”  and S’”  are just absurd’. This is of course a circular 
argument; S is preferred just because it is closer to our shared intuitions than S’, S” 
or S’” .
Still, someone could argue that if we were to substitute S with S’, S” or S’”  we 
would very likely be soon extinct. And that therefore, if we value our survival, we 
should follow S (or if not, an alternative scheme very close to it) because S is the 
optimum means for securing our survival. This argument, however, presupposes 
(though now at the meta-level) precisely what we want to justify, hence circularity or 
regress. In conclusion, S has a likely a priori character, and when S is accepted, it is 
accepted as correct without a non-viciously circular justification.
Due to this lack of a non-circular justification for S, if a believer in S were to 
criticize a believer of any of the alternatives to S as irrational, this last one could 
always retort with a tu quoque argument, that is,
You cannot criticize me, because you also do not justify without circularity 
your conditional S. I have as much right to my dogma as you to yours. All 
of us are ultimately dogmatic, and we only differ in which dogmas we end 
preferring. If because I prefer an alternative to S I am irrational, then so are 
you due to your preference for S.
b) If we grant to Laudan that methodological rules are the empirically warranted 
optimum means to some valued cognitive aims, and if we grant that these 
methodological rules pass judgment on empirical claims or theories, then a 
justificatory regress arises. Because if  Ml is supported by some evidence E l, one can 
then ask how was evidence El itself warranted. And to answer this last question we 
would need some other methodological rules M2. Rules M2 would then warrant 
evidence E l, and some other evidence E2 would in turn warrant rules M2, the 
question about the warrant of E2 would then reappear, and to answer this last petition
941 will argue in the next chapter, however, that S is not an adequate representation of 
means-ends rationality. I will argue that S should be modified to S2: if rational search for the 
warranted optimum means for the attainment of, or for the approximation to, your valued 
aims.
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of warrant we would go on to invoke methodological rules M3, rules which in turn 
would be supported by evidence E3, and so on ad infinitum.
Laudan acknowledges the possibility of this infinite regress and to avoid it, Laudan 
ends by presupposing our putative universal inductive convictions, R l, thus, Laudan 
says,
... we can avoid the regress provided that we can find some warranting or 
evidencing principle which all the disputing theories of methodology 
share in common. I f  such a principle -accepted by all of the contending 
parties -exists, then it can be invoked as a neutral and impartial vehicle 
for choosing between rival methodologies.
... I believe that we have such a criterion of choice in our normal 
inductive convictions about the appraisal of policies and strategies. In brief, 
and for these purposes, those convictions can be formulated in the following 
rule:
(R l) If actions of a particular sort, m, have consistently promoted 
certain cognitive ends, e, in the past, and rival actions, n, have failed 
to do so, then assume that future actions following the rule "if your 
aim is e, you ought to do m" are more likely to promote those ends 
than actions based on the rule "if your aim is e, you ought to do n."
(Laudan, 1987a, p. 25.)(Emphasis added.)
Rl stops the regress and provides the ground for trusting that our scientific methods 
will go on working in the future, that the future can in this matter be relied on to 
resemble the past. About the justification of R l, Laudan offers a couple of 
suggestions,
Two points are central: (1), (Rl) is arguably assumed universally among 
philosophers of science, and thus has promise as a quasi-Archimedean 
standpoint, and (2), quite independently of the sociology of philosophical 
consensus, it appears to be a sound rule of learning from experience. 
Indeed, if (Rl) is not sound, no general rule is.
(Laudan, 1987a, p. 26)(Emphasis added.)
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Clearly consensus amongst methodologists in favor of Rl (even if  this consensus 
existed, which it doesn’t as exemplified by Popperians) would not be sufficient to 
justify R l, since clearly everybody could well be wrong, given that the consensus 
could be just the result of a contingent sociological fact, or it could be only the result 
of a psychological accident of our make up.
About Laudan’s second justificatory suggestion, he does not provide any argument 
for the conditional “if  (Rl) is not sound, no general rule is”, and this conditional is 
not obvious, as Popperians exemplify, so it should be justified95. Nor can Laudan 
empirically establish that Rl is "a sound rule of learning" without circularity, that is, 
without assuming our inductive convictions R l. One could imagine such a circular 
empirical argument in support of rule Rl taking the following form:
The following of rule Rl consistently promoted our cognitive ends in the 
past, while rival rules failed to do so. Therefore, Rl is likely to be a more 
effective strategy for the promotion of our cognitive aims than actions based 
on rival rules.
This argument is rule circular96 because Rl is assumed to conclude that Rl is likely 
to be more effective than rival rules. Furthermore, when Laudan endorses Rl as 
“sound”, he is sneaking in an implicit prescription: comply with this sound rule of 
learning! And this prescription cannot be inferred from just a descriptive study of the 
history of science. This implicit prescription in favour of Rl is then also left 
unjustified. Thus,
95 Laudan’s conditional is an example of the pragmatic argument in favour of induction, an 
argument first proposed by Reichenbach, and later by Salmon. This argument has various 
difficulties but the most serious is that there is infinitude of rules that satisfy the conditional 
and to choose between them we require of some criterion, for example, a criterion of 
simplicity. And then the problem re-arises, how to justify without circularity this criterion of 
simplicity, or any other alternative criterion? Furthermore, even granting the criterion of 
simplicity or some other criterion, the selected rule amongst this infinite set of possible rules, 
would still have to prove that it can deal successfully with paradoxes such as those of 
Goodman. Because of these difficulties the pragmatic argument in favor of induction is not 
conclusive. Cf., Salmon, ref., and Chapter I, section 1.1, above.
96 Cf., Chapter I, for a criticism of Papineau’s rule circular justification of induction.
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If one is allowed to take for granted our ‘normal inductive convictions’ then 
there is little problem in justifying them. Surely the whole point of 
philosophy of science has been to try to articulate and defend these 
‘inductive convictions’. Since Laudan seems to endorse those convictions, 
he is of course taking a non-descriptivist stance: someone lacking them 
as a m atter of fact would not, as a m atter of evaluation, act in a 
genuinely scientific way.
(Worrall, 1999, p 355.)(Emphasis added.)
Another possible justificatory strategy would be to warrant belief in (Rl) by a form 
of conventionalism or by assuming Rl to be an example of the synthetic a priori, 
Laudan, however, has rejected explicitly both conventionalism and apriorism, thus 
Laudan has criticized Popper for his conventionalism about scientific methods and 
goals, and Laudan has likewise criticized Chisholm for his apriorism about scientific 
methods, hence conventionalism and a priorism are not an option for Laudan.
c) Laudan's most basic methodological assumptions (which include deductive logic) 
cannot be open to empirical questioning because the process of empirical questioning 
itself requires them. Otherwise, some ultimate methodological assumptions are likely 
to be universal and to remain fixed, because they are essential for any human 
scientific research endeavor. Laudan himself provides, a possible test for the putative 
a prioriness of Laudan’s posits,
If the naturalist is led to espouse methods which turn out as a matter of fact 
to be persistently bad indicators of a theory's future performance, then 
experience gives us machinery for recognizing the breakdown of those 
methods and doing something to patch them up... he sees in the capacity of 
"scientized" philosophy to correct itself the dispensability of other, "higher" 
forms of grounding.
(Laudan, 1990b, p. 58)(Emphasis added.)
It does not seem possible, however, that Laudan, for example, can even in principle 
give up his inductive rule, as a result of empirical correction or refutation, since to 
empirically criticize or correct this assumption of his, to test it, to refute it, Laudan
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would need to presuppose the soundness of this same assumption, or if not, he will 
need to assume the soundness of some other even more basic assumption, because,
... The questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some 
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which 
those turn.
(Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 341.)(Emphasis added.)
These most basic assumptions have an a priori, an Archimedean point character, 
these methodological foundations are not corrigible empirically like scientific 
theories are, these assumptions are not really rationally revisable in light of any 
future evidence. If not, under which empirical conditions would Laudan be ready to 
give up these basic assumptions? And using which methods would he rationally 
assess this evidence? Since we can’t criticize something with nothing, we need to 
assume our most basic presuppositions in order to identify a possible deficiency in 
them, therefore, these ultimate presuppositions are not amendable, because a process 
that relies on them cannot question these ultimate presuppositions. In other words,
...particular empirical observations can’t overthrow general principles 
except in light of still other and superior general principles that give the 
observations the necessary leverage.
... Not everything can be revised, because something must be used to 
determine whether a revision is warranted -even if the proposition at 
issue is a very fundamental one.
(Nagel Th., pp. 22, 65.)(Emphasis added.)
Laudan could retort that he never intended a wholly empirical theory of scientific 
methodology, that he only intended a meta-methodology as empirical as natural 
science itself. Laudan could therefore be ready to grant the a priori character o f some 
of his presuppositions, thus, Laudan says,
I am not claiming that the theory of methodology is a wholly empirical 
activity, any more than I would claim that theoretical physics was a wholly
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empirical activity. Both make extensive use of conceptual analysis as well 
as empirical results. But I do hold that methodology can be and should be 
as empirical as the natural sciences whose results it draws on.
(Laudan, 1987b, p. 231 .)(Emphasis added.)
This is a vague recommendation because it is a matter of debate how empirical the 
natural sciences are, on the other hand, why “should [methodology] be as empirical 
as the natural sciences”? Laudan doesn’t justify his injunction in favour of a 
scientific methodology as empirical as the natural sciences, therefore behind his 
naturalistic program also lays this basic unjustified posit. Still Laudan claims that,
... our methodological rules represent our best guesses about how to put 
questions to nature and about how to evaluate nature’s responses. Like any 
theory, they are in principle defeasible. And like most theories, they get 
modified through the course of time.
(Laudan, 1989, p. 374.)(Emphasis added.)
Now, methodology is an ambiguous concept97 since it can refer both to:
i) Basic methodological rules such as modus ponens and Laudan’s Rl.
ii) Non-basic methodological recommendations such as “Do double blind 
experiments”.
Laudan’s position on this topic could then be understood as saying that: on the 
whole, scientific methodological rules are empirically corrigible and modifiable 
through time, but not understood as saying, that it is possible to empirically correct 
our most basic methodological assumptions.
Again, if what Laudan were saying, is that some basic and fixed methodological 
rules, could be used to empirically criticize, revise and justify other less basic rules, 
then this view would be unproblematic, and it would agree with the meta- 
methodological opinion of a critic of Laudan’s reticulated model such as John 
Worrall98. Thus,
97 Worrall has argued that methodology is a vague term (cf., Worrall 1988, p. 270.)
98 Core or invariant methodological criteria plus some factual discoveries can lead to 
revisions of methodological canons not in the core, Worrall, for example, argues that the
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There is evidence from the history of science of the revisability of our 
‘methodological principles’ only if these are understood in Laudan’s very 
broad and highly substantive sense. The principles from the narrower 
domain may be sustantive, but there is no evidence that the possibility 
need be taken seriously that they might be revised.
(Worrall, 1989, p. 387.)(Emphasis added.)
Notice, however, that Worrall must have had to assume some methodological 
standards to identify and assess the pertinent evidence, so as to be able to conclude 
that “there is no evidence that the possibility”... And this is the point, to defend or 
criticize our ultimate foundations we have of necessity to presume them, therefore 
these ultimate foundations are not empirically revisable.
As a pragmatist Laudan will reject the Cartesian search for ultimate justifications and 
argue that his approach is a tinkerist approach -a  la Neurath. The tinkerist approach 
leaves unquestioned a corpus teorico of background knowledge, and follows a 
gradualist strategy, that is dealing with problems or questions only if there are 
warranted doubts. The tinkerist doesn’t try to provide justifications for our 
background assumptions, at least not while these background assumptions seem to be 
unproblematic. The slogan of the tinkerist is: ‘if it works don’t fix it,’ this strategy, 
however, appears as a means to conceal the lack of justification of the background 
knowledge.
Now, recall that Laudan has proposed a meta-methodology because he wants to 
avoid the relativism result of a lack of criteria to adjudicate amongst methods and 
aims, if so, he should be also interested in dealing with the warrant for his ultimate 
criteria, and if these justifications are unavailable, then he should admit it openly and 
resign himself to a non-eliminable kernel of fixed methodological dogmatic 
foundations.
factual discovery of the placebo-effect plus a fixed core methodological canon (“whenever 
possible, theories should be tested against plausible rival theories”) led to a new
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II.2 Can all scientific methods and aims be changeable, without falling into 
historical relativism?
The reticulated model claims to avoid historical relativism, even while, sustaining 
that all scientific theories, methods and aims are rationally modifiable. This claim, 
however, is problematic, thus,
a) Laudan maintains that our present methods turn out better when evaluated from 
our present perspective; he says that scientific progress occurs by our current lights, 
by our current standards,
We take science seriously precisely because it has promoted ends which we 
find cognitively important. More than that, it has become progressively 
more successful as time goes by. If you ask "Successful according to whom” 
or “Progressive according to what standards” the answer, of course, is 
successful by our lights; progressive according to our standards. Science 
in our time is better (by our lights of course) than it was 100 years ago, and 
the science of that time represented progress (again by our lights) 
compared with its state a century earlier.
(Laudan, 1987a, p. 28.) (Emphasis added.)
Laudan thus considers scientific progress as perspectival, that is, when we examine 
past science from our present cognitive perspective, we conclude that there has been 
a succession of past progressive steps, with all these previous steps leading to our 
contemporary scientific conception. This view of scientific progress recalls Kuhn’s 
position that scientific progress was relative to the various scientific paradigms. 
Progress, as understood by Laudan, is progress relative to whatever methodological 
rules and aims happen to be dominant now, but to defeat historical relativism one 
would need universal and ahistorical scientific standards and aims, that is, to defeat 
historical relativism one has to answer,
methodological recommendation in favour of double blind experiments. Cf., Worrall, 1988, 
pp. 273-4.
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... whether our present point of view is right to say that our present methods 
are better than the methods of science of three centuries ago. And a positive 
answer to that question requires some principles considered as outside the 
historical process.
(Worrall, 1989, p. 381.)
And these universal and ahistorical principles do not seem to be available in Laudan's 
doctrine of in principle transitory scientific theories, aims and methodological rules, 
or at least this seems true prima facie, since there is some ambiguity in Laudan's 
declarations, thus he claims,
...the history of science -unlike that of many other disciplines- offers an 
impressive record of actions and decisions moving closer through time to a 
realization of ends that most of us hold to be important and worthwhile.
(Laudan, 1987a, p. 28.) (Emphasis added.)
The doubt is whether these cognitively “important and worthwhile” ends are only 
those of us now (with different scientific communities having different favourites), 
or if  they are atemporal. If this last reading were the correct one, then how to 
interpret Laudan's assertions about all scientific factual theories, methods and aims 
being empirically modifiable, and about progress being only relative to “our lights” 
and “our standards”? One way to solve this inconsistency would be to read Laudan 
as saying that while most of our scientific methods and aims are empirically 
modifiable, our most basic methods are not. But if so, then what to make of the 
following quote from Laudan,
The view of science now emerging in some quarters (including my own) is 
Heraclitean through and through, insisting that science -diachronically 
viewed- changes its content, its methods, and its aims from time to time.
(Laudan, 1996, p. 143 .)(Emphasis added.)
This quote, and others like it, would then be just hyperbolic, or rhetorical, flourish, 
but if so, Laudan’s model would have a fixed methodological and axiological core, a
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core that would rationally evaluate methodological change beyond the core and thus 
avoid historical relativism, but then the reticulated model would become just a 
variation of the view that asserts that our most basic scientific methodology hasn’t 
changed.
On the other hand, if we are to take Laudan’s pronouncements at face value, then his 
view would not avoid historical relativism, and furthermore there would be an 
inconsistency between what Laudan intends his theory to be (“Heraclitean through 
and through”) and what in fact it can be, only partially Heraclitean.
b) In the ‘hierarchical1 conception methods warrant theories and not vice versa, while 
in Laudan's reticulated model, a factual theory may force a revision of 
methodological criteria, and in the process justify the new, the revised, 
methodological rules. Laudan thinks that, for example, the acceptance of the wave 
theory of light (T2) exemplifies such an event, in his account, Newton’s corpuscular 
theory of light (Tl) plus Newton’s inductivist methodology (M l) had been both long 
dominant, when the wave theory of light appeared, and most scientists eventually 
came to accept the wave theory -due to some of its epistemic attributes- as the best 
available optical theory. Laudan then goes on to claim that the wave theory once 
accepted, subsequently forced the deposition of Newton’s inductivist methodology, 
and its substitution with the hypothetico-deductive method (M2.) Allegedly, this 
methodological change happened, because it was discovered that the wave theory’s 
use of non-directly-observable theoretical entities (such as the luminiferous aether) 
was inconsistent with the recommendation made by Ml against this type of 
theoretical entities, therefore the wave theory promoted the change to M2, since M2 
allowed such unobservable entities.
This is an attractive story, and yet, the initial sanction of T2 by Ml could not have 
been rational, because the dominant scientific methodology at the time was M l, and 
allegedly Ml condemned directly unobservable entities such as the aether, and T2 
precisely assumed the aether.
If not, how could Ml have correctly warranted a theory with characteristics that it 
interdicts? How could Ml commit hara-kiri via the wave theory? That is, how 
exactly came T2 to be rationally accepted, while the scientists of the time accepted 
M l? Put differently,
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...if the initial acceptance of the wave theory was rational, then Newtonian 
inductivism (as described by Laudan) was not really in force at the time.
(Worrall, 1984, p. 266.)
If malgre tout, Newtonian methodology legitimized the wave theory, then Newtonian 
methodology couldn’t have condemned tout court directly unobservable theoretical 
entities. It could be instead that Newtonian methodology only advised against them", 
allowing directly unobservable theoretical entities if they provided some epistemic 
bonus, such as novel predictions.100 But then there would not have been any reason to 
give up Newtonian methodology because of the wave theory’s luminiferous aether, 
in other words,
If, on the other hand, Newtonian methodology permitted theories like the 
wave theory, then nothing new emerged about the wave theory once it had 
been generally accepted that would have required any methodological 
changes.
(Worrall, 1999, p 352.)
One way out for Laudan, would be to say that the change from Ml to M2 was only in 
the explicit or rhetorical declarations of the scientific communities involved, and to 
go on to claim that there was no change in the genuine, even if implicit, 
methodological rules followed by these scientific communities.101 But then, Laudan's 
example of methodological change as a result of theoretical change would be only a 
change in explicit methodology, and a change in explicit methodology can be 
compatible with fixed, genuine and implicit, methodological standards. These 
implicit standards would manifest themselves as methodological intuitive judgments,
99 This interpretation of Newtonian inductivism gets some backing from the fact that 
Newton’s theory itself assumed a universal force of gravity, which is an archetypal case of a 
directly unobservable theoretical entity, cf., Worrall, 1988, p. 272.
100 What to understand by a ‘novel prediction’ is a matter of ongoing debate, cf. Worrall, 
1988, p. 272, and Psillos, pp. 106-7.
101 The change in these communities’ explicit methodological pronouncements would bring 
these explicit pronouncements closer to the genuinely held and implicit methodological 
canons of these communities.
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hence, the wave theory would have been accepted, because scientists intuitively 
preferred the wave theory.
But if so, what has Laudan’s reticulated model accomplished? It has provided only 
an explanation of change in scientists’ rhetorical methodological statements. But 
surely the relevant philosophical problem is to explain change - i f  any- in the 
genuinely held scientific methodologies; this kind of change is the one, which would 
have possible relativistic implications. And since the explanation of change of 
genuinely held, even if only implicit, methodology is not provided by Laudan’s 
reticulated model, it would have to be done by some other model, such as that of the 
‘fixed genuine methodology’ camp, and the reticulated model would then be a 
disposable adornment of this other model.
Moreover, even if we grant to Laudan both his historical example and his reticulated 
model, several questions still arise:
Why should one change the methodological canons (i.e., M l) instead of rejecting the 
wave theory? The incoherence between Ml and T2 could have been removed by 
abandoning T2 and not by changing the methodological canons M l. Moreover, was 
the alleged methodological revision process (from Ml to M2) governed by some 
rules? If this process wasn’t governed by any rules,
... if it happens in some particular instance that, say, T is retained and M 
rejected, this is simply what happens as a matter of fact. Just as in Kuhn's 
‘big picture’, if a minority of scientists take the opposite view and hold on to 
M and hence reject T (or even if another minority fail to see any clash or 
tension between T and M!) then all one can say is that they do indeed form a 
minority.
(Worrall, 1999,p.345.)
The rational answer would be to claim that M was abandoned because of some 
deeper -possibly only implicit- normative criteria of good reason governing conflicts 
between theories and methodological rules. That is, relativism can be avoided only 
by assuming:
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i) That there are correct meta-methodological rules arbitrating conflicts 
between factual theories and methodological canons, and
ii) By also assuming a prescription to follow these meta-rules.
Now, if these meta-rules, plus the prescription to follow them, are not going to be 
taken for granted, the problem now arises of how to justify them. This justification 
has not been provided by Laudan, thus these meta-rules sit, in Laudan’s reticulated 
model, as unjudged judges102, and this lack of justification leads again into 
foundational relativism, on the other hand, if these unjustified meta-rules were also 
to change in time, we would end saddled as well with historical relativism.
CONCLUSION
Laudan has not justified without vicious circularity his most basic presuppositions, 
therefore he cannot avoid foundational relativism, furthermore:
Laudan can’t either avoid historical relativism, if as he says, all scientific methods 
are changeable. Otherwise,
Laudan’s model can avoid historical relativism, but only by granting that some 
genuinely held methods and aims -which could be only implicit- don’t change, that 
is, Laudan can avoid historical relativism if  his reticulated model only deals with 
change of rhetorically held methodological rules.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DOES LAUDAN’S META-METHODOLOGY PROMISE MORE 
THAN IT CAN DELIVER? (PART II: LAUDAN’S THEORY OF 
SCIENTIFIC AIMS.)
INTRODUCTION
In this last chapter, I will comment on Laudan’s theory of scientific aims, but first I 
will briefly summarize Laudan’s meta-methodological position, in order to get a 
clear view of the role assigned to scientific aims in Laudan’s meta-methodology.
Laudan argues that if relativism is to be avoided, then cognitive aims, theories and
i mmethods should be capable of rational adjudication . Hence, Laudan has proposed 
in his Science and Values -and in other more recent texts- a meta-methodology of 
science, which attempts to avoid relativism by providing a rational justification for 
the methodological, and axiological aspects of scientific change.104
Laudan also claims that previous philosophers such as Popper, Carnap, Hempel and 
Reichenbach “opened themselves up to the relativist challenge” either because these 
philosophers considered the methods of science a matter of convention,105 
or because these philosophers thought that the aims of science were settled by 
‘volitional decisions’.106 Alternatively, because these philosophers thought that the 
only thing one could rationally ask of a set of cognitive aims is for this set to be 
internally consistent.107
103 Cf., footnote # 86 in Chapter IV.
104 Laudan considers relativism as not desirable and hence he considers rationality as 
valuable. This is important to remember because his meta-methodology intends to be a 
naturalistic one. The question is whether the normative recommendations made by Laudan’s 
theory are provided only by a descriptive or empirical study of the history of science. Or 
whether the normative judgements made by Laudan’s theory are instead the result of tacit 
intuitive evaluations.
105 Cf., section ‘Of the Aims of Science,’ at the end of 1.1, in Chapter I, above.
106 Cf., ibidem.
107 Cf., Laudan, 1989, pp. 370-1
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Laudan tries to provide a rational account of the development of science through a
i n*reticulated model in which justification is multidirectional , and in which scientific 
theories, methods and aims can change during the history of science.109 Temporarily 
accepted methods justify the theories of the day, and are justified by temporarily 
accepted aims. These methods, in their turn, can also be changed by factual theories, 
while empirical theories and methodological rules also constrain the set of rationally 
possible cognitive aims. Hence, there is a mutual and typically non-simultaneous 
adjustment and justification among factual theories, methods and ends. Moreover, 
none of these three levels is an ultimate, or more solid, ground.
Rationality is for Laudan about searching for warrants to believe that one is 
following the most effective means, of those available, for the attainment of certain 
ends that one takes to be desirable. Furthermore, Laudan holds that the 
methodological rules of science are elliptical means-ends injunctions, 'hypothetical 
imperatives', of the form: i f  you value, or desire 'A', then you should do X'. And 
since experience informs us which are the best means for our chosen ends, then 
methodological rules are thought to be fallible, amendable and improvable via past or 
present experience.
Now, if Laudan’s reticulated model is to avoid relativism, then he must tell us how to 
rationally select the desiderata in the conditionals’ antecedents, the cognitive aims 
‘A’. If on the contrary the A's, the aims of science, were not themselves rationally 
selected, if any cognitive aim were as legitimate as any other, then these arbitrary 
aims could endorse any conceivable methodological rule. Arbitrary rules which 
could in turn legitimate any substantial theory, thus opening the gates to a radical 
cognitive relativism.
108 Laudan believes that previous meta-methodologies of science had in contrast a 
hierarchical view of justification, where justification flew unidirectional from goals to 
factual theories. In this alleged older hierarchical view, scientific goals sat at the top of the 
hierarchy and they were used to justify scientific methods, while scientific methods justified 
factual theories. (Cf., Laudan 1984, chapter II.)
109 Cf., Laudan, 1996, p. 143
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A 'scientific' creationist, for example, could propose as the central aim of science that 
of finding explanatory theories consistent with a literal reading of the Old Testament. 
If this cognitive aim were to be scientifically legitimate, then scientists would have 
as central endeavours the search for, and elimination of, inconsistencies between 
scientific theories and Biblical texts. Scientists would then have as an important 
scientific goal the search for an accurate translation and reading of the Old 
Testament. Creationism’s central aims and methods, however, would disqualify 
contemporary geology, palaeontology and evolution theory while endorsing the 
Genesis account.
Laudan admits that his reticulated view needs to be supplemented by a theory of 
legitimate aims -an “axiology” as he himself calls it.
... radical relativism about science seems to be an inevitable corollary of 
accepting (a) that different scientists have different goals, (b) that there is no 
rational deliberation possible about the suitability of different goals, and (c) 
that goals, methods, and factual claims invariably come in covariant 
clusters.
But here a crucial flaw appears, for what is being assumed is that a rational 
choice between alternative sets of internally consistent sets of cognitive 
goals is always impossible. This assumption, I believe, is false, not always, 
but in a sufficiently large range of cases.
(Laudan, 1984, p. 50.)
And
I suspect that we all believe that some cognitive ends are preferable to 
others. Methodology, narrowly conceived, is in no position to make those 
judgements, since it is restricted to the study of means and ends. We thus 
need to supplement methodology with an investigation into the legitimate or 
permissible ends of inquiry. That is, a theory of scientific progress needs an 
axiology of inquiry, whose function is to certify or de-certify certain 
proposed aims as legitimate... Methodology gets nowhere without axiology.
(Laudan, 1987, p. 29.)
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Laudan has given in his Science and Values some indications on how to develop 
such an axiology. I will explore Laudan’s suggestions on how to decide rationally 
between competing scientific aims, and I will comment on whether Laudan’s 
proposal can avoid relativism.
I LAUDAN’S THEORY OF AIMS
Laudan hinted in Science and Values -and in other more recent works110- that our 
scientific aims could sometimes be rationally appraised111 by asking that they satisfy 
the following constraints:
1.1 Laudan requires that scientific goals be jointly consistent.
It is true that I stress that inconsistent or incoherent aims ought to be 
rejected, but so should similarly afflicted rules and theories.
(Laudan, 1990b, p. 51.)
This way deductive logic works as an absolute constraint in Laudan’s meta- 
methodological proposal.
1.2 Laudan requires scientific goals to be non-utopian, a requirement that allegedly 
follows from a means-ends perspective o f rationality,
To adopt a goal with the feature that we can conceive of no actions that
110 For example, Chapter 8 of Laudan’s 1996.
111 Thus, Laudan distances himself from a philosopher such as Hume, who famously thought 
that reason could say very little (if anything at all) about the selection of our aims:
Reason is and ought only to be, the slave of passions, and can never pretend to any 
other office than to serve and obey them.
(A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 415.)
And,
It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the 
scratching of my finger.
(Ibidem p. 416; emphasis added.)
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would be apt to promote it, or a goal whose realization we could not 
recognize even if we had achieved it, is surely a mark of unreasonableness 
and irrationality.
(Laudan, 1984, p. 51)(Emphasis added.)
Laudan believes that if one is means/ends rational then one cannot have ‘utopian’ 
aims, because utopian aims would be of no help in selecting means. He believes 
rational aims should help us in selecting the best means to attain these rational aims, 
something that cannot be done with impossible, obscure, or unrecognisable goals. 
Laudan is allegedly only making a conditional recommendation against utopian aims 
( if you want to be rational, then avoid utopian aims.)U2 A scientific goal can in turn 
be ‘utopian’ in three ways:
1.2.1 A goal might be semantically utopian:
Many scientists espouse values or goals that, under critical challenge, they 
cannot characterize in a succinct and cogent way. They may be imprecise, 
ambiguous, or both. Such familiarly cited cognitive goals as simplicity and 
elegance often have this weakness, because most advocates of these goals 
can offer no coherent definition or characterization of them.
(Laudan, 1984, p. 52.)(Emphasis added.)
The concept of science itself may provide for Laudan another example of a semantic 
utopian concept.
1.2.2 A goal might be epistemically utopian:
112 Laudan, however, is possibly really making an implicit categorical recommendation 
against utopian aims. This because in the previous quote there is an implicit categorical 
recommendation to be means/ends rational (since Laudan values rationality, cf., footnote 
#104, above) and therefore there is an implicit categorical recommendation to avoid utopian 
goals.
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It sometimes happens that an agent can give a perfectly clear definition of 
his goal state and that the goal is not demonstrably utopian, but that 
nonetheless its advocates cannot specify (and seem to be working with no 
implicit form of) a criterion for determining when the value is present or 
satisfied and when it is not.
(Laudan, 1984, p. 53.)(Emphasis added.)
Notice that there is an ambiguity in this last quote, since it is not clear what to 
understand by a ‘criterion’. Is a criterion something everyone in a scientific 
community is to agree on? Must the criterion be infallible? Can the desired criterion 
be intuitive? If a criterion for the attainment of a goal were lacking, would it instead 
be enough to have a criterion for deciding when one approximates the goal? For 
example, a criterion could both be fallible and intuitive.
1.2.3 In addition, a goal is demonstrably utopian when,
it cannot possibly be achieved, given our understanding of logic or the 
laws of nature...
(Laudan, 1984, p. 52.) (Emphasis added.)
It would be utopian, for example, to aim in an infinite or immense cosmos, for 
certainty about empirical universal statements or to aim to construct a perpetual 
motion machine. And one way to find out whether some goals are non-demonstrably 
utopian (that is, achievable) is to search the historical record to see if our goals have 
been, and therefore can be, achieved, this irrespective of whether they were 
consciously sought or were merely unintended consequences of some actions. On the 
other hand, if the historical record shows that a sought after goal has not ever been 
achieved, then this goal could be unachievable or merely very difficult to attain.
1.3 Finally, Laudan proposes as another constraint on scientific goals that these 
goals should be consistent with the canonical achievements o f a successful scientific 
discipline.
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Laudan’s constraints of non utopianism and mutual consistency for scientific aims let 
in too much, that is, even if these constraints were to be sought and satisfied, one 
could still end with “scientific” aims that are surely ridiculous such as:
Look for theories in agreement with a literal reading of the Old Testament! Or, 
gather data at random! Or, seek false theories!
Laudan therefore further narrows the spectrum of possible cognitive aims by 
requiring that any proposal for new scientific aims must also be able to capture, to re­
describe, most of the canonical achievements of any successful scientific discipline,
... any proposals about the aims of science must allow for the retention as 
scientific of much of the exemplary work currently and properly regarded 
as such.
(Laudan 1996, p. 158.) (Emphasis added.)
And the proper achievements of any scientific discipline are judged by some implicit 
“pre-philosophical” pragmatic canons of scientific success.
Scientists' judgments as to the success of a scientific practice depend not on 
abstract epistemological and methodological matters but on palpably 
pragmatic ones (...) Thus, a medical practice is successful or not depending 
to the degree to which it gives its initiates the ability to predict and to alter 
the course of common diseases. An astronomical practice is successful to 
the extent that it enables one to anticipate future positions of planetary and 
celestial bodies. A theory of optics is successful if it can (say) predict the 
path of a light ray moving through various media and optical interfaces.
... If my suggestion that there must be a prephilosophical notion of 
empirical success -which is not itself beholden to controverted epistemic or 
methodological doctrines- seems controversial, we might ask how it could 
be otherwise.
(Laudan, 1996, pp. 148-9.) (Emphasis added.)
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Laudan’s “prephilosophical” pragmatic canons are cognitive goals such as empirical 
prediction and control113, and these canons judge what is scientifically proper, they 
judge what is scientifically successful. If Laudan, however, is to avoid relativism he 
should justify as valuable these standards of success, and he should also justify the 
high weight he gives to his pragmatic canons.
Furthermore, the following questions now arise: how “much of the exemplary work” 
is enough to retain? What of the 'exemplary work' must be retained, and what may be 
omitted? Moreover, is what Laudan and many of us think of as 'exemplary work'
(say, the work of Newton, Maxwell, Einstein) really exemplary? And if so why, and 
according to which criteria? And how do these criteria get justified? 114
II ARE LAUDAN’S RECOMMENDED CONSTRAINTS FOR COGNITIVE 
AIMS ADEQUATE?
I will illustrate many of the following criticisms with examples from non-cognitive 
ends115, because we are often better acquainted with these other goals, and hence they 
provide a useful and clarifying analogy. There are thus analogies between cognitive 
aims such as the search for verisimilar scientific theories, or to aim at simple or 
elegant scientific theories, and non-cognitive aims such as the ‘pursuit of 
happiness’116, the search of wisdom, or the craving for love. The analogy resides in 
that all of these goals both cognitive and non-cognitive ones would be for Laudan 
semantically and/or epistemically utopian, that is, these goals are imprecise (these 
goals are to a big extent intuitive) and we lack a litmus test or criterion of satisfaction 
for all of them.
On the other hand, there are also analogies between a non-cognitive aim such as 
perfect social justice and a cognitive aim such as complete truth, complete empirical 
adequacy, or full objectivity, concerning some scientific discipline. The analogy
1,3 Cf., Laudan 1996, pp. 148-9
114 If Laudan were to answer by proposing an analysis of a selection of past scientific 
exemplary work, the norms of exemplariness would be there already in his selection. In other 
words, 'exemplary' is a normative term, and if one were to try to infer the standards of 
exemplariness from a selection of past scientific work, one would only obtain the standards 
that one started with when selecting some scientific achievements, since to select the 
exemplary we must first assume some standards of exemplariness. In short, the exemplary 
cases don’t select themselves.
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resides in this case in that all of these aims cannot be achieved (‘given our 
understanding of logic or the laws of nature’) and so these goals would be, for 
Laudan, demonstrably utopian.
If it were to be argued that examples involving non-cognitive aims are misconceived 
because Laudan’s theory is intended only for cognitive aims, then one would expect 
these critics to argue why analogies can’t be drawn between these two types of aims. 
Laudan does not offer any argument of why his requirements for cognitive aims 
cannot be asked of non-cognitive aims, Laudan doesn't explain why what is asked of 
rational cognitive goals cannot be asked of the non-cognitive rational ends. In other 
words, why would it be rational for a Laudanite to have utopian non-cognitive aims? 
The ball is in these putative critics court. It is hoped that examples involving non- 
cognitive aims will have Laudan admit what he denies as rational in the case of 
cognitive aims.
I will first comment ambulando on Laudan’s recommendations against ‘semantic’ 
and ‘epistemic’ utopianism, then I will dwell upon Laudan’s injunctions against 
‘demonstrable utopianism’ and I will conclude by criticising Laudan’s injunction in 
favour of his pragmatic canons.
CRITICISMS OF LAUDAN’S THESES ABOUT SEMANTIC AND EPISTEMIC 
UTOPIANISM
II. 1.1 Laudan overvalues precision when excluding as rational (because o f  their 
being semantically utopian) imprecise and/or ambiguous goals
Aristotle’s maxim that one should not attempt to be more precise than the subject 
matter demands is a common place; one is as precise as the problem before us 
requires precision. Thus, it is not reasonable to look for conceptual precision for its 
own sake. For example, when dealing with everyday life problems we do not go after 
pedantic precision in concepts such as explanation, institution, state or person. 
Furthermore, the search for precision can conflict with the search for epistemic
115 Many of the following arguments were inspired by various helpful conversations I held 
on these topics with John Worrall.
116 This aim is in the American Declaration of Independence.
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virtues such as clarity and simplicity, because the search for precision will require 
extra terms and concepts. We should then be only as precise as the problem in hand 
requires, otherwise, we may end burdened with obscure and complex conceptual 
schemes, a situation that can be an obstacle to further theoretical developments.117 If 
the solution of a problem were to require, however, of more precision then the search 
for precision would be legitimate. This was the case with the Tarskian formalisation 
of the concept of truth, a formalisation that was needed, at least partly, because the 
intuitive notion of truth led to logical problems such as the ‘Liar paradox.’118
On the other hand, in the case of many important philosophical and meta-scientific 
terms and goals it appears unlikely that we will ever attain an absolute discursive 
precision of these terms, that is, a discursive precision that fully grasps our intuitive 
understanding of these terms and aims. This conclusion follows, because all 
definitions in order to avoid circularity or an infinite regress ultimately depend on 
intuitive primitive concepts.
As Socrates showed, we often know intuitively how to apply a concept without being 
able to provide an adequate explicit definition of the intuitive concept. That is, 
without being able to provide a definition that will apply to all the cases -an  only to 
those cases- where the intuitive notion applies correctly, and without a definition that 
will let us discern the defined notion from other close notions.
117 Popper for example argues (‘Realism and the Aim of Science’, pp. 270-1) that if Newton 
and other mathematicians had listened to Berkeley’s criticisms of their intuitive concepts of 
the derivative and the integral, and if these mathematicians had not neglected conceptual 
precision at this early stage of the development of the calculus, the growth of the differential 
calculus could have been obstructed: “It was the neglect of precision (...) which made the 
wonderful development of the calculus possible.” (Ibidem, p. 271.) Popper’s reading of the 
History of the Calculus is however controversial, here I am just echoing Popper’s view. 
Faraday’s electric field concept provides another example, the electric field started as a 
vague and imprecise concept, which won in precision as its relations with other 
electromagnetic concepts became clearer through Maxwell’s equations. It is then not 
reasonable to condemn as irrational imprecise or vague concepts, because that would 
disqualify the embryonic theories where these concepts appear.
118 By the way, verisimilitude is a concept where formalisation is not a requisite since its 
wide intuitive use hasn’t led into any logical paradoxes, even so, there have been various 
serious efforts at clarifying the concept of verisimilitude such as that of Niniluto (cf., 
Truthlikeness, Dordrecht:Reidel, 1987.)
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If it were to be argued that, the meaning of many philosophical and scientific terms is 
not obtained via definitions, but holistically via their place in a web of concepts or 
sentences in a theory or group of theories, then the meaning of these terms would be 
the more precise the more complex is the web of linguistic relations in which they 
are embedded. Now, since this relational complexity will always be finite, so will be 
the attainable precision of our philosophical concepts.
We may then have to resign ourselves never to grasp fully and discursively important 
philosophical or meta-scientific concepts and goals,119 concepts such as: 
Verisimilitude,120 Kuhn’s scientific paradigm, the concepts of theoretical fertility,121 
and those of theoretical simplicity and elegance, the concept of science itself, the 
concept of substance, and the goals and concepts of beauty and the good.
Still, we go on using these concepts even when we lack a full explicit definition of 
them, in conclusion, if to use a concept we first had to fully define it not much 
philosophy would be done, thus,
Philosophy is full of faulty definitions, especially of definitions which, 
while indeed containing some of the elements required, are yet not
119 Thus, Sosa claims that,
... we can legitimately attribute causes to an event, knowledge to a subject, and 
explanatory power to an account even in the absence of any precise and general 
philosophical definition or account of causation, knowledge, or explanation.
(E. Sosa, p. 99.) (Emphasis added.)
Sosa believes humans have an intrinsic and generally reliable faculty of reason and he 
arrives to this conclusion via an analogy with our faculty of sight. Now, given Sosa’s belief 
in our in general reliable faculty of reason it follows that our rational intuitions, in general 
and in standard situations, provide us with true beliefs and correct concepts. Thus,
If our defense of the analogy between sight and reason is adequate, it sustains 
invoking a faculty of reason to meet the challenge of how we know principles of 
logic constitutive of consistency -like the impossibility of self diversity- or 
principles of epistemology constitutive of coherence, like the need of high 
consistency for coherence. The answer in each case would be that such truths 
are manifest to reason.
(E. Sosa, p. 98.) (Emphasis added.)
120 For an argument in favour of an intuitive notion of verisimilitude, see Psillos, pp. 276-9.
121 A qualitative concept used by A. F. Chalmers and necessary for his objective theory of 
scientific change, cf., A. F. Chalmers: ‘Towards an objectivist account of theory change’, 
BJPS, 30,1979, pp. 227-33.
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complete. If we could make no use of a concept till we had defined it, all 
philosophy would be in a pitiable plight.
(Kant, A731, B759.)
If so, in the case of our most theoretical or basic concepts to aim for full discursive 
precision is a goal suspicious of being demonstrably utopian.
II. 1.2 Truth is fo r  Laudan an epistemically utopian aim only because Laudan’s 
criterion o f satisfaction is too exacting
Laudan thinks that truth, understood as correspondence, is an example of epistemic 
utopianism 122, therefore, Laudan believes that truth is an irrational scientific goal this 
notwithstanding that Laudan considers inconsistency -as most of us do- as an 
epistemic vice (for example, he recommended jointly consistent scientific goals in 
section 1.1 of this chapter .) If so, Laudan is saying that inconsistency is to be 
avoided, but surely if inconsistency is going to be avoided it is only because 
inconsistent theories cannot be true, in other words, Laudan, in spite of himself, aims 
at true theories.
Furthermore, Laudan’s denunciation of truth as irrational is implausible given that 
the search for truth has been the explicit aim of many scientists124. Moreover, we do 
have fallible but strong criteria for determining when truth is absent, and we also 
have some strictly fallible but still reasonable criteria for the presence of truth.
122 Cf., Laudan 1996, p. 78
123 And Laudan claimed that inter-theoretical inconsistency is an internal conceptual 
problem in his older book Progress and its Problems,
The most vivid, (...) type of internal conceptual problem arises with the discovery 
that a theory is logically inconsistent, and thus self contradictory (...) Unless the 
proponents of such theories are prepared to abandon the rules of logical inference 
(...), or can somehow “localize” the inconsistency, the only conceivable response to 
a conceptual problem of this kind is to refuse to accept the offending theory until 
the inconsistency is removed.
(Laudan, 1977, p. 49.)
124 Numerous scientists have highly valued and searched, at least prima facie, for explicative 
truth. Garre of Basel, a disciple of R. Koch, for example, risked his health and life by 
inoculating himself with staphylococci; he did this to find out whether the hypothesis of a 
bacterial cause for anthrax was true. Therefore, if truth as Laudan sustains is not a rational 
cognitive goal, then many scientist have been either grossly irrational qua scientists, or the
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For the absence of truth, we have criteria such as inconsistency and empirical 
refutation, and for the presence of truth, we have plausible and fallible criteria such 
as empirical success. If not, we have at least fallible criteria for the presence or 
absence of rational belief, where rational belief is belief that has been justified as 
true. We cannot, though, maintain that “if you form a rational belief then it will be 
true”, the most we can assert is that:
According to all the relevant evidence, there are good reasons to think that a 
rational belief is true. (This is precisely what ‘rational belief means.)
Thus in everyday life if we have good reasons to believe a statement to be true then 
we consider this statement as putatively true except if there were some good reasons 
to the contrary. For example, if  I see somebody approaching at a distance that looks 
like a friend of mine, then I assume it is true that my friend is approaching125 -unless 
I had some good specific reason to doubt it such as my previous knowledge that she
victims of self deception, but both these possibilities are implausible. The last one, because it 
would demand a colossal amount of false consciousness on the part of scientists, ironically, 
Laudan has criticized both Lakatos’ and Worrall’s alleged view that,
... scientists, including great scientists, chronically suffer from methodological 
‘false consciousness’ about what they do and why they do it... [Lakatos and 
Worrall] are forced to suppose that scientists are Koestlerian sleepwalkers, 
stumbling from discovery to discovery, reduced to incoherence and self-delusion 
whenever they attempt to describe what they are doing. Apart from the 
monumental psychological implausibility of supposing that great scientists never 
really understand what they are doing (but that we philosophers do), I must confess 
to finding it rather uncharitable to suppose that scientists’ explicit pronouncements 
about their principles of inference and experimental design are uniformly wide-of- 
the-mark.
(Laudan, 1988, p. 372.)
125 That is, I assume that my friend plus her not directly observable character structure is 
approaching; in other words, to have good reasons to support the hypothesis that my friend is 
approaching is ipso facto to have good reasons to believe that the unobservable entities 
postulated by this hypothesis (such as my friend’s character) exist. These unobservable 
entities are thought to exist because my previous experience has shown me that their putative 
existence provides the best explanation of my friend’s personality, though,
There is, of course, a problem about how one is to judge that one hypothesis is 
sufficiently better than another hypothesis. Presumably such a judgment will be 
based on considerations such as which hypothesis is simpler, which is more 
plausible, which explains more, which is less ad hoc, and so forth.
(Harman, p. 89.)
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has gone abroad. Analogously it is rational to conjecture that the entities postulated 
by our best-corroborated (or best confirmed) scientific hypotheses exist (from which 
it doesn’t follow that they in fact exist) except if  there were good reasons to the 
contrary.
Laudan argues126 that there are reasons to doubt that empirical success and truth are 
linked in the case of scientific theories. Laudan denies that one can explain the 
empirical success of scientific theories in terms of the truth-likeness of the 
ontological claims of scientific theories. He argues that the history of science shows 
that many empirically successful scientific theories of the past although they were 
successful for long periods are now thought to be wrong about their ontological 
claims. Therefore, by a simple meta-induction we conclude that our present 
successful scientific theories (hence our prima facie truth-like scientific theories) will 
be shown eventually to be ontologically false.
In this vein, the history of optics from Newton to our days allegedly provides a good 
example of such scientific change. Thus light was first thought to be beams of 
material corpuscles, later on, light was imagined as transversal waves in an elastic 
ether, after that, it was held to be electromagnetic waves in empty space, and now, 
light is thought to be a collection of photons, these last are entities with a 
schizophrenic particle-wave nature. The ontology assigned to light has changed 
dramatically in the last centuries, and yet all these various ontologies have been part 
of various past empirically successful scientific theories. It is then held that this 
historical example -and others like it- support a scepticism about the ontological 
claims of past and present scientific theories.
Laudan’s argument, however, has been criticized;127 the criticism, very briefly, goes 
as follows:
Laudan’s concept of empirical success is too weak and therefore on Laudan’s terms 
scientific success is too easy to achieve. If we define, however, empirical success
126 Cf., Laudan, 1984, p. 121.
127 Cf., Psillos, chapters 5 & 6.
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properly128, then genuine empirical success provides a fallible criterion of ontological 
truth, where genuine empirical success, however, provides a truth criterion only for 
the ontological claims mainly responsible for the success in question. In other words, 
the argument is that the genuine empirical success of past scientific theories did not 
depend on what we now believe to be their false ontological claims, but it depended 
on what was truth-like in their ontology. In addition, it is claimed that this truth-like 
portion in the ontology of past successful scientific theories has been retained in 
subsequent scientific theories. In other words,
... when a theory is abandoned, its theoretical constituents, i.e. the 
theoretical mechanisms and laws it posited, should not be rejected en bloc. 
Some of those theoretical constituents are inconsistent with what we now 
accept, and therefore they have to be rejected. But not all are. Some of them 
have been retained as essential constituents of subsequent theories (...) if it 
turns out that the theoretical constituents that were responsible for the 
empirical success of otherwise abandoned theories are those that have been 
retained in our current scientific image, then a substantive version of 
scientific realism can still be defended.
(...) the genuine empirical success of a theory does make it reasonable to 
believe that the theory has truth-like constituent theoretical claims.
...My claim is that it is precisely those theoretical constituents which 
scientists themselves believed to contribute to the successes of their theories 
(and hence to be supported by the evidence) that tend to get retained in 
theory change.
(Psillos, pp. 108-9.)
Along these lines a ‘structural realist’ such as John Worrall129 will argue that there 
are some ontological assumptions of abandoned mature scientific theories which get 
retained in the later reigning scientific theories. Worrall argues that these conserved
128 The notion of genuine empirical success includes the requirement of novel predictions 
which are in principle testable, where a prediction P, of a phenomenon E, is novel with 
respect of a theory T, if E is known before T is proposed, T is not ad hoc, and T predicts E. 
Cf., Psillos, pp. 106-7, also for a characterization of ad hoc ness.
129 Cf., J. Worrall, 1989b.
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parts relate to the mathematical structure of a theory. In this way, our previous 
example from the history of optics when read by Worrall, shows that the 
mathematical structure of light remained constant between Fresnel’s optics and later 
dominant optical theories. Thus, light is held to obey the same differential wave 
equations in Fresnel’s, Maxwell’s and quantum optics’ theories. This wave equation 
is then a putatitve description of a mathematical structural aspect of the world (the 
wave equation expresses a set of relations amongst unobservable real objects).
This way, optics is realist in the sense that it appears to have captured at least 
approximately a mathematical structure of light. This mathematical form or structure 
of light has been kept through successive optical theories while it has been associated 
to different images, or representations, or causal mechanisms: waves travelling in an 
all encompassing elastic solid ether, electromagnetic waves propagating in empty 
space, probability waves, etc. If so, it is therefore reasonable to conjecture that optics 
has found some true mathematical structures, and that at least in this modest sense, 
pace Laudan, truth is, and can be, a rational aim of optics, and if so, a rational aim of 
at least some of the sciences. Alternatively,
Roughly speaking, it seems right to say that Fresnel completely 
misidentified the nature of light; but none the less, it is no miracle that his 
theory enjoyed the empirical predictive success that it did; it is no miracle 
because Fresnel’s theory, as science later saw it, attributed to light the right 
structure.
Thus if we restrict ourselves to the level of mathematical equations - not, 
notice, the phenomenal level - there is in fact complete continuity between 
Fresnel’s and Maxwell’s theories.
... This example of an important theory change in science certainly appears, 
then, to exhibit cumulative growth at the structural level combined with 
radical replacement of the previous ontological ideas. It speaks, then, in 
favour of a structural realism.
(Worrall, 1989b, pp. 157-160.)
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Now, it is not always the case that the same mathematical structure is kept in a 
temporal sequence of dominant scientific theories, thus one finds that in some 
historical scientific sequences, the mathematical structure of the once dominant 
theory can be approximated as a special limiting case (an example of the 
‘correspondence principle’ at work) of the later prevailing theory. For example, the 
Newtonian equations are a special limiting case of the later Einstein’s gravitation 
equations, and continuity or accumulativity between these theories occurs (beyond 
carrying over the successful empirical content of the older theory) only at the 
mathematical level and this is what is understood by structural or syntactic 
continuity. Because of this continuity only at the structural level, the structural 
realist,
... insists that it is a mistake to think that we can ever ‘understand’ the 
nature of the basic furniture of the universe.
(Ibid. p. 162.)
The structural realist sustains that we can only hope to grasp some of the true 
mathematical relations or structures holding amongst very basic, unobservable130 and 
ineffable objects in nature.131
130 The structural realist’s conclusions may apply only to those mathematical mature sciences 
that deal with very basic and unobservable constituents of nature. Since in the case of 
sciences that deal with less basic objects, such as molecular biology, we can reasonably 
claim to have already seen - and manipulated - some of its theoretical objects, such as DNA 
and RNA molecules, say, via X ray diffraction, and by inserting and cutting segments of 
these molecules. Though, this could also be claimed even of particle physics, where 
physicists often talk of seeing protons (say, in a cloud chamber) and of spraying electrons 
and positrons,
Now how does one alter the charge on the niobium ball? Well, at that stage, said 
my friend, ‘we spray it with positrons to increase the charge or with electrons to 
decrease the charge.’ From that day forth I ‘ve been a scientific realist. So far as 
I ’m concerned, if you can spray them then they are real
(I. Hacking, p. 23.)
The problem here is that terms such as ‘seeing’ and ‘manipulating’ are ambiguous.
131 The structural realist then believes that one can distinguish between the structure and 
nature of a process or object, for example he believes that light is more than the 
mathematical relations that light obeys, and that this more (not capturable by mathematics?) 
is unknowable. For the structural realist this ‘more’ or noumenal nature of objects remains 
mysterious or obscure, the possibility, however, of a sharp distinction between structure and 
nature has been put in doubt,
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II. 1.3 Laudan’sprescription against ‘semantically’ and ‘epistemically’ utopian aims 
is unjustified because it often happens that one doesn ’t know, at least consciously, 
what one is aiming at, and still one can approach obscure goals by the ‘via 
negativa
One can aim at a goal as a sleepwalker; thus, many have tried to reach fuzzy goals 
even if they had to strive for them half in the dark. For instance, when one longs for 
somebody, it often happens that one does not really know what it is that one desires. 
It is easy to confuse a longing for love, or beauty, or immortality, or transcendence, 
or self-knowledge, or companionship with sexual desire.132 Thus, a personal 
relationship could start because of the search for fulfilment of a supposed erotic 
desire, just to discover that this desire is only an aspect of what we are really looking 
for, one discovers that the original longing was for something more than sex. What 
precisely that more is, it is something we cannot clearly express, it is a je  ne sais 
quoi. Arthur Rimbaud describes such a search in his dreamlike poem "Le bateau 
ivre" where he portrays the journey of a seer in a tipsy boat, this navigator seer is on 
a search for some unnamed goal that he only glimpses. Luis Bunuel has also 
portrayed such a situation in his Cet obscur objet du desir.
Such ends, due to their obscurity, are likely to be both semantically and epistemically 
utopian, that is, goals like these cannot be characterised in a ‘succinct and cogent 
way’, and/or we do not have a ‘criterion’ for determining when we have reached 
them. Hence, Laudan would disqualify aiming at them as irrational.
Still, one could hope to approach an intuitive goal, by struggling to eliminate what it 
is not, thus, we may try to approach the glimpsed aim by following a via negativa a 
la Popper, a via that is as fallible as any other strategy. One hopes, for example, to 
promote intuitive goals such as wisdom or verisimilitude133 by striving -in the first
Structural realism, to the extent that it rests on a sharp dichotomy between 
structure and content, and insofar as it makes only structure knowable and 
attainable, cannot be adequately defended.
(Psillos, p. 161.)
132 Cf., Diotima’s discourse in Plato’s Symposium.
133 Verisimilitude is an example of a cognitive goal that Laudan considers both semantic and 
epistemically utopian and therefore as irrational, even so, many scientists and philosophers 
claim, for example, that it is rational to believe that Einstein’s special relativity is a better 
approximation to truth (more verisimilar) than Newton’s mechanics.
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case- against cases of foolishness, or by struggling -in the second case- to reduce 
error. And one follows the via negativa only because one values, only because one 
desires, the obscure positive goals.
CRITICISMS OF LAUDAN’S RECOMMENDATION AGAINST 
DEMONSTRABLY UTOPIAN AIMS.
II.2 Laudan’s prescription in favour o f  non-demonstrably utopian aims is 
ambiguous
An ambiguity becomes apparent when the paragraph quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter’s section 1.2, is compared to that quoted in section 1.2.3, also of this chapter. 
While in the first of these quotes a utopian goal was characterised as one that could 
not be promoted by any actions, in the second quote a utopian aim was characterised 
as one that is impossible to achieve. According to the first characterisation, a goal 
such as social justice or the whole truth about some discipline would not be utopian, 
since we rationally believe that we can come nearer to them, that we can “promote” 
them. While on Laudan’s second characterisation, both these goals would be 
demonstrably utopian, that is, given our understanding of human frailty and finitude, 
these goals are strictu sensu unachievable.
This ambiguity about the nature of utopian goals may be the result of confusion in 
what Laudan understands by means/ends rationality. Laudan says in one place that a 
methodological rule is rational if it promotes some valued cognitive end(s), just to 
add in the next page that a rule is rational if following it is more likely than its 
alternatives to produce the valued end(s) (cf., Laudan 1987, pp. 24-5.) There seems 
then to be confusion between promoting and producing some valued result. It seems 
that Laudan has conflated two different types of goals as 'demonstrably utopian':
a. Type one: valuable goals known to be both impossible to attain and to 
approach.
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b. Type two: valuable goals known to be impossible to attain, yet known 
to be continuously approachable or promotable134,1 will call these last 
type of ends, ideal goals.
I will concede to Laudan that it may be irrational to accept valuable goals that are 
both impossible to attain and to approach (a rather uncommon kind of goal),135 but I 
will argue -contra Laudan- that ideal goals can be adopted rationally.
To call ideal goals irrational is to assert that if it is impossible to fully attain some 
valuable goal, then we should forsake this goal. This would be akin to a tantrum: 
‘either I know I can fully get what I desire, or I don’t care about it.’ On the other 
hand, Laudan’s advice against impossible goals may be cogent in a situation in 
which one has only one possibility: complete failure, without the possibility of partial 
failures, without intermediate options. In such a hypothetical situation, if the valuable 
goal sought is known to be unreachable, and if this goal is also known to be 
unapproachable, it might then be rational to resign ourselves and look for another
134 According to both of Laudan’s characterizations of utopian goals, goals that are attainable 
but extremely difficult to obtain can be rational. It may be, however, problematic in practice 
to distinguish between extremely difficult goals and impossible ones. For example, it would 
have been problematic for Spartacus and his followers to decide on light of the evidence 
available to them whether their aim (say, the abolition of slavery) was an impossible aim or 
just a very difficult goal.
Alternatively, consider the case of Soviet dissidents who struggled for political freedom in 
the 50 ‘s, were these dissidents irrational, as a Soviet psychiatrist would say? According to 
Laudan, whether these dissidents were irrational will depend on whether their goal was an 
impossible aim, or instead merely a very difficult end. It was extremely difficult to rationally 
decide one way or the other in the 50’s, since at the time there was not a single case of a 
‘communist’ country that had turned into a liberal democracy.
135 Even in this case, doubts arise when we recall that Calvinists -as declared in the Synod of 
Dort- aspire after salvation, although salvation might be impossible for some of them both to 
attain it and to promote it. This because they could be one of the unfortunates unknowingly 
predestined for damnation and this regardless of their faith, love of God and moral merit, or 
lack thereof. On the other hand, while Calvinists didn’t have a criterion for election, they 
thought it was reasonable to suppose that most of the elect would be marked by their 
character and behaviour, so Calvinists had a fallible criterion of election.
Calvinists live then in a permanent state of doubt and apprehension just hoping to be one of 
the elect. A similar situation may arise, when one wants to be fully rational about our 
epistemic methods, and therefore one wants to justify induction and deduction (say, without 
vicious circularity, regress or dogmatism.) Such a justification is likely to be unavailable and 
unapproachable, but still one aims at it, although lacking the desired justification, one keeps 
on using induction and deduction, though, without being committed to them. One proceeds 
just hoping for the best, fully aware of one’s precarious epistemic situation.
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goal. In the case of ideal goals, however, we don’t have such a radical situation, 
although ideals are strictly unachievable, they can still be continuously 
approximated, that is, there is an indefinitely long sequence of intermediate states 
between not achieving the utopian goals at all, and the impossible aim of fully 
achieving these goals.
Laudan could object that it would clearly be irrational to aim to construct a perpetual 
motion machine, an impossible goal given our present knowledge of the laws of 
thermodynamics, furthermore a perpetual motion machine is a promotable end, since 
we can approximate to this impossible goal by constructing more efficient machines. 
Laudan then could argue that this example creates a difficulty for the proposal that 
ideal goals can be rational. There is, however, a crucial difference between ideals and 
an impossible goal such as a perpetual motion machine. The difference is that while 
ideals (as far as we know) can be approximated indefinitely by a continuous 
sequence of small steps, in the case of the perpetual motion machine there are 
theoretical limits to how much the impossible goal can be approximated. In other 
words, in the case of the impossible machine the sequence of approximating steps 
has to end, in principle, long before the impossible goal is attained. Therefore, a 
perpetual motion machine is an impossible goal that after some stage is 
unapproximable and that is why it is irrational to aim to construct such a machine, 
though it is not irrational to aim to construct the theoretically most efficient machine 
possible. This last goal and ideals share the property of being approximable by an 
indefinitely long sequence of steps.
Ideals can be rational objectives if we understand means/ends rationality as the 
attitude of someone that searches for the warranted optimum means -amongst those 
available- for the attainment of, or for the continuous approximation, to his valued 
aims. Means/ends rationality then only requires that our means be at least conducive 
to our aims, it does not require that the rational means actually deliver the aims. 
Means/ends rationality excludes impossible, but continuously advance-able aims as 
rational only if it is understood narrowly, as Laudan sometimes seems to do. This 
exclusion happens only if means/ends rationality is understood as requiring that if 
rational we should look for strategies that take us to our goals.
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Laudan’s lack of discrimination between the previous two types of demonstrably 
utopian goals turns his injunction against demonstrably utopian aims into an 
‘imprecise’ and ‘vague’ recommendation. Laudan’s injunction against demonstrably 
utopian goals is then itself ‘semantically utopian’, and Laudan’s theory of scientific 
aims is self-referentially inconsistent.
II. 3 Idealists aiming for valuable and strictly impossible goals (though continuously 
promotable ones) have been praised by legions, and these idealists have been 
admired precisely because o f their idealism. Laudan’s disqualification o f  ideal aims 
is counter-intuitive, since it contradicts these widespread historical value intuitions. 
Laudan says,
We customarily regard as bizarre, if  not pathological, those who earnestly 
set out to do what we have very strong reasons for believing to be 
impossible.
(Laudan, 1984, p. 51)(Emphasis added.)
Perhaps we customarily judge thus, when considering common goals, but one is not 
governed by customary judgements, when assessing extraordinary cases. Thus, 
the epithets of bizarre, pathological, or unreasonable, are frequently withheld if the 
impossible but promotable aim sought is considered to be extremely valuable. In 
such a case the subject, (or generations of subjects) who struggles, or who is thought 
to struggle, after ideal aims will not be called mad or bizarre. He (they) will instead 
be considered an idealist, a hero, a martyr, a courageous man, or a saint.
The revered individual has often been the tragic idealist who aims at impossible, but 
continuously or indefinitely promotable goals, even if this idealist has to take arms 
against a sea of troubles, and even if during his lifetime he cannot prevail. The 
standard reading of Socrates’ conduct after his trial provides a well-known example 
of idealist conduct. Socrates chose to stay in Athens even after the death penalty had 
been pronounced against him, Socrates didn’t flee (which he could have done) 
because he allegedly thought that the correct thing to do, was to be self-coherent, to
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be true to himself, to be true to his sense of justice, and to obey his city’s laws136. 
Now, full personal and intellectual integrity is an impossible aim because of human 
frailty, and because its full attainment would require of full self-knowledge, it would 
require of no self-deception, of no inner hypocrisy. Still Socrates had it as an aim, 
and he was ready to sacrifice his life for this aim, would we call Socrates irrational 
by aiming at this end? 137
Laudan may likewise say that all those Christians that have aspired to be like Christ, 
and have aimed at a perfect Christian life are irrational, qua religious persona. An 
example of such a Christian would be St. Francis; Laudan may disqualify Francis as 
irrational138 because to strive towards perfection is irrational. It is irrational because 
we cannot expect human perfection, still Jesus asks his followers to seek perfection,
Therefore you shall be perfect, just as your Father in heaven is perfect.
(Mathew 5: 48.)
The various Christian Churches, for example, advice their faithful to struggle for the 
ideal of Christian marriage and also these Churches recommend the paradoxical 
looking norm: ‘love thy enemies’, even though these Churches must be fully aware 
that perfection is humanly impossible to attain.
Laudan could retort, that while he excludes impossible goals as rational, he is not 
excluding as rational some achievable goal close to, or similar, to the unattainable 
one. He may argue that many admired idealists supposedly striving after an 
impossible aim were really striving for less ambitious achievable goals.
136Cf., Plato’s ‘Crito’.
137 Oscar Wilde, at the Cadogan Hotel in 1895, after his failed action against Lord 
Queensberry, rejected -as Socrates had done before- the achievable option of flight to await 
instead inevitable arrest. Wilde may appear in this act, to be self-destructive and irrational, 
however, in another reading of this event, Wilde’s act shows him to have been determined 
not to yield to the pressures of a hypocritical society. Wilde stayed in England, and did 
forced labour, because at the Cadogan Hotel, Wilde decided to search an ideal, the ideal of 
self and social consistency, the ideal of self and social authenticity. Wilde stayed because he 
wanted to fight hypocrisy, and he was ready to suffer forced labour for the sake of this goal. 
A goal -that given what we know of human nature- is an impossible goal, and it is a goal that 
can only be approached.
138 Francis’ goal may also be irrational for Laudan, because it is possibly also both 
semantically vague, and epistemically utopian.
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However, this let out doesn’t work, we try to reach ideals, because any specifiable 
attainable aim would be palpably deficient as a substitute of the ideal goal. For 
instance, if we substitute the ideal of a perfect Christian life for an attainable goal 
such as a less than perfect Christian life, the substitute goal loses much of its appeal 
or value. Thus, we aim at the ideal even if  we know we are condemned -as Sisyphus- 
to always fall short of the ideal aim.
Besides, how much personal integrity, or virtue, or justice, or truth, or Christian 
perfection, would be rationally sufficient or appropriate? Since there is no cogent 
way of specifying in advance how close, or how far from, or how similar to, the ideal 
is good enough, we aim for the ideal itself.
A Laudanite might still argue that all the previous examples of ‘idealists’ are wrong, 
because all the individuals mentioned were not genuine idealists. He could argue that 
all of these individuals were not really striving after demonstrably utopian aims, but 
were rather trying to satisfy their vanity, or were looking for power, or for some 
other non-utopian goal. Even if  this were the case, these individuals have been 
admired, because they have been believed to be genuine idealists; in other words, the 
argument here only needs to assume that idealist behaviour has been widely held to 
be admirable139. This common esteem for idealist behaviour appears to contradict 
Laudan’s epithet of “irrational” or “pathological” for idealist conduct, and this even, 
if we were to grant that idealist conduct has never been genuinely exemplified by 
anyone.
Laudan’s proscription of ideals as irrational contradicts what we know about 
common human valuations and behaviour. It contradicts what we know about the 
behaviour of admired idealists, as well as what we know about the behaviour of the 
admirers of idealists. Laudan’s advice contradicts our understanding of persistent 
regularities, in this case, those regularities relating to the behaviour and valuations of 
at least a significant portion of humanity: idealists and all those that admire idealism.
139 It could still be argued that the numerous people that have admired idealist conduct have 
been the victims of self-deception, that they have really admired something else, but what 
could this something else be? Besides, the hypothesis of self-deception would require of a 
colossal amount of self-deception, or false consciousness, which appears as an implausible 
thesis.
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These transcultural psychological regularities could well be the result of one or more 
subjacent human psychological dispositional properties, or psychological laws of 
nature. If so, Laudan’s recommendation against demonstrably utopian aims is itself 
under suspicion of being ‘demonstrably’ utopian. Laudan’s recommendation is 
suspect of being precisely what it condemns, and then Laudan’s anti-utopianism is 
suspect of being self referentially contradictory. If so, Laudan’s meta-methodology 
has too exacting standards. If not, consider the following set of three theses:
i. With Laudan, sustain that idealist behaviour is irrational.
ii. Notice that in our culture ‘irrational’ is a term with derogatory implications of 
foolishness or madness. And
iii. Consider the empirical fact that through history there have been idealists140 
aiming at valuable ideals, and consider the empirical fact that many of these 
idealists have been widely admiredqua idealists.
This set appears to be incoherent, since from (i) and (ii) one concludes that idealists 
are foolish, or crazy, and this conclusion clearly clashes with (iii). One could try to 
escape this incoherence through one of the following options:
a. Conclude that the term ‘irrational’ whatever our de facto social use 
says is not a term of disapproval or abuse. However, to conclude this 
one would have to ignore an empirical fact.
b. Assert that idealists aiming for valuable ideals -whatever their 
numerous admirers have said- are not admirable qua idealists, and are 
even despicable. It is counterintuitive, however, to say, for example, 
that Socrates search for intellectual and personal integrity was 
“bizarre” or “pathological” (cf., Laudan’s quote in this section.)
c. Conclude that the search for very valuable, strictly unattainable, but 
promotable goals is rational, because a world without such utopian 
goals would be for many an impoverished world, and if ideals were 
irrational, then full rationality wouldn’t be desirable for these many.
140 Or at least, there have been people widely believed to have been idealists.
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Still this argument is somewhat weak, we only know that the set of theses (i)-(iii) is 
incoherent, but logic does not tell us which of these theses to give up, and which to 
adopt. I explore below, some further arguments for adopting option (c), none of these 
arguments taken in isolation will be conclusive, but their sum may carry considerable 
weight.
II. 3.1 Laudan’s recommendation against ideal aims is in fact a prescription for  
intellectual and moral complacency, for mediocrity or opportunism.
Laudan’s recommendation against ideal aims discourages us from aspiring after 
excellence, cognitive or otherwise. Laudan’s recommendation is contrary to a 
traditional virtue: courage, a virtue necessary to lead a good life, Laudan’s advice 
substitutes courage with conformism and stoic resignation. For Laudan a conformist 
or resigned slave would be rational, but a frustrated idealist -such as Spartacus- who 
would not conform, say, because of his aspiration after an impossible, but 
promotable, aim such as perfect social justice would not be rational.
Laudan seems to have confused success, expediency, with the struggle to do the right 
or correct thing, for Laudan, success understood as the attainment of attainable goals 
is the ultimate goal, success is Laudan’s idol, and then Laudan is prescribing 
opportunism.
Success, however, cannot be the ultimate standard, it cannot be the ultimate value, 
because we can always ask: is the success sought (i.e., the attainment of the 
attainable goal) right? Is the success sought just? Is the success sought desirable or 
valuable? For example, if the cognitive aim sought is reliable predictions or control 
of nature, we often think of it as undesirable, if  to achieve it, human or animal 
suffering is required. This is shown by the restrictions on human medical 
experimentation and by the ongoing debate on animal experimentation.
In addition, pyrrhic victories, and unjust victories (in the case of these last, as shown 
by the ongoing debate on just war) are often thought undesirable. And we may even 
value a defeat, an example is provided by the battle of Kosovo that Serbs -and their 
Hungarian and Albanian allies- lost in 1389. And yet this defeat has been hallowed
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by Serbs for centuries “in several great heroic ballads”141 possibly because it is 
believed that in that lost battle some ideal value was sought or defended (say, liberty, 
or honour.) Analogously we sometimes also value failed past theories (failures as 
judged by Laudan’s pragmatic canons of scientific success) because these theories 
suggested new perspectives or problems, possible examples of such theories are 
those of Aristarchus and of ancient Atomism.
II. 3.2 The fact that ideals are humanly impossible to attain, and that one can only 
approach ideals, provides paradoxically a powerful psychological reason for  
striving after valuable ideals, because striving after valuable ideals can create an 
enduring emotion o f self-respect.
Open-ended valuable goals can be more fulfilling because they permit us to move 
forward, because the journey is often more rewarding than reaching the destination. 
The idealist aims for ideals because he wants to keep on improving his 
accomplishments, because he believes in the perfectibility of life on earth, ideals help 
him in avoiding self-complacency. Ideals provide aspirational goals, regulative 
principles, which guide the idealist’s imagination, which guide his hopes and 
energies, even if the idealist cannot ever fully expect to achieve his ideals. Thus,
human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals also,... [ideals which] have 
practical power (as regulative principles), and form the basis of the possible 
perfection of certain actions... The wise man (of the Stoics) is... an ideal, 
that is, a man existing in thought only, but in complete conformity with the 
idea of wisdom.
(Kant, A569, B597.)
141 “Serbs and their allies suffered a defeat that has become hallowed in several great heroic 
ballads. (...) They have become lenses through which subsequent creators of national 
mythology have come to see their past, endow it with deep metaphysical import, and 
imagine the attributes of the nation in essentially spiritual terms. Kosovo was turned 
(especially during the 19th century) into the Jerusalem of the Serbs.” History of Serbia, 
Encyclopaedia Britannica CD 99 Multimedia.
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Contrariwise, in the case of non-utopian goals, one often suffers a letdown, after the 
transitory pleasure one experiences, once these goals are reached; then one wonders: 
what else is there? 142 It is continued hoping and continued striving that propels a 
person through life, this psychological fact, supplies one reason for aiming at ideals. 
Thus,
It is better to travel hopefully than to arrive.
(Old English saying.)
Furthermore, a life’s struggle after ideals can cause -at least in certain temperaments- 
lasting emotions of self-respect or self-esteem and these emotions are necessary for a 
good life143. Therefore, it may be rational -at least for some temperaments- to strive 
for ideals and their concurrent emotions of self-esteem.
Consider, for instance, the case of an idealist such as Sir Thomas More who 
sacrificed the Chancellorship and his life to be true to himself44. Thus, before being 
executed, he said to the onlookers that he was dying,
... the king's good servant and God's first.
(Emphasis added.)
Sir Thomas’ aim unfortunately clashed with the Royal absolutism then in vogue, but 
St. Thomas prioritised personal integrity whatever the cost. Now, if one takes into 
account More’s situation (i.e., the background beliefs and valuations of St. Thomas 
and those of an important sector of his European contemporaries) one then discovers 
that he and many of his contemporaries considered his conduct as praiseworthy.145
142 This psychological fact may be exemplified by a phenomenon such as that of the idealised 
and valued Medieval ‘courtly love’. This love was a longing that lasted as long as it was not 
physically satisfied, and therefore the lovers avoided physically consummating their love, 
this was a love, which on the other hand, could not be consummated without violating the 
partners’ previous marriage or fealty vows.
143 For Rawls (cf., section 67) self-respect is one of the primary goods, that is, one of the 
goods necessary for the framing and successful execution of a rational plan of life.
144 This is a strictly impossible aim, as I argued when discussing the case of Socrates, 
therefore, from Laudan’s perspective More’s goal is an irrational aim.
145 Thus,
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Hence, More’s conduct very likely provided him with self, and social esteem; in 
other words, there is a link between the search for ideals and positive emotions, such 
as self-esteem. These positive emotions could arise only if both Saint Thomas and 
his contemporaries (or at least, those that Sir Thomas esteemed) believed that More 
was really aiming at some valuable ideals, and not just, for example, at fame or 
prestige. What his contemporaries probably admired in Sir Thomas was his heroic 
effort to be true to his own values and principles, that is, they probably admired his 
enkrateia.
The search of valuable ideals can likewise provide whole communities with 
generalised emotions of self-respect146. This fact has been known and exploited, for 
example, by army leaders. These leaders take care to motivate future combatants by 
convincing them that the war they are to engage in is a just war, a war that aims at 
ideals, such as democracy, justice, freedom, honour, glory, etc. An army that 
believes that it is fighting for valuable ideals is a motivated army, and such a 
collective belief increases the likelihood of this army’s heroic behaviour. In the case 
of scientific communities, one may speculate that those scientific communities that 
aim (or believe to aim) at utopian goals such as truth gain in self-respect, and 
therefore such communities also gain in motivation.
In Laudan’s tripartite reticulated model of substantial theories, methodological rules 
and goals, emotions have been left out, possibly because we ignore so much about 
the nature of emotions and about their possible rationality. But as the previous 
example suggests, a complete theory of rational human action, in particular a 
complete theory of rational scientific action, may need to consider emotions.
The news of More's death shocked Europe. Erasmus mourned the man he had so 
often praised, "whose soul was more pure than any snow, whose genius was such 
that England never had and never again will have its like."
The official image of More as a traitor did not gain credence even in Protestant 
lands.
(‘Sir Thomas More’ in Encyclopaedia Britannica, CD 99.)
146 The ideals of one community clearly don’t have to be the ideals of any other community, 
hence, one could imagine a community of psychopaths or Nazis -who having a coherent
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RELATIVISTIC IMPLICATIONS OF LAUDAN’S THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC 
GOALS
II.4 Laudan does not justify as valuable his pragmatic canons o f  scientific success, 
and therefore relativism as characterised by Laudan threatens
Laudan told us that scientific aims ought to be consistent with his pre-philosophical 
pragmatic canons of scientific success (such as, empirical prediction, and control, cf., 
this chapter’s section 1.3 above.) These pragmatic canons allegedly distinguish the 
success of science -the scientific Tradition147- from the success of other disciplines, 
also with a tradition, such as for example philosophy or theology.
Laudan’s pragmatic canons provide then a de facto demarcation criterion between 
successful science and other cognitive endeavours, and this demarcation criterion has 
the character of an intuition, since Laudan told us that his pragmatic canons are “pre- 
philosophical” notions. This notwithstanding Laudan’s rejection of intuitionism,
... we will have no need for our ‘pre-analytic Intuitions’ about concrete 
cases, or for value profiles of the ‘scientific elite’, or for any other form of 
intuitionism about concrete cases. (...) The naturalist metamethodologist, as 
I have described him, needs... no prior assumptions about which 
disciplines are ‘scientific’ and which are not.
(Laudan, 1996, pp. 137-8.)(Emphasis added.)
Laudan seems to be saying (again, cf., this chapter’s section 1.3, above),
I f  you are to be rational, and i f  you want to do successful science, then you should 
not ignore my pre-theoretical pragmatic canons o f empirical success.
The question now arises of how to justify this conditional norm,148 if  one rejects, as 
Laudan has done, justification in terms of intuition, convention or stipulation149, then
alternative morality to ours- would get emotions of self -respect by aiming at what we would 
consider criminal goals.
147 Cf., Laudan, 1996, p. 146.
148 There is in this conditional an implicit categorical prescription in favour of the pragmatic 
canons, since Laudan would not call someone who would ignore his pragmatic canons, while 
wanting to do successful science, fully rational, moreover, ‘rational’ is for Laudan a term of 
praise (cf., footnote # 104.)
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we may look for an empirical justification of the conditional. Laudan believes that as 
a matter of historical description the successful sciences have satisfied his pragmatic 
canons, and that therefore the conditional in question follows from the historical 
evidence. Nevertheless, why aren’t the canons of other activities prescribed to 
whoever wants to do successful science? For example, why aren’t theology, 
philosophy, scientology, creation science, or even demonology, taken as examples of 
bona fide  scientific disciplines, as examples of successful sciences?
Laudan has selected some disciplines as examples of successful science, because 
they fulfil his preconceptions or intuitions (intuitions which are also ours, but not 
those o f ‘creation scientists’) of successful science, and of course, the disciplines so 
chosen then exemplify his pre-philosophical canons of successful science. It couldn’t 
be otherwise. We are then left with pre-analytic canons, which are merely declared as 
idiosyncratic of successful science. We are then left with some intuitive canons that 
are dogmatically asserted as those of scientific success,150 this claim then has an a 
priori character, an a prioriness which contradicts Laudan’s intended naturalism.
The situation is analogous to that of someone who would say: i f  you want to be just, 
do as St Francis! If we ask why do as St Francis? Then we would be answered, 
because the just, in fact, behave as St Francis. Since the just, however, don’t select 
themselves, the following questions now arise: which standards were used to select 
the just? And why weren’t Henry VIII, Richard II, or Francisco Pizarro selected as 
archetypes of the just?
The answer may be that some individuals were selected as just, because their conduct 
is consistent with widely held “pre-philosophical” preconceptions or intuitions of 
justice (these ‘pre-philosophical’ preconceptions of justice are not shared by all, for 
example, not by Hitler.) Then, of course, the individuals so selected, in fact 
exemplify our pre-philosophical canons of justice. The problem is now to justify as 
correct the preconceptions or intuitions that helped to select the allegedly just
149 Laudan has criticized Popper for his conventionalism about scientific aims and methods, 
and he has criticized Lakatos for his intuitionism. Cf., Laudan (1996), pp. 15-16.
150 Otherwise, to study the sciences we must have some pre-theoretical notion of what 
science is, in order to recognise and select the sciences, and with this pre-theoretical
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individuals. If this petition of justification is not satisfied, then we could rightly 
conclude that it has merely been dogmatically asserted that St Francis conduct was 
just151.
Then relativism threatens because if Laudan’s pragmatic standards have to be taken 
for granted, if  they have the logical character of dogma, then the logical possibility 
arises of a Babel of different dogmatic canons. The creation scientist, for example, 
could reject Laudan’s canons and invoke other standards; standards, which the 
creationist could rightly argue, are as dogmatic, as irrational, as Laudan’s.
Laudan may argue that to ask for justification all the way down to the ‘bedrock’ is 
unreasonable, that it is unreasonable because bedrock justifications cannot be 
provided.
Laudan may argue that to aim at such ultimate justification is a ‘demonstrably 
utopian’ cognitive aim,152 and that therefore it is an irrational aim. Still, Laudan 
himself has told us that what gives comfort to relativism is the lack of justification of 
methodological rules or standards (cf., footnote # 86 in Chapter IV, above.) 
Furthermore, Laudan’s pragmatic canons are de facto scientific aims or standards, 
though of a very general character, since they apply to all scientific disciplines. For 
example, to abide by the canon that we should prefer theories that make successful 
predictions is the same as to set prediction as a goal that must be fulfilled by all 
scientific theories. This becomes especially clear when one notices that these canons 
“serve as certifier or de-certifier for new proposals about the aims o f  science”153, so 
these canons are the supreme scientific aims, the aims that judge any other scientific 
aims. And if we are to accept Laudan’s directive on how to beat relativism, we must 
then try to justify these canons, moreover, since a non viciously circular justification 
is, and apparently it will be always unavailable, then one must conclude that
presupposition as a background then we can go on to demand that any philosophy or 
methodology of science be compatible with it.
151 This argument is inspired in a similar argument of J. Worrall, cf., Worrall, 1999, p. 348.
152 It is a ‘demonstrably utopian’ aim, because if we understand proper justification (as 
Laudan does) as an argument in favour of a statement, method, or goal, then logic tells us 
that since every argument has premisses, the search of justification must lead to an infinite 
regress, circularity or dogmatism.
153 Laudan, 1990b, p. 53.
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relativism -as characterised by Laudan- is likely to be unbeatable154. To beat this 
relativist threat Laudan would require a criterion of rationality by which to judge his 
pre-philosophical canons, and Laudan should then proceed to justify -  or if  not, at 
least try to explicate- this prior criterion of rationality. But both justification and 
explication are missing. In sum, Laudan advises against demonstrably utopian aims, 
but at the same time he appears to have an impossible or demonstrably utopian aim: 
the goal of avoiding the relativism that results from a lack of justification.
Notice also, that Laudan’s pragmatic canons are de facto ahistorical and universal 
basic scientific aims, this because these canons judge the success of any past or 
present mature scientific discipline.155 Thus, these canons judge the success of 
disciplines as dissimilar as medicine, optics and astronomy (cf., second quote in this 
chapter’s section 1.3, above) The fixed and universal character of these canons 
contradicts, however, Laudan’s thesis that the aims of science can change.
The view of science now emerging in some quarters (including my own) is
Heraclitean through and through, insisting that science -diachronically
viewed- changes its content, its methods, and its aims from time to time.
(Laudan, 1996, p. 143)(Emphasis added.)
II. 5 Even i f  we grant to Laudan -without justification- that his pragmatic canons o f  
scientific success are valuable scientific aims, he also needs to assume -again 
without justification- that his canons are dominant amongst valuable scientific goals
Laudan requires that scientific goals -amongst these one would expect to find his 
pragmatic canons of scientific success- should be jointly consistent. Mutual goal 
consistency, however, is not a trivial matter, because our aims are not always 
completely independent, hence, acting to fulfil some aims may make it difficult or 
impossible to achieve others. This difficulty arises because a rational life does not 
consist of a series of successive actions, each one directed at satisfying one or
154 Or as John Worrall has argued: “relativism as Laudan defines it, is inevitable.” (cf., 
Worrall, 1989, p. 381.)
155 In the case of physics, say, from Newton onwards.
178
another of our goals. Our different valuable aims then have to be somehow 
negotiated or sacrificed to be made complementary, to be accommodated into a 
coherent whole. Hence, goal debates often merely have to do with diverse ways of 
weighting ends or values, and not with the selection of the set of valuable aims itself.
For example, a British Labourite allegedly gives more weight to social justice than a 
Tory does, though both might share the same list of liberal values. As another 
example, assume that two XVIth century astronomers share the same cognitive 
values, and assume that both astronomers share the same value ranking, except that 
the first astronomer gives more weight to conceptual simplicity, while the second one 
gives a higher rank to inter-theoretical coherence. If so, our first astronomer may end 
preferring the Copemican system, because of its higher conceptual simplicity, while 
the second scientist may side with the geocentric system, because of its higher 
coherence with Aristotelian physics and cosmology.156
Another tension between cognitive aims157 is exemplified by the incompatibility 
between clarity, precision and brevity (cf., this chapter’s section II. 1.1, above), there 
are, moreover, incompatibilities between many cognitive aims with other type of 
goals, such as social usefulness, psychological well being, and moral ends. This last 
case has been exploited by fiction writers with the character of the 'mad scientist' or 
technologist such as Dr. Frankenstein. Examples of every day life contradictory 
aims, or of aims that are at least partially incompatible, are:
• The tensions between social egalitarism and individual freedom.158
• The incompatibilities between preservation of life and quality of life, as 
illustrated by the axiological debates around abortion and euthanasia.
• The inconsistencies between economic growth, standard of life, and a healthy 
ecosystem.
• The inconsistencies between full employment and no-inflation in a market 
economy.
156 Cf., chap. XIII of Kuhn’s The Essential Tension.
157 Cf., chap. XIII of Kuhn’s The Essential Tension, where Kuhn discusses some other 
examples of incompatibilities between cognitive aims.
158 This example of incompatible aims was argued at length by I. Berlin, cf., p. 12.
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• The tensions between individual freedoms and community values, for 
example, the case of individual private property vs. communal property.
• The tensions between freedom of speech, the preservation of life, and 
physical and moral integrity, as exemplified by the axiological debates about 
child and sado-masochistic pornography.
Incompatibilities between goals can lead, when unsolved, to a Buridan's ass's 
situation, hence, it is necessary to know how to prioritise weight or reinterpret aims 
to combine them in a new consistent synthesis159. However, there are many possible 
value hierarchies allowed by reason, and this situation holds even after full 
deliberation of these value hierarchies’ foreseeable consequences. This because to 
evaluate the consequences of hierarchies, to arrive at judgements in pro or in con, 
requires in turn of some other values, or meta-values.
Thus, one could arrive at the rational evaluation of some value ranking by 
considering whether this ranking’s foreseeable consequences are conducive to the 
attainment of some ulterior goal(s), or rather meta-values. But if one tries to go on to 
justify as valuable some of these meta-values, while excluding -as Laudan would like 
to do-justification by convention or intuition, then one will end once more with 
Sextus trilemma. In addition, if the regress and viciously circular justifications are to 
be avoided, then we are left only with dogmatism.
Therefore, axiological inconsistencies in the end will have to be dealt with by 
ranking values by appealing to dogmatic prejudices about what is important or 
relevant. The harmonisation of aims is then a question decided by biographical or 
historical accident, not by reason, in other words, which value ranking you end 
preferring is a matter of conviction, not logic. This means that even if different 
rational communities were to share the same values, they still could have different
159 The weighing of ends is also needed to fine-tune the means chosen to approach or attain 
some aims, since the means are often underdetermined by the desired end states. If the only 
aim of a community were, for example, egalitarianism the way it was approached (say, 
through revolutionary terror, or through gradualist reform) would be irrelevant. Hence, to 
help narrow the under determination of chosen means, other weighted aims are needed, aims 
such as human rights and democratic values. If not, one could end with results as dissimilar 
as Maoist China and the Japan of the 60’s, two very different societies that were allegedly 
quite egalitarian.
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value rankings, moreover, none of these various value hierarchies could be shown to 
be rationally better than any other, except, from their own meta-perspective.160
If a pluralism of value hierarchies is to be innocuous, if it is not going to become an 
anarchic relativism where anything goes, then it must give priority to some aims, to 
confine the universe of value hierarchies to those acceptable. For example, in the 
case of contemporary liberal democracies, the pluralism of life styles allowed by 
these societies is far from being full relativism; contemporary democratic liberalism 
is restricted by the priority given to values such as human rights, and tolerance. 
Similarly, if a pluralism of scientific value hierarchies were to be innocuous, it would 
have to be restricted by postulating that some scientific goals should have priority in 
all acceptable scientific value rankings.
For Laudan the dominant goals are likely to be his pragmatic canons, Laudan needs 
scientists qua scientists to value his canons, but Laudan also needs scientists to give 
his canons priority over other cognitive desiderata. Consequently, if these canons 
were to be valued but given a low weight, if one were to emphasise in their instead, 
say, audacious speculation plus theoretical beauty, then one may end doing 
something closer to contemporary French philosophy than to empirical science.
Laudan has not justified his prioritisation of his canons, therefore Laudan’s 
prioritisation of his canons has to be taken for granted and it has a dogmatic 
character, a dogmatic character that leads into relativism as understood by Laudan.
He says,
... when values are shared but not weighted equally, and when values are not 
fully shared, we seem to be confronted by an irresolvable disagreement - 
irresolvable, that is, if we stick to the limited resources of the classical 
hierarchical model.
(Laudan, 1984, p. 41.)
160 The resulting pluralism of value hierarchies implies that there are many possible rational 
plans of life, or many possible rational scientific conducts. The awareness of this axiological 
fact may be an antidote against the danger of fanaticism, a danger to which the search for 
ideals can lead. The fanatic is the narrow-minded idealist who considers his ideals -and his 
high ranking of his ideals- as the only legitimate ones. The fanatic does not recognise -  or 
even if he does, he chooses to ignore it - that reason permits many alternative ideals and 
value hierarchies.
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But from what we have seen, these goal disagreements are irresolvable even with the 
resources of Laudan’s reticulated model, in conclusion,
Without restrictions on appropriate aims for science, Laudan’s account 
surrenders proper normative force; by acknowledging such restrictions it 
surrenders naturalism.
(Worrall, 1999, p. 354.)
Laudan’s account surrenders a full bloodied naturalism because Laudan’s pragmatic 
canons have an a priori character, and because Laudan is taking a non-descriptivist 
position when requiring his canons, thus for Laudan someone not following his 
canons would not, as a matter of evaluation, be acting in an authentic scientific way.
CONCLUSION
The counter-examples to Laudan’s theory of scientific aims discussed in this 
chapter tried to show that Laudan’s theory is incoherent -i.e., jointly incompatible- 
with value beliefs or goals that are intuitively right, and which form part of our 
background knowledge. Now, if it were asked that why should we take seriously 
these intuitive value beliefs, the answer would be that these intuitive beliefs are 
manifest to reason and that reason, like sight, is an intrinsic, fallible, but in general 
reliable -  at least when dealing with our strongest shared intuitions - human faculty. 
Now, if the sceptic were to press and ask for a justification for the belief in the 
reliability of reason, we will end justifying this last belief by using directly or 
indirectly the same faculty in question, and the argument would be viciously circular. 
Alternatively, belief in the overall reliability of reason has, in the end, a dogmatic 
character.
On the other hand, Laudan’s injunctions against ‘semantic’ and ‘epistemic utopian’ 
scientific aims would be unobjectionable if these injunctions were taken as weak 
desiderata, but not as strict requirements for rational scientific ends. On the other 
hand, Laudan’s recommendation against ‘demonstrably utopian’ aims is just wrong,
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because means-ends rationality at most proscribes impossible and not asymptotically 
approximable goals, that is, it does not proscribe as rational ideal goals.
In addition, Laudan could avoid relativism by either re-defining what to understand 
by relativism, or by openly welcoming some viciously circular justifications. 
Alternatively, he could just resign himself and accept that his meta-methodology 
cannot avoid relativism, as he understands relativism.
Furthermore, Laudan needs a theory of scientific aims because he considers 
methodological rules as conditionals, with scientific aims as the antecedents of these 
conditionals. But if Laudan were to have another model of scientific methodological 
rules, then the need for a theory of scientific aims could be obviated; this would be 
welcomed given the complexity and difficulty of adjudicating scientific aims.
There is a further reason to abandon the conception of methodological rules as 
hypothetical imperatives, it is that at least some scientific methodological rules, such 
as ‘avoid ad hoc hypothesis,’ cannot be properly construed as empirical elliptical 
conditionals, thus,
[Laudan] suggests that this rule is really a conditional: ‘if you want to have 
risky theories, then avoid ad hoc hypothesis’. But the connection between 
the antecedent and consequent of this conditional is not of course empirical 
(or even partly empirical) it is purely conceptual -  nothing in the way the 
world is could make an ad hoc theory risky, ‘ad hoc’ means tailored to 
already known evidence (and if the evidence is already known and the 
theory tailored to it, it follows of course that the theory is at no risk from 
that evidence).
Other plausible ‘cognitive virtues’ that spring to mind are empirical 
adequacy, simplicity and truth (though Laudan would dismiss the latter two 
as reasonable aims on the grounds that they are utopian). But what values of 
the variable X in ‘if you want a theory that is simple/true/empirically 
adequate prefer theories with X’ might make such a conditional plausible 
and at the same time dependent for its acceptability on which theories we 
accept about some substantive feature of the world?
(Worrall, 1999, p. 354.)
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